17 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2022 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2014Instead, defendant argues, for the first time, that the “near per se” exigency that the Supreme Court identified in State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644, 657 , 227 P3d 729 (2010), does not justify warrantless residential entries. 7 As support for that argument, defendant invokes, inter alia, two of this court’s decisions, State v. Roberts, 75 Or App 292 , 706 P2d 564 (1985), and State v. Kruse, 220 Or App 38 , 184 P3d 1182 (2008), in which we held that, with respect to warrantless residential searches aimed at obtaining evidence of DUII, to support an exigency exception to the general warrant requirem 2014Instead, defendant argues, for the first time, that the “near per se” exigency that the Supreme Court identified in State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644, 657 , 227 P3d 729 (2010), does not justify warrantless residential entries. 7 As support for that argument, defendant invokes, inter alia, two of this court’s decisions, State v. Roberts, 75 Or App 292 , 706 P2d 564 (1985), and State v. Kruse, 220 Or App 38 , 184 P3d 1182 (2008), in which we held that, with respect to warrantless residential searches aimed at obtaining evidence of DUII, to support an exigency exception to the general warrant requirem | 2 | 2 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2021In the case of blood-alcohol analysis, an exigency exception exists “when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant applica- tion.” Id. at ___, 139 S Ct at 2537 . “[T]he natural dissipa- tion of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always con- stitute an emergency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ , 136 S Ct 2160, 2174 , 195 L Ed 2d 560 (2016) (emphasis in orig- inal; citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 US 141, 156 , 133 S Ct 2021In the case of blood-alcohol analysis, an exigency exception exists “when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant applica- tion.” Id. at ___, 139 S Ct at 2537 . “[T]he natural dissipa- tion of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always con- stitute an emergency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ , 136 S Ct 2160, 2174 , 195 L Ed 2d 560 (2016) (emphasis in orig- inal; citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 US 141, 156 , 133 S Ct | 1 | 3 |
State v. Portulanogreen2 sentences2022To put it simply, deciding between pressing public safety needs and pursuing a warrant “is just the kind of scenario for which the exigency rule was born—just the kind of grim dilemma it lives to dissolve.” Id. 2022The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause * * *.” US Const, Amend IV. “[A] warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception,” including “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 569 US at 148-49 (inter- nal qu | 1 | 2 |
State v. McMullengreen2 sentences2015We conclude that, because the trooper in this case had probable cause to believe that a controlled substance other than alcohol would be present in defendant’s urine, and the evidence establishes that at least one controlled substance — cocaine—continues to change in urine, exigency normally exists.” McMullen, 250 Or App at 213-14 (emphases added); 8 cf. State v. Mazzola, 260 Or App 378 , 317 P3d 360 (2013), aff’d, 356 Or 804 , 345 P3d 424 (2015) (holding that warrantless administration of FSTs in nonalcohol controlled substance intoxication context was justified by the exigency exception). 2012As we recently held in State v. McMullen, 250 Or App 208, 213-14 , 279 P3d 367 (2012), if police have probable cause to believe that evidence of a controlled substance will be in a suspect’s urine, the exigency exception justifies a warrantless seizure and search of the suspect’s urine in most cases. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Stevensgreen2 sentences2022“The scope of a warrant excep- tion,” for instance, “is limited by the purposes for that excep- tion.” Id. at 141-42 ; see also State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 130-31 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (a report of missing children justi- fied a brief, targeted investigation of the house where police had probable cause to believe the children were located). 2022“The scope of a warrant excep- tion,” for instance, “is limited by the purposes for that excep- tion.” Id. at 141-42 ; see also State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 130-31 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (a report of missing children justi- fied a brief, targeted investigation of the house where police had probable cause to believe the children were located). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCarthygreen2 sentences2022Exigent circumstances are cir- cumstances where prompt responsive action by police offi- cers is demanded.” McCarthy, 369 Or at 142 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 282 State v. Thompson Exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as the exigency exception, are limited in various ways, including in terms of scope and duration. 2022“The scope of a warrant excep- tion,” for instance, “is limited by the purposes for that excep- tion.” Id. at 141-42 ; see also State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 130-31 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (a report of missing children justi- fied a brief, targeted investigation of the house where police had probable cause to believe the children were located). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quinngreen2 sentences2022See McCarthy, 369 Or at 178 (an exigency may justify initial seizure, but “the seizure itself may elim- inate any exigency that would justify proceeding further without a warrant,” such as, in that case, searching a car); State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 239-40 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (exi- gent circumstance of someone being held inside a room by an armed person did not justify warrantless entry into the room after the person being held walked out the door); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 392 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (a deferred warr 2022State v. Fondren, 285 Or 361, 366-67 , 591 P2d 1374 , cert den, 444 US 834 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986) (exigent circumstances did not exist when offi- cer waited four hours after establishing probable cause to seize a parked automobile because an “officer cannot create exigent circumstances by his own inaction”); Quinn, 290 Or at 392 (a search that was delayed “for the convenience of the police and the owner of the stolen property” was not justified by the exigency exception). