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17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 8 courts 1989–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Lehmangreen2 sentences2006Use of the consent-to-settle clause to deny benefits, absent any showing of actual prejudice by the insurer, “frustratefs] public policy by depriving the insured of benefits for which she had paid.” Id., at 938 . 2004See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lehman, 743 A.2d 933, 941 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Where the insured settles with a tort-feasor without the insurer’s consent and does not prejudice the insurer’s interests, the purpose of the consent-to-settle clause is lacking.”), relying upon, Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co., 472 Pa. 66 , 371 A.2d 193 (1977). “[T]he purpose of the prejudice requirement is to allow an insurer to refuse payment only if its procedural handicap has led to disadvantageous, substantive results ... [Cjourts have required a showing not only of the loss of substantial defense oppo | 3 | 5 |
Daley-Sand v. West American Insurancegreen2 sentences2008As to Daley-Sand , here we note only that the decision was embodied in a closely-written opinion affirming an equitable remedy afforded by a trial court and “hold[ing] only that the operation of the consent to settle clause in this case as now written frustrates public policy.” Daley-Sand, 387 Pa.Super. at 642 , 564 A.2d at 970 . 2008As to Daley-Sand , here we note only that the decision was embodied in a closely-written opinion affirming an equitable remedy afforded by a trial court and “hold[ing] only that the operation of the consent to settle clause in this case as now written frustrates public policy.” Daley-Sand, 387 Pa.Super. at 642 , 564 A.2d at 970 . | 2 | 4 |
State Farm Insurance Companies v. Ridenourgreen1 sentence2007See generally State Farm, Insurance Companies v. Ridenour, 485 Pa.Super. 463 , 646 A.2d 1188 (1994). ¶ 11 The denial of the claim based on the destruction of the potential dram shop action is based purely on the lack of notice and is directly connected to American States’ rights of subrogation. | 1 | 1 |
Burton v. Republic Insurancegreen1 sentence2006Burton v. Republic Insurance Company, 845 A.2d 889, 893 (Pa.Super.2004). ¶ 14 In the present ease, we must interpret the consent-to-settle clause in Nationwide’s policy. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 486380green1 sentence2004Co., 815 F.2d 890, 899 (3d Cir. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co.green2 sentences2004See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lehman, 743 A.2d 933, 941 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Where the insured settles with a tort-feasor without the insurer’s consent and does not prejudice the insurer’s interests, the purpose of the consent-to-settle clause is lacking.”), relying upon, Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co., 472 Pa. 66 , 371 A.2d 193 (1977). “[T]he purpose of the prejudice requirement is to allow an insurer to refuse payment only if its procedural handicap has led to disadvantageous, substantive results ... [Cjourts have required a showing not only of the loss of substantial defense oppo 2004See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lehman, 743 A.2d 933, 941 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Where the insured settles with a tort-feasor without the insurer’s consent and does not prejudice the insurer’s interests, the purpose of the consent-to-settle clause is lacking.”), relying upon, Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co., 472 Pa. 66 , 371 A.2d 193 (1977). “[T]he purpose of the prejudice requirement is to allow an insurer to refuse payment only if its procedural handicap has led to disadvantageous, substantive results ... [Cjourts have required a showing not only of the loss of substantial defense oppo | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Morris
green
2 sentences2015Accordingly, the court adopted the test forwarded by Insureds under which an insurer, defending subject to a reservation of rights, is required to reimburse an insured for a settlement reached in violation of the consent to settle clause where coverage is found to exist and the settlement is “fair and reasonable” and made in “good faith and without collusion.” Id. at 6-11 (citing in support Insurance Co. of North America v. Spangler, 881 F.Supp. 539 (D.Wyo.1995); Morris, 154 Ariz. 113 , 741 P.2d 246 ; Kelly v. Iowa Mut. 2015Accordingly, the court adopted the test forwarded by Insureds under which an insurer, defending subject to a reservation of rights, is required to reimburse an insured for a settlement reached in violation of the consent to settle clause where coverage is found to exist and the settlement is “fair and reasonable” and made in “good faith and without collusion.” Id. at 6-11 (citing in support Insurance Co. of North America v. Spangler, 881 F.Supp. 539 (D.Wyo.1995); Morris, 154 Ariz. 113 , 741 P.2d 246 ; Kelly v. Iowa Mut. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Insurance Co. of North America v. Spangler
green
