unliquidated claim in Oklahoma

1964In Allison v. Allen, Okl., 326 P.2d 1059 , we considered Title 23 O.S.1961 § 6, and we held: “Interest cannot be recovered upon an unliquidated claim where a trial is necessary in order to ascertain the amount due.” In Lumbermen’s Supply Co. v. Neal, 189 Okl. 544 , 119 P.2d 1017 , we held: “Interest on an unliquidated claim, uncertain both as to existence and amount until established by an accounting, should be allowed only from the date of judgment.” See also Dick v. Essary, 201 Okl. 196 , 203 P.2d 715 .

1964In Allison v. Allen, Okl., 326 P.2d 1059 , we considered Title 23 O.S.1961 § 6, and we held: “Interest cannot be recovered upon an unliquidated claim where a trial is necessary in order to ascertain the amount due.” In Lumbermen’s Supply Co. v. Neal, 189 Okl. 544 , 119 P.2d 1017 , we held: “Interest on an unliquidated claim, uncertain both as to existence and amount until established by an accounting, should be allowed only from the date of judgment.” See also Dick v. Essary, 201 Okl. 196 , 203 P.2d 715 .

2023This Court correctly stated: In a tort action founded on an unliquidated claim for damages, a defaulting party is deemed to have admitted only plaintiff's right to recover, so that the court is "without authority or power to enter a judgment fixing the amount of recovery in the absence of the introduction of evidence," and if it attempts to do so such judgment "is void and not merely erroneous or voidable." Graves v. Walters , 1975 OK CIV APP 20 , ¶ 2, 534 P.2d 702 ( Tippens v. Turben , 1933 OK 154, ¶ 0 , 19 P.2d 605 (syl. nos. 1 & 2 by the Court)(overruled in part on other grounds, American B

2023This Court correctly stated: In a tort action founded on an unliquidated claim for damages, a defaulting party is deemed to have admitted only plaintiff's right to recover, so that the court is "without authority or power to enter a judgment fixing the amount of recovery in the absence of the introduction of evidence," and if it attempts to do so such judgment "is void and not merely erroneous or voidable." Graves v. Walters , 1975 OK CIV APP 20 , ¶ 2, 534 P.2d 702 ( Tippens v. Turben , 1933 OK 154, ¶ 0 , 19 P.2d 605 (syl. nos. 1 & 2 by the Court)(overruled in part on other grounds, American B

2017The necessary exercise of the trial court's discretion on remand removes this case "from the modification situation," Fisher , 798 P.2d at 805 , and essentially rendered the fee award, up until the date of the recent Order, an unliquidated claim requiring the trial court to reexamine all the facts and circumstances to determine an appropriate amount due. ¶31 We conclude the trial court erred in awarding postjudgment interest from the date of the initial fee order.

2017More precisely, and contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the trial court did more than perform, a simple mathematical computation because the trial court was also required to reexamine- the facts and circumstances in light of the applicable factors.-As the Majority stated in Hess, “attorney fees must be recalculated on remand.” 2014 OK 111 , ¶ 1 n.1, 341 P.3d 662 , The necessary exercise of the trial court’s discretion on remand removes this ease “from the modification situation,” Fisher, 798 P.2d at 805 , and essentially rendered the fee award, up until the date of the recent Order, an unliqui

1991Smith v. Owens, 397 P.2d 673 (Okla.1965).

1978Smith v. Owens, Okl., 397 P.2d 673 (1965); Allison v. Allen, Okl., 326 P.2d 1059 (1958). *395 In the present case, before the court could decide the fair value of the stock pursuant to 18 O.S.1971 § 1.160 c, disputed evidence relating to different methods of valuation via expert testimony had to be weighed, and appraisal testimony assessed.

1978Smith v. Owens, Okl., 397 P.2d 673 (1965); Allison v. Allen, Okl., 326 P.2d 1059 (1958). *395 In the present case, before the court could decide the fair value of the stock pursuant to 18 O.S.1971 § 1.160 c, disputed evidence relating to different methods of valuation via expert testimony had to be weighed, and appraisal testimony assessed.

