unliquidated claim in California

2016(See Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 [“for the principle of accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claim, there must be a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties”]; In re Marriage of Sabine M. and Toshio M., at p. 1215 [no bona fide dispute where the debtor did not dispute amount or validity of debt]; Kelly v. David D.

2011(Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 [ 234 P.2d 16 ].) “ ‘[I]t matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent.’ ” (Ibid.; see Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 518 ].) This, in context, also amounts to an objective standard as the word “honest” when juxtaposed with the word “fraudulent” conveys the meaning that the dispute must be actual, real or “bona fide.” d.

1976(McNutt v. City of Los Angeles (1921) 187 Cal. 245, 259 [ 201 P. 592 ]; Perkins v. Blauth (1912) 163 Cal. 782, 793 [ 127 P. 50 ]; Estate of Piercy (1914) 168 Cal. 755, 758 [ 145 P. 91 ] [dictum]; Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 [ 18 P. 100 ].) The court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against Welton Beckett. *535 Nicholson-Brown argues that, even if prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim is not awardable under section 3288, Welton Beckett’s conduct constituted malice so that the jury could have awarded prejudgment interest under the provision

1976(McNutt v. City of Los Angeles (1921) 187 Cal. 245, 259 [ 201 P. 592 ]; Perkins v. Blauth (1912) 163 Cal. 782, 793 [ 127 P. 50 ]; Estate of Piercy (1914) 168 Cal. 755, 758 [ 145 P. 91 ] [dictum]; Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 [ 18 P. 100 ].) The court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against Welton Beckett. *535 Nicholson-Brown argues that, even if prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim is not awardable under section 3288, Welton Beckett’s conduct constituted malice so that the jury could have awarded prejudgment interest under the provision

2015(See Hansen v. Covell (1933) 218 Cal. 622, 629 [“debtor may not defeat the creditor’s right to interest on a liquidated sum by setting up an unliquidated claim as an offset”]; Great Western Drywall, Inc. v. Roel Constr.

2015(See Hansen v. Covell (1933) 218 Cal. 622, 629 [“debtor may not defeat the creditor’s right to interest on a liquidated sum by setting up an unliquidated claim as an offset”]; Great Western Drywall, Inc. v. Roel Constr.

2015Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“The ‘“mere pleading of unliquidated counterclaims does not render unliquidated an otherwise certain or 17 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2015Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“The ‘“mere pleading of unliquidated counterclaims does not render unliquidated an otherwise certain or 19 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

1967Bein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal. App.2d 670, 686 [ 321 P.2d 753 ], the applicable principle is stated as follows: “As a general rule interest in the form of damages is not allowed prior to rendition of judgment on an unliquidated claim or on the amount of a demand which cannot be ascertained either from the face of the contract or by reference to a well-established market value.” (See also Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 462, 476 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 310]; see also Axell v. Axell, supra, 256 ; Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [ 195 P.2d 408 , 4 A.L.R.2d 1380 ].) Thes

1967Bein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal. App.2d 670, 686 [ 321 P.2d 753 ], the applicable principle is stated as follows: “As a general rule interest in the form of damages is not allowed prior to rendition of judgment on an unliquidated claim or on the amount of a demand which cannot be ascertained either from the face of the contract or by reference to a well-established market value.” (See also Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 462, 476 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 310]; see also Axell v. Axell, supra, 256 ; Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [ 195 P.2d 408 , 4 A.L.R.2d 1380 ].) Thes

1967Bein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal. App.2d 670, 686 [ 321 P.2d 753 ], the applicable principle is stated as follows: “As a general rule interest in the form of damages is not allowed prior to rendition of judgment on an unliquidated claim or on the amount of a demand which cannot be ascertained either from the face of the contract or by reference to a well-established market value.” (See also Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 462, 476 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 310]; see also Axell v. Axell, supra, 256 ; Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [ 195 P.2d 408 , 4 A.L.R.2d 1380 ].) Thes

1967Bein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal. App.2d 670, 686 [ 321 P.2d 753 ], the applicable principle is stated as follows: “As a general rule interest in the form of damages is not allowed prior to rendition of judgment on an unliquidated claim or on the amount of a demand which cannot be ascertained either from the face of the contract or by reference to a well-established market value.” (See also Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 462, 476 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 310]; see also Axell v. Axell, supra, 256 ; Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [ 195 P.2d 408 , 4 A.L.R.2d 1380 ].) Thes

1952Of course, for the principle of accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claim, there must be a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties (Stub v. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 218 [ 124 P.2d 826 ]), but ‘it matters not that there was no solid foun *754 dation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent’ (B. & W.

