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11 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1976–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. O'Briengreen2 sentences1994The O’Brien test states that governmental regulations on conduct with expressive elements are sufficiently justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government to enact the law; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest (United States v O’Brien, supra, 391 US, at 377 ). 1994The O’Brien test states that governmental regulations on conduct with expressive elements are sufficiently justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government to enact the law; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest (United States v O’Brien, supra, 391 US, at 377 ). | 1 | 3 |
McSparron v. McSparrongreen2 sentences2006In my view, the determination of the court, much more so than the decision of the majority, accomplishes the “core purpose of the O’Brien rule: to assure the nontitled spouse an equitable share of the license to which that spouse’s efforts contributed” (McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 282 [1995], rearg dismissed 88 NY2d 916 [1996]). 2006In my view, the determination of the court, much more so than the decision of the majority, accomplishes the “core purpose of the O’Brien rule: to assure the nontitled spouse an equitable share of the license to which that spouse’s efforts contributed” (McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 282 [1995], rearg dismissed 88 NY2d 916 [1996]). | 1 | 2 |
DiCaprio v. DiCapriogreen2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2 |
Holterman v. Holtermangreen2 sentences2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). 2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). | 1 | 1 |
Reczek v. Reczekgreen2 sentences2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). 2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). | 1 | 1 |
Vainchenker v. Vainchenkergreen2 sentences2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). 2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). | 1 | 1 |
McNally v. McNallygreen2 sentences2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). 2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). | 1 | 1 |
Krigsman v. Krigsmangreen2 sentences2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). 2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). | 1 | 1 |
Marcus v. Marcusgreen2 sentences1995Finally and most fundamentally, the merger doctrine is flawed because its practical effect is to limit the O’Brien rule’s application to recently acquired licenses (see, DiCaprio v DiCaprio, supra, at 946-948 [Lawton, J., dissenting]; Marcus v Marcus, supra, at 139). 1995Finally and most fundamentally, the merger doctrine is flawed because its practical effect is to limit the O’Brien rule’s application to recently acquired licenses (see, DiCaprio v DiCaprio, supra, at 946-948 [Lawton, J., dissenting]; Marcus v Marcus, supra, at 139). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McSparron v. McSparron
green
2 sentences2006In my view, the determination of the court, much more so than the decision of the majority, accomplishes the “core purpose of the O’Brien rule: to assure the nontitled spouse an equitable share of the license to which that spouse’s efforts contributed” (McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 282 [1995], rearg dismissed 88 NY2d 916 [1996]). 2006In my view, the determination of the court, much more so than the decision of the majority, accomplishes the “core purpose of the O’Brien rule: to assure the nontitled spouse an equitable share of the license to which that spouse’s efforts contributed” (McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 282 [1995], rearg dismissed 88 NY2d 916 [1996]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lipsky v. Lipsky
green
2 sentences2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). 2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Corasanti v. Corasanti
green
2 sentences2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). 2006I therefore conclude that the court properly awarded defendant 40% of the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage (see Holterman, 3 NY3d at 7-9 [awarding nontitled spouse 35% of other spouse’s enhanced earning capacity]; Lipsky v Lipsky, 276 AD2d 753 [2000] [50%]; Reczek v Reczek, 239 AD2d 867, 868 [1997] [35%], abrogated on other grounds by Corasanti v Corasanti, 296 AD2d 831 [2002]; see also Krigsman v Krigsman, 288 AD2d 189, 191 [2001] [50%]; McNally v McNally, 251 AD2d 302, 303 [1998] [50%]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997] [50%]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Isaiah O. v. Andrea P.