1964In Allison v. Allen, Okl., 326 P.2d 1059 , we considered Title 23 O.S.1961 § 6, and we held: “Interest cannot be recovered upon an unliquidated claim where a trial is necessary in order to ascertain the amount due.” In Lumbermen’s Supply Co. v. Neal, 189 Okl. 544 , 119 P.2d 1017 , we held: “Interest on an unliquidated claim, uncertain both as to existence and amount until established by an accounting, should be allowed only from the date of judgment.” See also Dick v. Essary, 201 Okl. 196 , 203 P.2d 715 .

2023This Court correctly stated: In a tort action founded on an unliquidated claim for damages, a defaulting party is deemed to have admitted only plaintiff's right to recover, so that the court is "without authority or power to enter a judgment fixing the amount of recovery in the absence of the introduction of evidence," and if it attempts to do so such judgment "is void and not merely erroneous or voidable." Graves v. Walters , 1975 OK CIV APP 20 , ¶ 2, 534 P.2d 702 ( Tippens v. Turben , 1933 OK 154, ¶ 0 , 19 P.2d 605 (syl. nos. 1 & 2 by the Court)(overruled in part on other grounds, American B

2023This Court correctly stated: In a tort action founded on an unliquidated claim for damages, a defaulting party is deemed to have admitted only plaintiff's right to recover, so that the court is "without authority or power to enter a judgment fixing the amount of recovery in the absence of the introduction of evidence," and if it attempts to do so such judgment "is void and not merely erroneous or voidable." Graves v. Walters , 1975 OK CIV APP 20 , ¶ 2, 534 P.2d 702 ( Tippens v. Turben , 1933 OK 154, ¶ 0 , 19 P.2d 605 (syl. nos. 1 & 2 by the Court)(overruled in part on other grounds, American B

2017More precisely, and contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the trial court did more than perform, a simple mathematical computation because the trial court was also required to reexamine- the facts and circumstances in light of the applicable factors.-As the Majority stated in Hess, “attorney fees must be recalculated on remand.” 2014 OK 111 , ¶ 1 n.1, 341 P.3d 662 , The necessary exercise of the trial court’s discretion on remand removes this ease “from the modification situation,” Fisher, 798 P.2d at 805 , and essentially rendered the fee award, up until the date of the recent Order, an unliqui

2017More precisely, and contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the trial court did more than perform, a simple mathematical computation because the trial court was also required to reexamine- the facts and circumstances in light of the applicable factors.-As the Majority stated in Hess, “attorney fees must be recalculated on remand.” 2014 OK 111 , ¶ 1 n.1, 341 P.3d 662 , The necessary exercise of the trial court’s discretion on remand removes this ease “from the modification situation,” Fisher, 798 P.2d at 805 , and essentially rendered the fee award, up until the date of the recent Order, an unliqui

1964In Allison v. Allen, Okl., 326 P.2d 1059 , we considered Title 23 O.S.1961 § 6, and we held: “Interest cannot be recovered upon an unliquidated claim where a trial is necessary in order to ascertain the amount due.” In Lumbermen’s Supply Co. v. Neal, 189 Okl. 544 , 119 P.2d 1017 , we held: “Interest on an unliquidated claim, uncertain both as to existence and amount until established by an accounting, should be allowed only from the date of judgment.” See also Dick v. Essary, 201 Okl. 196 , 203 P.2d 715 .

1964In Allison v. Allen, Okl., 326 P.2d 1059 , we considered Title 23 O.S.1961 § 6, and we held: “Interest cannot be recovered upon an unliquidated claim where a trial is necessary in order to ascertain the amount due.” In Lumbermen’s Supply Co. v. Neal, 189 Okl. 544 , 119 P.2d 1017 , we held: “Interest on an unliquidated claim, uncertain both as to existence and amount until established by an accounting, should be allowed only from the date of judgment.” See also Dick v. Essary, 201 Okl. 196 , 203 P.2d 715 .

