8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2022The Court determined that there is a “‘compelling need’ for a blood test of drunk-driving suspects whose condition deprives officials of a reasonable opportunity to conduct a breath test” and that the only question under the exigency doctrine is “whether this compelling need justifies a warrantless search because there is . . .‘no time to secure a warrant.’” Id. at 2537 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013)). 2017See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely , 133 S.Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville , | 3 | 3 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2017See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely , 133 S.Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville , 2017See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely , 133 S.Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville , | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gomezgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶ 13 , 140 N.M. 653 , 146 P.3d 298 (stating that, in deciding the issue of exigent circumstances in knock and announce cases, “there are no bright-line rules,” and the appellate courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 28 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 (disavowing a bright-line test or blanket rule “delineating reasonableness in knock and announce cases involving the exigency exception[,]” and stating that the “appellate court must consider the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Gomez, 1997-NM 2006See State v. Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶ 13 , 140 N.M. 653 , 146 P.3d 298 (stating that, in deciding the issue of exigent circumstances in knock and announce cases, “there are no bright-line rules,” and the appellate courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 28 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 (disavowing a bright-line test or blanket rule “delineating reasonableness in knock and announce cases involving the exigency exception[,]” and stating that the “appellate court must consider the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Gomez, 1997-NM | 2 | 2 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2017See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case- by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville, 459 U.S. at 559 (answering in the 2017See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely , 133 S.Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville , | 1 | 2 |
State v. Christmasgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Christmas, 2002-NMCA-020, ¶ 8 , 131 N.M. 591 , 40 P.3d 1035 . 2025See State v. Christmas, 2002-NMCA-020, ¶ 8 , 131 N.M. 591 , 40 P.3d 1035 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Christmasgreen1 sentence2025See State v. Christmas, 2002-NMCA-020, ¶ 8 , 131 N.M. 591 , 40 P.3d 1035 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶ 13 , 140 N.M. 653 , 146 P.3d 298 (stating that, in deciding the issue of exigent circumstances in knock and announce cases, “there are no bright-line rules,” and the appellate courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 28 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 (disavowing a bright-line test or blanket rule “delineating reasonableness in knock and announce cases involving the exigency exception[,]” and stating that the “appellate court must consider the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Gomez, 1997-NM 2006See State v. Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶ 13 , 140 N.M. 653 , 146 P.3d 298 (stating that, in deciding the issue of exigent circumstances in knock and announce cases, “there are no bright-line rules,” and the appellate courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 28 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 (disavowing a bright-line test or blanket rule “delineating reasonableness in knock and announce cases involving the exigency exception[,]” and stating that the “appellate court must consider the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Gomez, 1997-NM | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2006See State v. Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶ 13 , 140 N.M. 653 , 146 P.3d 298 (stating that, in deciding the issue of exigent circumstances in knock and announce cases, “there are no bright-line rules,” and the appellate courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 28 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 (disavowing a bright-line test or blanket rule “delineating reasonableness in knock and announce cases involving the exigency exception[,]” and stating that the “appellate court must consider the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Gomez, 1997-NM 2006See State v. Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶ 13 , 140 N.M. 653 , 146 P.3d 298 (stating that, in deciding the issue of exigent circumstances in knock and announce cases, “there are no bright-line rules,” and the appellate courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 28 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 (disavowing a bright-line test or blanket rule “delineating reasonableness in knock and announce cases involving the exigency exception[,]” and stating that the “appellate court must consider the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Gomez, 1997-NM | 1 | 1 |
cluster 676510green1 sentence2005Id. accord United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir.1994) (“[T]he law has uniformly recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess firearms and that entrance into a situs of drug trafficking activity carries all too real dangers to law enforcement officers.”) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Geary S. Stowegreen1 sentence2005E.g., United States v. Stowe, 100 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir.1996) (“While the presence of a gun alone is not necessarily enough, drug dealing is a crime infused with violence. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2017However, because the search incident to arrest doctrine is categorical, as opposed to the exigency exception to the warrant requirement, which, McNeely teaches, requires a case-by-case analysis, the Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless blood draws for alcohol testing as searches incident to arrest: “[b]lood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test.” Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2183-84 . 2017However, because the search incident to arrest doctrine is categorical, as opposed to the exigency exception to the warrant requirement, which, McNeely teaches, requires a case-by-case analysis, the Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless blood draws for alcohol testing as searches incident to arrest: "[b]lood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test." Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2183 -84 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