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wyattgreen2 sentences2014For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant’s appellate contentions are not preserved for our review. 8 See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343 , 15 P3d 22 (2000) (“[A] party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted.”). 2014For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant’s appellate contentions are not preserved for our review. 8 See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343 , 15 P3d 22 (2000) (“[A] party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Krusegreen2 sentences2014Instead, defendant argues, for the first time, that the “near per se” exigency that the Supreme Court identified in State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644, 657 , 227 P3d 729 (2010), does not justify warrantless residential entries. 7 As support for that argument, defendant invokes, inter alia, two of this court’s decisions, State v. Roberts, 75 Or App 292 , 706 P2d 564 (1985), and State v. Kruse, 220 Or App 38 , 184 P3d 1182 (2008), in which we held that, with respect to warrantless residential searches aimed at obtaining evidence of DUII, to support an exigency exception to the general warrant requirem 2014Instead, defendant argues, for the first time, that the “near per se” exigency that the Supreme Court identified in State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644, 657 , 227 P3d 729 (2010), does not justify warrantless residential entries. 7 As support for that argument, defendant invokes, inter alia, two of this court’s decisions, State v. Roberts, 75 Or App 292 , 706 P2d 564 (1985), and State v. Kruse, 220 Or App 38 , 184 P3d 1182 (2008), in which we held that, with respect to warrantless residential searches aimed at obtaining evidence of DUII, to support an exigency exception to the general warrant requirem | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Davis v. State, 907 NE2d 1043, 1050 (Ind Ct App 2009) (“[C]ircumstances of animal cruelty may create exigent circumstances to permit a warrantless search of the curtilage.”); Morgan v. State, 289 Ga App 209, 212, 656 SE2d 857, 860 (2008) (an exigency exception to the warrant requirement exists “where a police officer reasonably believes that an animal on the property is in need of immediate aid due to injury or mistreatment”); Brinkley v. County of Flagler, 769 So 2d 468, 472 (Fla Dist Ct App 2000) (the apparent distress of a large number of dogs made it reasonable to conclude “that | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2022Turning to the Fourth Amendment, in its briefing, the state acknowledges that that Josephine County’s lack of electronic warrant procedures is “particularly relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis under Missouri v. McNeely.” However, argues the state, 356 State v. Portulano “After the suppression hearing in this case, the Court decided Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 US ___ , 139 S Ct 2525, 2531 , 204 L Ed 2d 1040 (2019), which makes clear that the exigency exception applies in situations such as this where a crash has occurred and the defendant has been trans- ported to the hospital. 2021In the case of blood-alcohol analysis, an exigency exception exists “when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant applica- tion.” Id. at ___, 139 S Ct at 2537 . “[T]he natural dissipa- tion of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always con- stitute an emergency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ , 136 S Ct 2160, 2174 , 195 L Ed 2d 560 (2016) (emphasis in orig- inal; citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 US 141, 156 , 133 S Ct | 2 | 2021–2022 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2022State v. Fondren, 285 Or 361, 366-67 , 591 P2d 1374 , cert den, 444 US 834 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986) (exigent circumstances did not exist when offi- cer waited four hours after establishing probable cause to seize a parked automobile because an “officer cannot create exigent circumstances by his own inaction”); Quinn, 290 Or at 392 (a search that was delayed “for the convenience of the police and the owner of the stolen property” was not justified by the exigency exception). 2022State v. Fondren, 285 Or 361, 366-67 , 591 P2d 1374 , cert den, 444 US 834 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986) (exigent circumstances did not exist when offi- cer waited four hours after establishing probable cause to seize a parked automobile because an “officer cannot create exigent circumstances by his own inaction”); Quinn, 290 Or at 392 (a search that was delayed “for the convenience of the police and the owner of the stolen property” was not justified by the exigency exception). | 2 | 2000–2022 |
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2022Turning to the Fourth Amendment, in its briefing, the state acknowledges that that Josephine County’s lack of electronic warrant procedures is “particularly relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis under Missouri v. McNeely.” However, argues the state, 356 State v. Portulano “After the suppression hearing in this case, the Court decided Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 US ___ , 139 S Ct 2525, 2531 , 204 L Ed 2d 1040 (2019), which makes clear that the exigency exception applies in situations such as this where a crash has occurred and the defendant has been trans- ported to the hospital. 2021In the case of blood-alcohol analysis, an exigency exception exists “when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant applica- tion.” Id. at ___, 139 S Ct at 2537 . “[T]he natural dissipa- tion of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always con- stitute an emergency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ , 136 S Ct 2160, 2174 , 195 L Ed 2d 560 (2016) (emphasis in orig- inal; citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 US 141, 156 , 133 S Ct | 2 | 2021–2022 |
