simple-and-direct test in Ohio

2024See State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 109 , 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000) (if the state can meet the simple and direct test, it need not meet the stricter other acts test). {¶ 41} Turner’s first assignment of error is overruled.

2024See State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 109 , 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000) (if the state can meet the simple and direct test, it need not meet the stricter other acts test). {¶ 41} Turner’s first assignment of error is overruled.

2026“Furthermore, the simple and direct test ‘focuses on whether the trier of fact is likely to consider “evidence of one [offense] as corroborative of the other . . . ”’” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 77 (1991), quoting Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23, 27 (D.C.Cir. 1953).

2026The simple-and-direct test focuses on “whether the trier of fact is likely to consider ‘evidence of one [offense] as corroborative of the other.’ ” (Bracketed text in original.) State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 77 (1991), quoting Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23, 27 (D.C.Cir. 1953).

2026“Furthermore, the simple and direct test ‘focuses on whether the trier of fact is likely to consider “evidence of one [offense] as corroborative of the other . . . ”’” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 77 (1991), quoting Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23, 27 (D.C.Cir. 1953).

2026The simple-and-direct test focuses on “whether the trier of fact is likely to consider ‘evidence of one [offense] as corroborative of the other.’ ” (Bracketed text in original.) State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 77 (1991), quoting Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23, 27 (D.C.Cir. 1953).

2025Evidence is ‘simple and direct’ if (1) the jury is capable of readily separating the proof required for each offense, (2) the evidence is unlikely to confuse jurors, (3) the evidence is straightforward, and (4) there is little danger that the jury would ‘improperly consider testimony on one offense as corroborative of the other.’ State v. Gideon, 2021-Ohio-1863, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Valentine, 2019-Ohio- 2243, at ¶ 47, quoting State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-8702, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.). {¶13} The simple and direct test is applied “to prevent the finder of fact from confusing the offenses.” State v. Va

2025Evidence is ‘simple and direct’ if (1) the jury is capable of readily separating the proof required for each offense, (2) the evidence is unlikely to confuse jurors, (3) the evidence is straightforward, and (4) there is little danger that the jury would ‘improperly consider testimony on one offense as corroborative of the other.’ Gideon at ¶ 9 , quoting Valentine, 2019-Ohio-2243, at ¶ 47 , quoting State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-8702, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.).

2025“Ohio appellate courts routinely find no prejudicial joinder where the evidence is presented in an orderly fashion as to the separate offenses or victims without significant -5- Case Nos. 5-23-42, 5-23-43 overlap or conflation of proof.” State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Lewis, 2010-Ohio-4202 , ¶ 33 (6th Dist.).

2025State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). {¶27} Under the simple and direct test, a claim of prejudice is negated when the offenses subject to joinder are “simple and direct, so that a jury is capable of -11- Case No. 3-24-03 segregating the proof required for each offense.” State v. Shook, 2014-Ohio-3987, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Fletcher, 2004-Ohio-4517, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.).

2025State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). {¶27} Under the simple and direct test, a claim of prejudice is negated when the offenses subject to joinder are “simple and direct, so that a jury is capable of -11- Case No. 3-24-03 segregating the proof required for each offense.” State v. Shook, 2014-Ohio-3987, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Fletcher, 2004-Ohio-4517, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.).

2021Logan No. 8-14-01, 2014-Ohio-3987, ¶ 28 (concluding that “[t]he result of the trial seems to suggest that the testimony was simple and direct as the jury acquitted Shook on one of the counts”). {¶56} Because it is dispositive, we need address only the trial court’s determination that joinder was appropriate under the simple-and-direct test.

2022Thus, “[i]f the state can meet the joinder test, it -31- Case No. 1-21-53, 1-21-54 and 1-21-55 need not meet the stricter ‘other acts’ test.” State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 109 (2000). {¶53} Generally, “[e]vidence meets the simple-and-direct standard [of the joinder test] if it is straightforward and uncomplicated enough that the jury can segregate the proof required for each offense.” Parham, 2019-Ohio-358, at ¶ 27 , citing State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422 , 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 52 .

2022Thus, “[i]f the state can meet the joinder test, it -31- Case No. 1-21-53, 1-21-54 and 1-21-55 need not meet the stricter ‘other acts’ test.” State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 109 (2000). {¶53} Generally, “[e]vidence meets the simple-and-direct standard [of the joinder test] if it is straightforward and uncomplicated enough that the jury can segregate the proof required for each offense.” Parham, 2019-Ohio-358, at ¶ 27 , citing State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422 , 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 52 .

2026Ultimately, however, because we ground our analysis in the simple-and-direct test, this error is immaterial to our resolution of the case. 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO inadmissible at separate trials under Evid.R. 404(B), severance is not required if the evidence is simple and direct, Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163 . {¶ 31} In applying the simple-and-direct test, the inquiry is on whether the evidence of each offense is separate and direct, whether the evidence is uncomplicated, and whether the jury is likely to be confused.

