unliquidated claim in Nebraska

1956Co. v. Evertson, 157 Neb. 540 , 60 N. W. 2d 638 , as follows: “Recovery of interest on an unliquidated claim, the subject of reasonable controversy, and incapable of being fixed by computation, may be had only from the date of the determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount.” The present case is within this rule and interest may be recovered only from the date a judgment is rendered.

1956Co. v. Evertson, 157 Neb. 540 , 60 N. W. 2d 638 , as follows: “Recovery of interest on an unliquidated claim, the subject of reasonable controversy, and incapable of being fixed by computation, may be had only from the date of the determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount.” The present case is within this rule and interest may be recovered only from the date a judgment is rendered.

1972With regard to the plaintiff’s claim for prejudgment interest, the rule is: “Recovery of interest on an unliquidated claim, the subject of reasonable controversy and incapable of being fixed by computation, may be had only from the date of determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount.” Inland Drilling Co. v. Davis Oil Co., 183 Neb. 116 , 158 N. W. 2d 536 .

1972With regard to the plaintiff’s claim for prejudgment interest, the rule is: “Recovery of interest on an unliquidated claim, the subject of reasonable controversy and incapable of being fixed by computation, may be had only from the date of determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount.” Inland Drilling Co. v. Davis Oil Co., 183 Neb. 116 , 158 N. W. 2d 536 .

1967In Muller Enterprises, Inc. v. Gerber, 178 Neb. 463 , 133 N. W. 2d 913 , we held that recovery of interest on an unliquidated claim, the subject of reasonable controversy and incapable of being fixed by computation, may be had only from the date of determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount.

1967In Muller Enterprises, Inc. v. Gerber, 178 Neb. 463 , 133 N. W. 2d 913 , we held that recovery of interest on an unliquidated claim, the subject of reasonable controversy and incapable of being fixed by computation, may be had only from the date of determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount.

1957It follows that, in an action to recover compensation for the taking or damaging of private property for a public use, based upon the constitutional provision, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead or prove that she filed a claim therefor with the defendant city as provided by the charter.” Article I, section 21, of the Constitution of Nebraska, is as follows: “The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.” In Quest v. East Omaha Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 538 , 52 N. W. 2d 417 , this court said: “In an action for damages based up

1957It follows that, in an action to recover compensation for the taking or damaging of private property for a public use, based upon the constitutional provision, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead or prove that she filed a claim therefor with the defendant city as provided by the charter.” Article I, section 21, of the Constitution of Nebraska, is as follows: “The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.” In Quest v. East Omaha Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 538 , 52 N. W. 2d 417 , this court said: “In an action for damages based up

1953Dist., 151 Neb. 49 , 36 N. W. 2d 478 .

1953Dist., 151 Neb. 49 , 36 N. W. 2d 478 .

1953Dist., 151 Neb. 497 , 37 N. W. 2d 923 , it is said: “Recovery of interest on an unliquidated claim, the subject of reasonable controversy, and incapable of being fixed by computation, may be had only from the date of the determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount.” See, also, Smith v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr.

1953Dist., 151 Neb. 497 , 37 N. W. 2d 923 , it is said: “Recovery of interest on an unliquidated claim, the subject of reasonable controversy, and incapable of being fixed by computation, may be had only from the date of the determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount.” See, also, Smith v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr.

1953“A cause of action for personal injuries alleged to have-been proximately caused by negligence of a decedent during his lifetime survives, and when no action was-brought thereon during his lifetime, it must be prosecuted by a claim filed against the estate of decedent in-the county court which has exclusive original jurisdiction-thereof.” Such opinion cites numerous cases sustaining the-aforesaid conclusions, and was cited with approval as: late as Flessner v. Wenquist, ante p. 378, 56 N. W. 2d 294 . *887 Section 25-1267.41, R.

1926This point is fully discussed in Henry v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331 , and it is held that the statute, “requiring the filing of a notice with the city clerk of a municipal corporation within 30 days from the time a right of action for an unliquidated claim accrues, as a condition precedent to an action thereon, applies to claims against such a corporation arising out of the performance of its corporate duties, but has no application to a case arising out of the conduct by it of a purely private business enterprise, voluntarily entered into, which is entirely outside of its ordinary governme

1911See, also, Kelly v. Wiard, 49 Conn. 443 ; Levy v. Steinbach, 43 Md. 212 ; McDonald v. Mackenzie, 24 Or. 573 ; Wood & Houston v. Steele, 65 Ala. 436 .

1911See, also, Kelly v. Wiard, 49 Conn. 443 ; Levy v. Steinbach, 43 Md. 212 ; McDonald v. Mackenzie, 24 Or. 573 ; Wood & Houston v. Steele, 65 Ala. 436 .

1911See, also, Kelly v. Wiard, 49 Conn. 443 ; Levy v. Steinbach, 43 Md. 212 ; McDonald v. Mackenzie, 24 Or. 573 ; Wood & Houston v. Steele, 65 Ala. 436 .

1906In that case, the court quotes 2 Sutherland, Damages (3d ed.), sec. 347, where, after laying down the rule that interest is not allowable on unliquidated claims, the author adds: “The allowance of interest as damages is not dependent on this rigid test.” In Brady v. Wilcoxson, 44 Cal. 239 , the court, although denying the right of interest on an unliquidated claim prior to judgment said: “On such demands, interest, eo nomine, cannot be allowed.” It would seem, then, that the rule in Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, supra, while supported by the single Wisconsin case it cites, is in conflict with both

1906In that case, the court quotes 2 Sutherland, Damages (3d ed.), sec. 347, where, after laying down the rule that interest is not allowable on unliquidated claims, the author adds: “The allowance of interest as damages is not dependent on this rigid test.” In Brady v. Wilcoxson, 44 Cal. 239 , the court, although denying the right of interest on an unliquidated claim prior to judgment said: “On such demands, interest, eo nomine, cannot be allowed.” It would seem, then, that the rule in Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, supra, while supported by the single Wisconsin case it cites, is in conflict with both