2 sentences2015Accordingly, the court adopted the test forwarded by Insureds under which an insurer, defending subject to a reservation of rights, is required to reimburse an insured for a settlement reached in violation of the consent to settle clause where coverage is found to exist and the settlement is “fair and reasonable” and made in “good faith and without collusion.” Id. at 6-11(citing in support Insurance Co. of North America v. Spangler, 881 F.Supp. 539 (D. 2015Accordingly, the court adopted the test forwarded by Insureds under which an insurer, defending subject to a reservation of rights, is required to reimburse an insured for a settlement reached in violation of the consent to settle clause where coverage is found to exist and the settlement is “fair and reasonable” and made in “good faith and without collusion.” Id. at 6-11 (citing in support Insurance Co. of North America v. Spangler, 881 F.Supp. 539 (D.Wyo.1995); Morris, 154 Ariz. 113 , 741 P.2d 246 ; Kelly v. Iowa Mut. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Cerankowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence2007This concept is embodied in Cerankowski v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, 783 A.2d 343 (Pa.Super.2001), which held that an insurer must demonstrate prejudice before it can invoke a consent to settle clause and deny coverage. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
cluster 761530
neutral
1 sentence2006Id., at 169 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance v. Nayerahamadi
green
2 sentences1998Id. at 218 . 1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Boyle v. Erie Insurance
green
2 sentences1998In Boyle v. Erie Insurance Company, 441 Pa. Super. 103 , 656 A.2d 941 (1995), the court was asked, among other things, to determine if the consent-to-settle clause contained in the subject insurance policy could be invoked to support the insurance company’s contention that its policyholder was not entitled to underinsured benefits. 1998In Boyle v. Erie Insurance Company, 441 Pa. Super. 103 , 656 A.2d 941 (1995), the court was asked, among other things, to determine if the consent-to-settle clause contained in the subject insurance policy could be invoked to support the insurance company’s contention that its policyholder was not entitled to underinsured benefits. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Archer v. State Farm Insurance
green
2 sentences1993The carrier filed for summary judgment claiming: “[i]ts subrogation rights were destroyed when plaintiff executed the release without the consent or knowledge of State Farm, and in violation of the consent-to-settle clause ... of [its] policy.” Archer, supra at 560-61 , 615 A.2d at 781 . 1993The carrier filed for summary judgment claiming: “[i]ts subrogation rights were destroyed when plaintiff executed the release without the consent or knowledge of State Farm, and in violation of the consent-to-settle clause ... of [its] policy.” Archer, supra at 560-61 , 615 A.2d at 781 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Dyer v. Travelers
green
2 sentences1993However, the court predicted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would follow Melendez v. Pennsylvania Assigned Claim Plans, supra, and Dyer v. Travelers, 392 Pa. Super. 202 , 572 A.2d 762 (1990), and hold that consent-to-settle clauses are enforceable. 2 The court then stated: “Fisher also argues that USAA could not invoke the consent-to-settle clause because it was not prejudiced by the settlement. 1993However, the court predicted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would follow Melendez v. Pennsylvania Assigned Claim Plans, supra, and Dyer v. Travelers, 392 Pa. Super. 202 , 572 A.2d 762 (1990), and hold that consent-to-settle clauses are enforceable. 2 The court then stated: “Fisher also argues that USAA could not invoke the consent-to-settle clause because it was not prejudiced by the settlement. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Wheeler v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1993In Wheeler v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 749 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Melendez v. Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan
green
2 sentences1992Melendez v. Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan, 384 Pa.Super. 48 , 557 A.2d 767 (1989). 1992Melendez v. Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan, 384 Pa.Super. 48 , 557 A.2d 767 (1989). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Cotton v. Insurance Co. of North America
neutral
2 sentences1992Co. of North America, 344 Pa.Super. 602 , 497 A.2d 254 (1985), this Court has not yet addressed the availability of underinsured motorist benefits where the insured settles with a tortfeasor in *564 violation of a consent to settle clause in a private insurance policy. 1992Co. of North America, 344 Pa.Super. 602 , 497 A.2d 254 (1985), this Court has not yet addressed the availability of underinsured motorist benefits where the insured settles with a tortfeasor in *564 violation of a consent to settle clause in a private insurance policy. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Kester v. Erie Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences1991See, e.g.: Kester v. Erie Insurance Exchange, supra 399 Pa.Super. at 212-13 , 582 A.2d at 21 . 1991See, e.g.: Kester v. Erie Insurance Exchange, supra 399 Pa.Super. at 212-13 , 582 A.2d at 21 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Longworth v. Van Houten
green
1 sentence1989It also recognized that enforcement of this clause casts the insured victim into a limbo that “utterly frustrates the legislative purpose of providing maximum and expeditious protection to the innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists”, Longworth, 223 N.J.Super. 184 , 538 A.2d at 419 , while it also frustrates the legitimate expectations of the insured victim who purchases UIM coverage. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.