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6 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
California v. Carneygreen2 sentences2013See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“The mobility of automobiles . . . ‘creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.’ ” (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976))); Navas, 597 F.3d at 498-500 ; United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 In 1999, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Supreme Court made this point unmistakably clear: [T]he automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraban 1998However, the Court has since retreated from a strict application of the exigency requirement in vehicle searches and has emphasized that “pervasive schemes of regulation” giving rise to “reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (emphasis added); see also Barrios-Lomeli v. State, 113 Nev. 952 , 944 P.2d 791 (1997) (acknowledging the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the exigency r | 2 | 3 |
Barrios-Lomeli v. Stategreen2 sentences1998However, the Court has since retreated from a strict application of the exigency requirement in vehicle searches and has emphasized that “pervasive schemes of regulation” giving rise to “reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (emphasis added); see also Barrios-Lomeli v. State, 113 Nev. 952 , 944 P.2d 791 (1997) (acknowledging the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the exigency r 1998However, the Court has since retreated from a strict application of the exigency requirement in vehicle searches and has emphasized that “pervasive schemes of regulation” giving rise to “reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (emphasis added); see also Barrios-Lomeli v. State, 113 Nev. 952 , 944 P.2d 791 (1997) (acknowledging the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the exigency r | 2 | 2 |
Roaden v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2018Additionally, we held that there "is no justification for applying the exigent circumstances exception when 'officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search." Id. at 855-56, 336 P.3d at 944 (emphasis added) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 ); see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at 153 (indicating that the exigency exception should be preserved for situation in which police are "truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation" (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2018Additionally, we held that there "is no justification for applying the exigent circumstances exception when 'officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search." Id. at 855-56, 336 P.3d at 944 (emphasis added) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 ); see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at 153 (indicating that the exigency exception should be preserved for situation in which police are "truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation" (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973)). 2018Additionally, we held that there "is no justification for applying the exigent circumstances exception when 'officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search." Id. at 855-56, 336 P.3d at 944 (emphasis added) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 ); see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at 153 (indicating that the exigency exception should be preserved for situation in which police are "truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation" (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lomando Scottgreen1 sentence2013See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“The mobility of automobiles . . . ‘creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.’ ” (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976))); Navas, 597 F.3d at 498-500 ; United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 In 1999, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Supreme Court made this point unmistakably clear: [T]he automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraban | 1 | 1 |
South Dakota v. Oppermangreen1 sentence2013See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“The mobility of automobiles . . . ‘creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.’ ” (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976))); Navas, 597 F.3d at 498-500 ; United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 In 1999, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Supreme Court made this point unmistakably clear: [T]he automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraban | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Dysongreen1 sentence2013See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“The mobility of automobiles . . . ‘creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.’ ” (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976))); Navas, 597 F.3d at 498-500 ; United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 In 1999, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Supreme Court made this point unmistakably clear: [T]he automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraban | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harnischgreen2 sentences1999See Harnisch II, 114 Nev. 225 , 954 P.2d 1180 (1998). 1999See Harnisch II, 114 Nev. 225 , 954 P.2d 1180 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
California v. Ramosgreen1 sentence1998Even though this court did not correctly pronounce the present status of the federal constitutional law on this issue, “[i]t is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution *228 requires.” California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 48
green
1 sentence2013See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“The mobility of automobiles . . . ‘creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.’ ” (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976))); Navas, 597 F.3d at 498-500 ; United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 In 1999, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Supreme Court made this point unmistakably clear: [T]he automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraban | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Pennsylvania v. Labron
green
1 sentence2013See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“The mobility of automobiles . . . ‘creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.’ ” (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976))); Navas, 597 F.3d at 498-500 ; United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 In 1999, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Supreme Court made this point unmistakably clear: [T]he automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraban | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Harnisch
green
2 sentences1998Because no exigency was present here, Harnisch, 113 Nev. at 223 , 931 P.2d at 1365 , the warrantless search of Harnisch’s car was not justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 1 Accordingly, we deny this petition. 2 1 Cause appearing, we grant the state’s request to exceed the ten-page limit for petitions for rehearing. 1998Because no exigency was present here, Harnisch, 113 Nev. at 223 , 931 P.2d at 1365 , the warrantless search of Harnisch’s car was not justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 1 Accordingly, we deny this petition. 2 1 Cause appearing, we grant the state’s request to exceed the ten-page limit for petitions for rehearing. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.