1952Of course, for the principle of accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claim, there must be a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties (Stub v. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 218 [ 124 P.2d 826 ]), but ‘it matters not that there was no solid foun *754 dation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent’ (B. & W.

1952Engineering Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal.App. 164,171 [ 137 P. 624 ] Also, the debtor must make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders is subject to the condition that it shall be in full satisfaction.

1952Engineering Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal.App. 164,171 [ 137 P. 624 ] Also, the debtor must make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders is subject to the condition that it shall be in full satisfaction.

2024Bohannon Organization (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 787, 792 .) “[A]n agreement of accord and satisfaction presupposes a prior controversy concerning the relative rights of the parties under the pre- existing agreement . . . .” (Everhardy v. Union Finance Co. (1931) 115 Cal.App. 460, 464 .) “‘Performance of a legal duty to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration . . . .’” (In re Marriage of Sabine and Toshio M., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215 .) According to plaintiff, he sufficiently alleged the existence of a bona fide dispute.

2016Bohannon Organization (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 787, 792 [accord and satisfaction cannot be based on “a mere 6 An unliquidated claim is a claim where the amount owed has not been determined.

2024Bohannon Organization (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 787, 792 .) “[A]n agreement of accord and satisfaction presupposes a prior controversy concerning the relative rights of the parties under the pre- existing agreement . . . .” (Everhardy v. Union Finance Co. (1931) 115 Cal.App. 460, 464 .) “‘Performance of a legal duty to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration . . . .’” (In re Marriage of Sabine and Toshio M., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215 .) According to plaintiff, he sufficiently alleged the existence of a bona fide dispute.

1951Engineering Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal.App. 164, 171 [ 137 P. 624 ]; see 1 C.J.S. 32(b), pp. 515-517; 1 Cal.Jur. 7, p. 131; Berger v. Lane, supra, 190 Cal. 443, 450-451 ; Shortell v. Evans- Ferguson Corp., 98 Cal.App. 650, 663 [ 277 P. 519 ]; Everhardy v. Union Finance Co., 115 Cal.App. 460, 465 [ 1 P.2d 1024 ]). [3] Also, the debtor must make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders is subject to the condition that it shall be in full satisfaction. (1 Am.Jur. 22, p. 223; Ann.Cas. 1915A, 954; Lapp-Gifford Co. v. Muscoy Water Co., supra, 166 Cal. 25, 27-28 ; Biaggi v. Sawyer, 75 Cal.App.2d 105, 113

2011(Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 [ 234 P.2d 16 ].) “ ‘[I]t matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent.’ ” (Ibid.; see Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 518 ].) This, in context, also amounts to an objective standard as the word “honest” when juxtaposed with the word “fraudulent” conveys the meaning that the dispute must be actual, real or “bona fide.” d.

2002(Rabinowitz v. Kandel (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 961, 965 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 897 ].) A defendant asserting the defense of accord and satisfaction must establish “(1) that there was a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties, (2) that the debtor made it clear that acceptance of what he tendered was subject to the condition that it was to be in full satisfaction of the creditor’s unliquidated claim, and (3) that the creditor clearly understood when accepting what was tendered that the debtor intended such remittance to constitute payment in full of the particular claim in issue.” (Thompson v. Williams (1989

2016(See Schwartz v. Cal. Claim Service (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 47, 54 [a liquidated claim “represents a legal duty to pay a definite sum in satisfaction of an obligation”].) 8 refusal to pay an undisputed claim”]; Teledyne Mid-America Corp. v. HOH Corp. (9th Cir. 1973) 486 F.2d 987, 992 [in order for there to be an accord and satisfaction, “there must first be a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties regarding the amount owed”].) The bona fide dispute must relate to the parties’ rights or obligations under the pre- existing agreement.

2016(See Schwartz v. Cal. Claim Service (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 47, 54 [a liquidated claim “represents a legal duty to pay a definite sum in satisfaction of an obligation”].) 8 refusal to pay an undisputed claim”]; Teledyne Mid-America Corp. v. HOH Corp. (9th Cir. 1973) 486 F.2d 987, 992 [in order for there to be an accord and satisfaction, “there must first be a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties regarding the amount owed”].) The bona fide dispute must relate to the parties’ rights or obligations under the pre- existing agreement.