State v. Milligan
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2022See McCarthy, 369 Or at 178 (an exigency may justify initial seizure, but “the seizure itself may elim- inate any exigency that would justify proceeding further without a warrant,” such as, in that case, searching a car); State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 239-40 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (exi- gent circumstance of someone being held inside a room by an armed person did not justify warrantless entry into the room after the person being held walked out the door); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 392 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (a deferred warr 2022See McCarthy, 369 Or at 178 (an exigency may justify initial seizure, but “the seizure itself may elim- inate any exigency that would justify proceeding further without a warrant,” such as, in that case, searching a car); State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 239-40 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (exi- gent circumstance of someone being held inside a room by an armed person did not justify warrantless entry into the room after the person being held walked out the door); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 392 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (a deferred warr | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Quinn
green
1 sentence2022See McCarthy, 369 Or at 178 (an exigency may justify initial seizure, but “the seizure itself may elim- inate any exigency that would justify proceeding further without a warrant,” such as, in that case, searching a car); State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 239-40 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (exi- gent circumstance of someone being held inside a room by an armed person did not justify warrantless entry into the room after the person being held walked out the door); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 392 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (a deferred warr | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Fondren
green
2 sentences2022State v. Fondren, 285 Or 361, 366-67 , 591 P2d 1374 , cert den, 444 US 834 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986) (exigent circumstances did not exist when offi- cer waited four hours after establishing probable cause to seize a parked automobile because an “officer cannot create exigent circumstances by his own inaction”); Quinn, 290 Or at 392 (a search that was delayed “for the convenience of the police and the owner of the stolen property” was not justified by the exigency exception). 2022State v. Fondren, 285 Or 361, 366-67 , 591 P2d 1374 , cert den, 444 US 834 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986) (exigent circumstances did not exist when offi- cer waited four hours after establishing probable cause to seize a parked automobile because an “officer cannot create exigent circumstances by his own inaction”); Quinn, 290 Or at 392 (a search that was delayed “for the convenience of the police and the owner of the stolen property” was not justified by the exigency exception). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Thompson
green
1 sentence2022Cite as 370 Or 273 (2022) 283 In this case, Officer Robertson took defendant’s phone and held it for five days before seeking and obtaining a warrant. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2022See McCarthy, 369 Or at 178 (an exigency may justify initial seizure, but “the seizure itself may elim- inate any exigency that would justify proceeding further without a warrant,” such as, in that case, searching a car); State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 239-40 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (exi- gent circumstance of someone being held inside a room by an armed person did not justify warrantless entry into the room after the person being held walked out the door); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 392 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (a deferred warr 2022See McCarthy, 369 Or at 178 (an exigency may justify initial seizure, but “the seizure itself may elim- inate any exigency that would justify proceeding further without a warrant,” such as, in that case, searching a car); State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 239-40 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (exi- gent circumstance of someone being held inside a room by an armed person did not justify warrantless entry into the room after the person being held walked out the door); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 392 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (a deferred warr | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Renz v. Beeman
green
1 sentence2022State v. Fondren, 285 Or 361, 366-67 , 591 P2d 1374 , cert den, 444 US 834 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986) (exigent circumstances did not exist when offi- cer waited four hours after establishing probable cause to seize a parked automobile because an “officer cannot create exigent circumstances by his own inaction”); Quinn, 290 Or at 392 (a search that was delayed “for the convenience of the police and the owner of the stolen property” was not justified by the exigency exception). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Carroll v. United States
green
1 sentence2021Thus, Carroll recognized a true exigency exception for the seizure of vehicles, that is, an exception that applies only when a seizure would be “impos- sible except without a warrant.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Chambers v. Maroney
green