green
1 sentence2022The Court determined that there is a “‘compelling need’ for a blood test of drunk-driving suspects whose condition deprives officials of a reasonable opportunity to conduct a breath test” and that the only question under the exigency doctrine is “whether this compelling need justifies a warrantless search because there is . . .‘no time to secure a warrant.’” Id. at 2537 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Trudelle
green
2 sentences2010Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 9-16 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 ; Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 28-32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 . {18} In Trudelle, we recognized, as we did in Johnson, that meth labs “can be dangerous because they contain chemicals that may be explosive under certain conditions.” Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶ 32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 . 2010Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 9-16 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 ; Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 28-32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 . {18} In Trudelle, we recognized, as we did in Johnson, that meth labs “can be dangerous because they contain chemicals that may be explosive under certain conditions.” Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶ 32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2010We affirmed these conclusions in Moore and, relying on the well-developed rules of exigency, clarified that a warrantless search of a suspected meth lab falls within the exigency exception only when officers “have knowledge of specific, articulable facts that demonstrate that immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶ 14 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {19} In State v. Brown, 2010-NMCA-079, ¶ 19 2010We affirmed these conclusions in Moore and, relying on the well-developed rules of exigency, clarified that a warrantless search of a suspected meth lab falls within the exigency exception only when officers “have knowledge of specific, articulable facts that demonstrate that immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶ 14 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {19} In State v. Brown, 2010-NMCA-079, ¶ 19 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2010We affirmed these conclusions in Moore and, relying on the well-developed rules of exigency, clarified that a warrantless search of a suspected meth lab falls within the exigency exception only when officers “have knowledge of specific, articulable facts that demonstrate that immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶ 14 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {19} In State v. Brown, 2010-NMCA-079, ¶ 19 2010We affirmed these conclusions in Moore and, relying on the well-developed rules of exigency, clarified that a warrantless search of a suspected meth lab falls within the exigency exception only when officers “have knowledge of specific, articulable facts that demonstrate that immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶ 14 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {19} In State v. Brown, 2010-NMCA-079, ¶ 19 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Trudelle
green
2 sentences2010Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 9-16 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 ; Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 28-32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 . {18} In Trudelle, we recognized, as we did in Johnson, that meth labs “can be dangerous because they contain chemicals that may be explosive under certain conditions.” Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶ 32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 . 2010Moore, 2008-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 9-16 , 144 N.M. 14 , 183 P.3d 158 ; Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 28-32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 . {18} In Trudelle, we recognized, as we did in Johnson, that meth labs “can be dangerous because they contain chemicals that may be explosive under certain conditions.” Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶ 32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Attaway
green
2 sentences2005In the present case, the officers believed that the occupants, including an alleged drug-dealer, had weapons consisting of “fully automatic Mini-14’s and sawed-off shotguns.” The specific, articulable facts in the present matter of multiple “fully automatic Mini-14’s and sawed-off shotguns,” as well as the allegation that the resident was a drug dealer, viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, was the basis for the officers’ reasonable suspicion that the occupants had a propensity for violence and justified the exigency exception to the announcement rule. {26} In Attaway, this Court c 2005In the present case, the officers believed that the occupants, including an alleged drug-dealer, had weapons consisting of “fully automatic Mini-14’s and sawed-off shotguns.” The specific, articulable facts in the present matter of multiple “fully automatic Mini-14’s and sawed-off shotguns,” as well as the allegation that the resident was a drug dealer, viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, was the basis for the officers’ reasonable suspicion that the occupants had a propensity for violence and justified the exigency exception to the announcement rule. {26} In Attaway, this Court c | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.