2002(Rabinowitz v. Kandel (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 961, 965 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 897 ].) A defendant asserting the defense of accord and satisfaction must establish “(1) that there was a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties, (2) that the debtor made it clear that acceptance of what he tendered was subject to the condition that it was to be in full satisfaction of the creditor’s unliquidated claim, and (3) that the creditor clearly understood when accepting what was tendered that the debtor intended such remittance to constitute payment in full of the particular claim in issue.” (Thompson v. Williams (1989

2002(Rabinowitz v. Kandel (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 961, 965 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 897 ].) A defendant asserting the defense of accord and satisfaction must establish “(1) that there was a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties, (2) that the debtor made it clear that acceptance of what he tendered was subject to the condition that it was to be in full satisfaction of the creditor’s unliquidated claim, and (3) that the creditor clearly understood when accepting what was tendered that the debtor intended such remittance to constitute payment in full of the particular claim in issue.” (Thompson v. Williams (1989

2001However, the court did not analyze the subsection or the statute, and the issue of whether subdivision (b) applied to the County as a public entity was never raised. ( Bloodgood, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 47 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 807 ; see Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 284 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 241 , 902 P.2d 259 [cases do not support propositions never considered or decided].) Therefore, although Bloodgood is no doubt an opinion in which subdivision (b) was relied upon to support an award of interest against a public entity on an unliquidated debt, the decision provides no reasoned guidance on

2001However, the court did not analyze the subsection or the statute, and the issue of whether subdivision (b) applied to the County as a public entity was never raised. ( Bloodgood, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 47 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 807 ; see Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 284 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 241 , 902 P.2d 259 [cases do not support propositions never considered or decided].) Therefore, although Bloodgood is no doubt an opinion in which subdivision (b) was relied upon to support an award of interest against a public entity on an unliquidated debt, the decision provides no reasoned guidance on

1989(Ramos v. City of Santa Clara (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 93, 96 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 485 ].) For the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claim, the defendant must establish: (1) that there was a “bona fide dispute” between the parties, (2) that the debtor made it clear that acceptance of what he tendered was subject to the condition that it was to be in full satisfaction of the creditor’s unliquidated claim, and (3) that the creditor clearly understood when accepting what was tendered that the debtor intended such remittance to constitute payment in f

1989(Ramos v. City of Santa Clara (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 93, 96 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 485 ].) For the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claim, the defendant must establish: (1) that there was a “bona fide dispute” between the parties, (2) that the debtor made it clear that acceptance of what he tendered was subject to the condition that it was to be in full satisfaction of the creditor’s unliquidated claim, and (3) that the creditor clearly understood when accepting what was tendered that the debtor intended such remittance to constitute payment in f

1984PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES Prior to the amendment of Civil Code section 3287 in 1967, to add subdivision (b) (Stats. 1967, ch. 1230, § 1), it was the general rule that prejudgment interest was not to be awarded on unliquidated claims; i.e., “where damages can be ascertained only by a judicial determination upon conflicting evidence as to the amount due, ...” (Nicholson-Brown, Inc. v. City of San Jose (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 159 ]; see also Civil Code, § 3287, subd. (a).) As a rule, the amount of damages in an action on quantum meruit is held to be an unl

1984PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES Prior to the amendment of Civil Code section 3287 in 1967, to add subdivision (b) (Stats. 1967, ch. 1230, § 1), it was the general rule that prejudgment interest was not to be awarded on unliquidated claims; i.e., “where damages can be ascertained only by a judicial determination upon conflicting evidence as to the amount due, ...” (Nicholson-Brown, Inc. v. City of San Jose (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 159 ]; see also Civil Code, § 3287, subd. (a).) As a rule, the amount of damages in an action on quantum meruit is held to be an unl

1984(A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 496 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 ]; Esgro Central, Inc. v. General Ins.

1984(A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 496 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 ]; Esgro Central, Inc. v. General Ins.

1984(Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67-68 [ 18 P. 100 ]; Samuels v. Singer (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 545, 549 [ 36 P.2d 1098 ].) Hence, prior to the passage of Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b), an award of prejudgment interest clearly was precluded in a quantum meruit action.

1984(Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67-68 [ 18 P. 100 ]; Samuels v. Singer (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 545, 549 [ 36 P.2d 1098 ].) Hence, prior to the passage of Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b), an award of prejudgment interest clearly was precluded in a quantum meruit action.