2 sentences2021In later cases, including Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42, 48-52 , 90 S Ct 1975 , 26 L Ed 2d 419 (1970), the Supreme Court relied on Carroll to create a per se exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 2021In later cases, including Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42, 48-52 , 90 S Ct 1975 , 26 L Ed 2d 419 (1970), the Supreme Court relied on Carroll to create a per se exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2021In the case of blood-alcohol analysis, an exigency exception exists “when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant applica- tion.” Id. at ___, 139 S Ct at 2537 . “[T]he natural dissipa- tion of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always con- stitute an emergency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ , 136 S Ct 2160, 2174 , 195 L Ed 2d 560 (2016) (emphasis in orig- inal; citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 US 141, 156 , 133 S Ct 2021In the case of blood-alcohol analysis, an exigency exception exists “when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant applica- tion.” Id. at ___, 139 S Ct at 2537 . “[T]he natural dissipa- tion of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always con- stitute an emergency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ , 136 S Ct 2160, 2174 , 195 L Ed 2d 560 (2016) (emphasis in orig- inal; citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 US 141, 156 , 133 S Ct | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Fessenden / Dicke
green
2 sentences2021State v. Fessenden, 355 Or 759, 775-76 , 333 P3d 278 (2014). 2021State v. Fessenden, 355 Or 759, 775-76 , 333 P3d 278 (2014). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ehly
green
2 sentences2018In reviewing the denial of the motion to suppress for legal error, State v. Ehly , 317 Or. 66 , 74-75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993), we conclude that because the officer had probable cause to seize the car and the containers inside it, the purse was lawfully seized pursuant to the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. 2018In reviewing the denial of the motion to suppress for legal error, State v. Ehly , 317 Or. 66 , 74-75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993), we conclude that because the officer had probable cause to seize the car and the containers inside it, the purse was lawfully seized pursuant to the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Rivas
green
1 sentence2016Turning to the cases cited by the state, we did conclude in Rivas that, once the police received proper consent from the homeowner to search the property, “anything found was properly seized, regardless of who owned it.” Rivas, 99 Or App at 31 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Fuller
green
2 sentences2015In State v. Fuller, 252 Or App 245, 287 P3d 1147 (2012), we reiterated and amplified McMullen's reasoning. 2015In State v. Fuller, 252 Or App 245, 287 P3d 1147 (2012), we reiterated and amplified McMullen's reasoning. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Mazzola
green
2 sentences2015We conclude that, because the trooper in this case had probable cause to believe that a controlled substance other than alcohol would be present in defendant’s urine, and the evidence establishes that at least one controlled substance — cocaine—continues to change in urine, exigency normally exists.” McMullen, 250 Or App at 213-14 (emphases added); 8 cf. State v. Mazzola, 260 Or App 378 , 317 P3d 360 (2013), aff’d, 356 Or 804 , 345 P3d 424 (2015) (holding that warrantless administration of FSTs in nonalcohol controlled substance intoxication context was justified by the exigency exception). 2015We conclude that, because the trooper in this case had probable cause to believe that a controlled substance other than alcohol would be present in defendant’s urine, and the evidence establishes that at least one controlled substance — cocaine—continues to change in urine, exigency normally exists.” McMullen, 250 Or App at 213-14 (emphases added); 8 cf. State v. Mazzola, 260 Or App 378 , 317 P3d 360 (2013), aff’d, 356 Or 804 , 345 P3d 424 (2015) (holding that warrantless administration of FSTs in nonalcohol controlled substance intoxication context was justified by the exigency exception). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Mazzola
green
2 sentences2015We conclude that, because the trooper in this case had probable cause to believe that a controlled substance other than alcohol would be present in defendant’s urine, and the evidence establishes that at least one controlled substance — cocaine—continues to change in urine, exigency normally exists.” McMullen, 250 Or App at 213-14 (emphases added); 8 cf. State v. Mazzola, 260 Or App 378 , 317 P3d 360 (2013), aff’d, 356 Or 804 , 345 P3d 424 (2015) (holding that warrantless administration of FSTs in nonalcohol controlled substance intoxication context was justified by the exigency exception). 2015We conclude that, because the trooper in this case had probable cause to believe that a controlled substance other than alcohol would be present in defendant’s urine, and the evidence establishes that at least one controlled substance — cocaine—continues to change in urine, exigency normally exists.” McMullen, 250 Or App at 213-14 (emphases added); 8 cf. State v. Mazzola, 260 Or App 378 , 317 P3d 360 (2013), aff’d, 356 Or 804 , 345 P3d 424 (2015) (holding that warrantless administration of FSTs in nonalcohol controlled substance intoxication context was justified by the exigency exception). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. MacHuca
green
2 sentences2014Instead, defendant argues, for the first time, that the “near per se” exigency that the Supreme Court identified in State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644, 657 , 227 P3d 729 (2010), does not justify warrantless residential entries. 7 As support for that argument, defendant invokes, inter alia, two of this court’s decisions, State v. Roberts, 75 Or App 292 , 706 P2d 564 (1985), and State v. Kruse, 220 Or App 38 , 184 P3d 1182 (2008), in which we held that, with respect to warrantless residential searches aimed at obtaining evidence of DUII, to support an exigency exception to the general warrant requirem 2014Instead, defendant argues, for the first time, that the “near per se” exigency that the Supreme Court identified in State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644, 657 , 227 P3d 729 (2010), does not justify warrantless residential entries. 7 As support for that argument, defendant invokes, inter alia, two of this court’s decisions, State v. Roberts, 75 Or App 292 , 706 P2d 564 (1985), and State v. Kruse, 220 Or App 38 , 184 P3d 1182 (2008), in which we held that, with respect to warrantless residential searches aimed at obtaining evidence of DUII, to support an exigency exception to the general warrant requirem | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Mellenberger green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.