green
1 sentence2005Although plaintiffs’ notice of appeal is from Supreme Court’s March 3, 2004 decision rather than the subsequent order and judgment dated March 31, 2004 and entered April 6, 2004, this Court may, in the interest of justice, treat the notice of appeal as premature and reach the merits (see Matter of Isaiah O. v Andrea P., 287 AD2d 816 , 817 n [2001]; see also CPLR 5520 [c]). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Grunfeld v. Grunfeld
green
2 sentences2004The Goodman court relied on our decisions in McSparron v McSparron ( 87 NY2d 275 [1995]) and Grunfeld v Grunfeld ( 94 NY2d 696 [2000]), cases discussing the relationship between equitable distributions under the O’Brien rule and maintenance awards. 2004The Goodman court relied on our decisions in McSparron v McSparron ( 87 NY2d 275 [1995]) and Grunfeld v Grunfeld ( 94 NY2d 696 [2000]), cases discussing the relationship between equitable distributions under the O’Brien rule and maintenance awards. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
In Re the Marriage of Francis
green
2 sentences2004In 19 years, not one other state has adopted the O’Brien rule, 3 and Iowa seems to have backed away (In re Marriage of Francis, 442 NW2d 59 [Iowa 1989]). 2004In 19 years, not one other state has adopted the O’Brien rule, 3 and Iowa seems to have backed away (In re Marriage of Francis, 442 NW2d 59 [Iowa 1989]). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cronin v. Cronin
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Vanasco v. Vanasco
neutral
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Golub v. Golub
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Morton v. Morton
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
McGowan v. McGowan
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Morimando v. Morimando
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Elkus v. Elkus
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Martin v. Martin
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hougie v. Hougie
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor 2001The Court of Appeals found it to be “a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder.” (Id., at 586.) The O’Brien analysis is not limited to professional licenses and has been used to find a medical board certification (Savasta v Savasta, 146 Misv 2d 101 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a law degree (Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), an accounting degree (Vanasco v Vanasco, 132 Misc 2d 227 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]), a podiatry practice (Mor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
O'Brien v. O'Brien
green
2 sentences2001All of these decisions, like O’ Brien (supra), base their finding of marital property on the “enhanced earning capacity” which the “thing of value” provided to its holder. 2001All of these decisions, like O’ Brien (supra), base their finding of marital property on the “enhanced earning capacity” which the “thing of value” provided to its holder. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding that the regulation on prostitution was not a content-based regulation on speech nor was it a regulation on conduct with an expressive element ( 478 US 697 ). 1994The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding that the regulation on prostitution was not a content-based regulation on speech nor was it a regulation on conduct with an expressive element ( 478 US 697 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Onofre
green
1 sentence1986Defendants also seek to justify dismissal under the constitutional right of privacy citing People v Onofre ( 51 NY2d 476 ). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Lawton v. Steele green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Lawton v. . Steele green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim
green
2 sentences1985In O’Brien , the Court held that where “speech” and “non-speech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a law aimed at the “nonspeech” elements, but having an “incidental” effect on the protected expression, is justified “if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”. ( 391 US, at p 3 1985In O’Brien , the Court held that where “speech” and “non-speech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a law aimed at the “nonspeech” elements, but having an “incidental” effect on the protected expression, is justified “if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”. ( 391 US, at p 3 | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Croatan Books, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985Van De Kamp v American Art Enters., 75 Cal App 3d, at p 531,142 Cal Rptr, at p 342, supra; Commonwealth v Croatan Books, 228 Va, at p_, 323 SE2d, at p 88 , supra). 9 We agree with these decisions, and thus turn to an application of the four-part O’Brien test. 1985Van De Kamp v American Art Enters., 75 Cal App 3d, at p 531,142 Cal Rptr, at p 342, supra; Commonwealth v Croatan Books, 228 Va, at p_, 323 SE2d, at p 88 , supra). 9 We agree with these decisions, and thus turn to an application of the four-part O’Brien test. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Lane v. City of Mount Vernon green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
green
2 sentences1985In O’Brien , the Court held that where “speech” and “non-speech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a law aimed at the “nonspeech” elements, but having an “incidental” effect on the protected expression, is justified “if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”. ( 391 US, at p 3 1985In O’Brien , the Court held that where “speech” and “non-speech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a law aimed at the “nonspeech” elements, but having an “incidental” effect on the protected expression, is justified “if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”. ( 391 US, at p 3 | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| O'Brien v. Lanpar Company green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Leumi Financial Corp. v. Richter neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Dime Savings Bank v. Carlozzo neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Leumi Financial Corp. v. Richter green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.