exigency exception in Massachusetts

1999These circumstances raise the question of whether the officers, upon the arrest of Hakim and the defendant, could seize the drugs from the trunk without first obtaining a warrant or whether they were required to keep the Cadillac under guard in the driveway until a warrant was applied for and obtained. 8 See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 357 (1978), where the court noted that “[wjhile the feasibility of posting guard has mitigated the exigency of the moment where a search of a dwelling was involved (Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 803 [1975]), the exigency requirement generally ha

1995“The exigency requirement has generally not been as rigorously applied to motor vehicles as to homes.” Cast, supra at 904 , citing Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 357 (1978).

2018Or, to put it another way, "where the exigency is reasonably foreseeable and the police offer no justifiable excuse for their prior delay in obtaining a warrant, the exigency exception to the warrant requirement is not open to them." Forde , 367 Mass. at 803 , 329 N.E.2d 717 .

2018Or, to put it another way, "where the exigency is reasonably foreseeable and the police offer no justifiable excuse for their prior delay in obtaining a warrant, the exigency exception to the warrant requirement is not open to them." Forde , 367 Mass. at 803 , 329 N.E.2d 717 .

1999These circumstances raise the question of whether the officers, upon the arrest of Hakim and the defendant, could seize the drugs from the trunk without first obtaining a warrant or whether they were required to keep the Cadillac under guard in the driveway until a warrant was applied for and obtained. 8 See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 357 (1978), where the court noted that “[wjhile the feasibility of posting guard has mitigated the exigency of the moment where a search of a dwelling was involved (Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 803 [1975]), the exigency requirement generally ha

1983While the feasibility of posting guard has mitigated the exigency of the moment where a search of a dwelling was involved (Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 803 [1975]), the exigency requirement generally has not been as rigorously applied to cars. [Footnote omitted.] For example, in Chambers v. Maroney, [ 399 U.S. 42 (1970)], the Supreme Court upheld an automobile search conducted at the police station hours after the driver’s arrest.

2004See Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 723 (1995).

1999See Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 720 (1995), in which we relatively recently rehearsed the law of warrantless entry. (a) Exigency exception.

2018See Commonwealth v. Molina , 439 Mass. 206 , 211, 786 N.E.2d 1191 (2003).

2018In Molina , the police received the name and address of a suspect, reported and discussed the allegations back at the station, then proceeded to the suspect's residence to effectuate the arrest without a warrant. 439 Mass. at 207, 210, 786 N.E.2d 1191 .

2025"To support such a search, 'the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the police had probable cause and were faced with exigent circumstances such as danger to their lives, danger to the lives of others, or the destruction of evidence, such that it would be impracticable to 11 obtain a warrant.'" Loadholt, 456 Mass. at 422 , quoting Commonwealth v. Moore, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 334, 338 (2002).

2020See Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201 , 1208 n.6 (1992), citing Davidson, supra at 849 (actual 13Notably, § 24 (1) (f) (1), requiring actual consent for blood draws for the purposes of determining BAC, was passed one year after the United States Supreme Court decided Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966), which established that blood draws performed without consent are constitutionally permissible with either a search warrant or an exigency exception.

2020See e.g., Commonwealth v. Eggleston, 453 Mass. 554 , 557 - 558 (2009) (no exigent circumstances needed to search motor vehicle parked in a tire store parking lot when officers had probable cause to believe motor vehicle contained contraband).

2020See id. at 46 — 48 (finding anonymous 911 caller to have satisfactory basis of knowledge where she "reported her firsthand observations," and sufficient --------------------------- [5] When dispensing with the exigency requirement of the automobile exception, our appellate decisions often refer to the inherent mobility of a vehicle encountered by police on a "public way." However, it is clear to the Court that the vehicle being in a "public place" is sufficient to dispense with the exigency requirement.

2020See Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201 , 1208 n.6 (1992), citing Davidson, supra at 849 (actual 13Notably, § 24 (1) (f) (1), requiring actual consent for blood draws for the purposes of determining BAC, was passed one year after the United States Supreme Court decided Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966), which established that blood draws performed without consent are constitutionally permissible with either a search warrant or an exigency exception.