1964The Wilcox v. Westerheide case, supra, was followed and cited as authority in Cherry v. Chambers, 205 Okl. 71 , 235 P.2d 674 .

1964The Wilcox v. Westerheide case, supra, was followed and cited as authority in Cherry v. Chambers, 205 Okl. 71 , 235 P.2d 674 .

1958In support of this contention the Unit cites and relies upon Essley v. Mershon, Okl., 262 P.2d 417 , and cases of similar import.

1957Watts v. Elmore, 198 Okl. 141 , 176 P.2d 220 .

1957Watts v. Elmore, 198 Okl. 141 , 176 P.2d 220 .

1951Webb v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 194 Okla. 30 , 147 P. 2d 169 .

1951Webb v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 194 Okla. 30 , 147 P. 2d 169 .

1950Notes taken by mutual insurance company from its members, which are payable only in case payment is necessary to meet losses, are not taxable.” See Kentucky & Louisville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 153 Ky. 824 , 156 S. W. 897 , 45 L.R.A.

1950Notes taken by mutual insurance company from its members, which are payable only in case payment is necessary to meet losses, are not taxable.” See Kentucky & Louisville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 153 Ky. 824 , 156 S. W. 897 , 45 L.R.A.

1947Under these circumstances we are of the opinion this matter falls within the rule announced in Lumbermen’s Supply Co. v. Neal, 189 Okla. 544 , 119 P. 2d 1017 , and in Dunlap v. Spencer, 191 Okla. 557 , 131 P. 2d 994 , that where there has been a system of reciprocal dealings carried on between parties to a business arrangement, an unliquidated claim for money or credit arising therefrom is not an “account receivable” as is required to be rendered for taxation under the intangible personal property tax law.

1947Under these circumstances we are of the opinion this matter falls within the rule announced in Lumbermen’s Supply Co. v. Neal, 189 Okla. 544 , 119 P. 2d 1017 , and in Dunlap v. Spencer, 191 Okla. 557 , 131 P. 2d 994 , that where there has been a system of reciprocal dealings carried on between parties to a business arrangement, an unliquidated claim for money or credit arising therefrom is not an “account receivable” as is required to be rendered for taxation under the intangible personal property tax law.

1926While an unliquidated claim is indefinite in amount, while the amount cannot be made certain by one party alone or by mere calculation, while “the damages in such cases are an uncertain quantity, depending upon no fixed standard” (Cox v. McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60 ), and while the determination is therefore left to judgment by adjustment or litigation, yet the representative is entitled to be informed so he may decide whether or not to undertake to settle without suit, and the statute contemplates that such information as a basis for investigation and action should be given him in the first instan

1922We have held in the case of Bates v. Reitz, 157 Ky. 514 , and other cases, that unliquidated damages may be pleaded as a set-off by the defendant in an action against him by a nonresident plaintiff where the defendant has no other adequate remedy, but if the defendant may have an independent common law action against the plaintiff for such unliquidated damages he cannot plead'it as a set-off or counterclaim.

1912Harvey Lumber Co., 5 Okla. 774 , 50 Pac. 84 .) *162 The general rule is stated in 23 Cyc. 753, as follows: “If the action is in tort, or upon an unliquidated claim or demand, a default admits plaintiff’s right to recover, but not the amount to which he is entitled; and therefore further proceedings will be necessary to determine the amount of the judgment.

1912Harvey Lumber Co., 5 Okla. 774 , 50 Pac. 84 .) *162 The general rule is stated in 23 Cyc. 753, as follows: “If the action is in tort, or upon an unliquidated claim or demand, a default admits plaintiff’s right to recover, but not the amount to which he is entitled; and therefore further proceedings will be necessary to determine the amount of the judgment.