2025However, we do not need to consider whether the trial court plainly erred, because, as Mitchell admits in his brief, the evidence presented was simple and direct. “‘[W]hen simple and direct evidence exists, an accused is not prejudiced by joinder regardless of the nonadmissibility of evidence of these crimes as “other acts” under Evid.R. 404(B).’” Belle, 2019-Ohio-787 , at ¶ 24 quoting Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163 ; see also State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 , (1991) (“[I]f the State can meet the joinder test [i.e., the simple and direct test], it need not meet the stricter other-acts te

2025Evidence is ‘simple and direct’ if (1) the jury is capable of readily separating the proof required for each offense, (2) the evidence is unlikely to confuse jurors, (3) the evidence is straightforward, and (4) there is little danger that the jury would ‘improperly consider testimony on one offense as corroborative of the other.’ Gideon at ¶ 9 , quoting Valentine, 2019-Ohio-2243, at ¶ 47 , quoting State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-8702, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.).

2021Accord Valentine at ¶ 55 (“While the state argues that the cases could be tried together under either test, there is no reason for us to look to the more stringent “other acts” test because the evidence here was simple and straightforward.”).

2026See State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 75 (1994) (“A jury is presumed to follow the instructions given to it by the trial judge.”); see also Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) (“Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions.”). {¶ 35} In its brief discussion of the simple-and-direct test, the court of appeals stated that the evidence would not be simple and direct because “the offenses against each victim occurred years apart.” 2024-Ohio-43 at ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).

2026See State v. Coley, 2001-Ohio-1340, ¶ 41 ; State v. Brooks, 44 Ohio St.3d 185, 193 (1989).

2026Overall, the evidence is simple and direct when “the jury is believed capable of segregating the proof on each charge.” State v. Roberts, 62 Ohio St.2d 170, 175 (1980). {¶ 46} I agree with the court of appeals that “the danger of a jury improperly considering testimony on one offense as corroborative of another alleged offense is significant,” 2024-Ohio-43 at ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).

2026See State v. Coley, 2001-Ohio-1340, ¶ 41 ; State v. Brooks, 44 Ohio St.3d 185, 193 (1989).

2026See State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 75 (1994) (“A jury is presumed to follow the instructions given to it by the trial judge.”); see also Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) (“Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions.”). {¶ 35} In its brief discussion of the simple-and-direct test, the court of appeals stated that the evidence would not be simple and direct because “the offenses against each victim occurred years apart.” 2024-Ohio-43 at ¶ 26 (5th Dist.).

2025Evidence is ‘simple and direct’ if (1) the jury is capable of readily separating the proof required for each offense, (2) the evidence is unlikely to confuse jurors, (3) the evidence is straightforward, and (4) there is little danger that the jury would ‘improperly consider testimony on one offense as corroborative of the other.’ State v. Gideon, 2021-Ohio-1863, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Valentine, 2019-Ohio- 2243, at ¶ 47, quoting State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-8702, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.). {¶13} The simple and direct test is applied “to prevent the finder of fact from confusing the offenses.” State v. Va

2025Evidence is ‘simple and direct’ if (1) the jury is capable of readily separating the proof required for each offense, (2) the evidence is unlikely to confuse jurors, (3) the evidence is straightforward, and (4) there is little danger that the jury would ‘improperly consider testimony on one offense as corroborative of the other.’ State v. Gideon, 2021-Ohio-1863, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Valentine, 2019-Ohio- 2243, at ¶ 47, quoting State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-8702, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.). {¶13} The simple and direct test is applied “to prevent the finder of fact from confusing the offenses.” State v. Va

2025State v. Bradshaw, 2023-Ohio-1244, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). {¶27} Under the simple and direct test, a claim of prejudice is negated when the offenses subject to joinder are “simple and direct, so that a jury is capable of -11- Case No. 3-24-03 segregating the proof required for each offense.” State v. Shook, 2014-Ohio-3987, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Fletcher, 2004-Ohio-4517, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.).

2025However, we do not need to consider whether the trial court plainly erred, because, as Mitchell admits in his brief, the evidence presented was simple and direct. “‘[W]hen simple and direct evidence exists, an accused is not prejudiced by joinder regardless of the nonadmissibility of evidence of these crimes as “other acts” under Evid.R. 404(B).’” Belle, 2019-Ohio-787 , at ¶ 24 quoting Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163 ; see also State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 , (1991) (“[I]f the State can meet the joinder test [i.e., the simple and direct test], it need not meet the stricter other-acts te

2025Evidence of each crime is simple and direct when it is “so clearly separate and distinct as to prevent the jury from considering evidence of [one crime] as corroborative of the other.” State v. Quinones, 2005-Ohio-6576, ¶ 48 (11th Dist.).

2024No. 04AP-1314, 2006-Ohio-2066, ¶ 31 (noting the evidence “of both the Sunoco and BP robberies was simple and direct, and neither crime was so complex that the jury would have difficulty separating the proof required for each offense”). {¶ 42} The evidence in the present case satisfied the simple-and-direct standard.