1976(McNutt v. City of Los Angeles (1921) 187 Cal. 245, 259 [ 201 P. 592 ]; Perkins v. Blauth (1912) 163 Cal. 782, 793 [ 127 P. 50 ]; Estate of Piercy (1914) 168 Cal. 755, 758 [ 145 P. 91 ] [dictum]; Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 [ 18 P. 100 ].) The court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against Welton Beckett. *535 Nicholson-Brown argues that, even if prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim is not awardable under section 3288, Welton Beckett’s conduct constituted malice so that the jury could have awarded prejudgment interest under the provision

1976(McNutt v. City of Los Angeles (1921) 187 Cal. 245, 259 [ 201 P. 592 ]; Perkins v. Blauth (1912) 163 Cal. 782, 793 [ 127 P. 50 ]; Estate of Piercy (1914) 168 Cal. 755, 758 [ 145 P. 91 ] [dictum]; Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 [ 18 P. 100 ].) The court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against Welton Beckett. *535 Nicholson-Brown argues that, even if prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim is not awardable under section 3288, Welton Beckett’s conduct constituted malice so that the jury could have awarded prejudgment interest under the provision

1976(McNutt v. City of Los Angeles (1921) 187 Cal. 245, 259 [ 201 P. 592 ]; Perkins v. Blauth (1912) 163 Cal. 782, 793 [ 127 P. 50 ]; Estate of Piercy (1914) 168 Cal. 755, 758 [ 145 P. 91 ] [dictum]; Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 [ 18 P. 100 ].) The court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against Welton Beckett. *535 Nicholson-Brown argues that, even if prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim is not awardable under section 3288, Welton Beckett’s conduct constituted malice so that the jury could have awarded prejudgment interest under the provision

1976(McNutt v. City of Los Angeles (1921) 187 Cal. 245, 259 [ 201 P. 592 ]; Perkins v. Blauth (1912) 163 Cal. 782, 793 [ 127 P. 50 ]; Estate of Piercy (1914) 168 Cal. 755, 758 [ 145 P. 91 ] [dictum]; Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 [ 18 P. 100 ].) The court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against Welton Beckett. *535 Nicholson-Brown argues that, even if prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim is not awardable under section 3288, Welton Beckett’s conduct constituted malice so that the jury could have awarded prejudgment interest under the provision

1976(McNutt v. City of Los Angeles (1921) 187 Cal. 245, 259 [ 201 P. 592 ]; Perkins v. Blauth (1912) 163 Cal. 782, 793 [ 127 P. 50 ]; Estate of Piercy (1914) 168 Cal. 755, 758 [ 145 P. 91 ] [dictum]; Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 [ 18 P. 100 ].) The court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against Welton Beckett. *535 Nicholson-Brown argues that, even if prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim is not awardable under section 3288, Welton Beckett’s conduct constituted malice so that the jury could have awarded prejudgment interest under the provision

1976(McNutt v. City of Los Angeles (1921) 187 Cal. 245, 259 [ 201 P. 592 ]; Perkins v. Blauth (1912) 163 Cal. 782, 793 [ 127 P. 50 ]; Estate of Piercy (1914) 168 Cal. 755, 758 [ 145 P. 91 ] [dictum]; Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 [ 18 P. 100 ].) The court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against Welton Beckett. *535 Nicholson-Brown argues that, even if prejudgment interest on an unliquidated claim is not awardable under section 3288, Welton Beckett’s conduct constituted malice so that the jury could have awarded prejudgment interest under the provision

1967Bein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal. App.2d 670, 686 [ 321 P.2d 753 ], the applicable principle is stated as follows: “As a general rule interest in the form of damages is not allowed prior to rendition of judgment on an unliquidated claim or on the amount of a demand which cannot be ascertained either from the face of the contract or by reference to a well-established market value.” (See also Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 462, 476 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 310]; see also Axell v. Axell, supra, 256 ; Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [ 195 P.2d 408 , 4 A.L.R.2d 1380 ].) Thes

1967Bein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal. App.2d 670, 686 [ 321 P.2d 753 ], the applicable principle is stated as follows: “As a general rule interest in the form of damages is not allowed prior to rendition of judgment on an unliquidated claim or on the amount of a demand which cannot be ascertained either from the face of the contract or by reference to a well-established market value.” (See also Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 462, 476 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 310]; see also Axell v. Axell, supra, 256 ; Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [ 195 P.2d 408 , 4 A.L.R.2d 1380 ].) Thes