2020See Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201 , 1208 n.6 (1992), citing Davidson, supra at 849 (actual 13Notably, § 24 (1) (f) (1), requiring actual consent for blood draws for the purposes of determining BAC, was passed one year after the United States Supreme Court decided Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966), which established that blood draws performed without consent are constitutionally permissible with either a search warrant or an exigency exception.

2019See Commonwealth v. Tyree , 455 Mass. 676 , 690-691, 919 N.E.2d 660 (2010) ("In evaluating whether exigent circumstances existed, we also have placed particular emphasis on whether police consider[ed] how long it would take to obtain a warrant before acting" [quotation and citation omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Forde , 367 Mass. 798 , 801-803, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).

2019See Commonwealth v. Tyree , 455 Mass. 676 , 690-691, 919 N.E.2d 660 (2010) ("In evaluating whether exigent circumstances existed, we also have placed particular emphasis on whether police consider[ed] how long it would take to obtain a warrant before acting" [quotation and citation omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Forde , 367 Mass. 798 , 801-803, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).

2017See Commonwealth v. Straw, 422 Mass. 18 Because we conclude that the voluntariness of the defendant's statements "appear[s] from the record with unmistakable clarity," Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 85 (2000) (quotation omitted), we need not address the defendant's request to remand this case for findings and rulings on the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.

2017See Commonwealth v. Straw, 422 Mass. 18 Because we conclude that the voluntariness of the defendant's statements "appear[s] from the record with unmistakable clarity," Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 85 (2000) (quotation omitted), we need not address the defendant's request to remand this case for findings and rulings on the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.

2011See Commonwealth v. McAfee, supra at 476 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Forde, supra at 803 , in which, in reliance on precedent from the Supreme Judicial Court, this court observed that “it is long settled that ‘where the exigency is reasonably foreseeable and the police offer no justifiable excuse for their prior delay in obtaining a warrant, the exigency exception to the warrant requirement is not open to them.’ ” The facts in Mc-Afee are quite similar to the facts here.

2009In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982), the Court held that a warrantless vehicle search is proper as long as police officers have probable cause to search the vehicle, “even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.” The Court later clarified that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement, and that it applies as long as the vehicle is “readily mobile” and officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband.

2009Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).

2007To meet this burden, the Commonwealth must show that (1) “the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that an exigency existed,” and (2) their actions were “reasonable under the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Morrison, 429 Mass. 511, 515 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Marchione, 384 Mass. 8, 10-11 (1981).

2007To meet this burden, the Commonwealth must show that (1) “the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that an exigency existed,” and (2) their actions were “reasonable under the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Morrison, 429 Mass. 511, 515 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Marchione, 384 Mass. 8, 10-11 (1981).

2007The officers’ initial entry fell within the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. 18 “Exigencies which may justify a procedure without warrant are a narrow category and must be established by the Commonwealth which bears the burden of proof.” Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456 (1981).

2002See Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 807 (1975); Commonwealth v. Pietrass, supra at 898-899 ; Commonwealth v. Midi, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 594 (1999).

1999These circumstances raise the question of whether the officers, upon the arrest of Hakim and the defendant, could seize the drugs from the trunk without first obtaining a warrant or whether they were required to keep the Cadillac under guard in the driveway until a warrant was applied for and obtained. 8 See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 357 (1978), where the court noted that “[wjhile the feasibility of posting guard has mitigated the exigency of the moment where a search of a dwelling was involved (Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 803 [1975]), the exigency requirement generally ha

1981The defendant attacks the warrantless search of the house to which the police had been called, emphasizing the burden placed on the government to justify such a search by Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974), and relying on limitations placed on the exigency exception by Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 801-803 (1975).

1975A number of recent Federal Circuit Court cases are cited for this proposition, with principal reliance apparently being placed on Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 540 (1st Cir.1968): "Haste does not become necessary in the present sense if the need for it has been brought about by deliberate and unreasonable delay.

1975A number of recent Federal Circuit Court cases are cited for this proposition, with principal reliance apparently being placed on Niro v. United States, 388 F. 2d 535, 540 (1st Cir. 1968): “Haste does not become necessary in the present sense if the need for it has been brought about by deliberate and unreasonable delay.