17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Tomeygreen2 sentences2016See Commonwealth v. Shickora, 116 A.3d 1150, 1156 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“The culpability requirement of Section 5511 is wantonness or cruelty.”); See also Commonwealth v. Tomey, 884 A.2d 291, 295 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support trial court’s determination that the Appellant acted wantonly when he deprived his dogs of access to clean and sanitary shelter). 2015Commonwealth v. Tomey, 884 A.2d 291, 294 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 781, 906 A.2d 542 (2006). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Fieldgreen2 sentences2001See id. at 524-25, 417 A.2d at 163 . 18 Field was vague in terms of identifying the precise nature of the culpability requirement discerned. 2001See id. at 524-25, 417 A.2d at 163 . [18] Field was vague in terms of identifying the precise nature of the culpability requirement discerned. | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Martirgreen1 sentence2019An EWOC conviction does not require that the child be in imminent threat of physical harm; rather, it “only requires proof of circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare.” Commonwealth v. Martir, 712 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Shickoragreen2 sentences2016See Commonwealth v. Shickora, 116 A.3d 1150, 1156 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“The culpability requirement of Section 5511 is wantonness or cruelty.”); See also Commonwealth v. Tomey, 884 A.2d 291, 295 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support trial court’s determination that the Appellant acted wantonly when he deprived his dogs of access to clean and sanitary shelter). 2016This Court has defined “wanton” in the animal cruelty context as “unreasonably or maliciously risking harm while being utterly indifferent to the consequences." Shickora, supra at 1157 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Weissgreen2 sentences2014Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 583 Pa. 6 , 874 A.2d 623, 630 (2005); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 139 Pa. 247 , 21 A. 10, 10 (1891). 2014Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 583 Pa. 6 , 874 A.2d 623, 630 (2005); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 139 Pa. 247 , 21 A. 10, 10 (1891). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ludwiggreen2 sentences2014Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 583 Pa. 6 , 874 A.2d 623, 630 (2005). 2014Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 583 Pa. 6 , 874 A.2d 623, 630 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Baronegreen2 sentences2001See Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa.Super. 282 , 419 A.2d 457 (1980)(plurality). 21 The lead opinion, authored by then-President Judge Cercone, endorsed the proposition, advocated by the majority herein, that the General Assembly did not intend to impose absolute liability for homicide by vehicle, but rather, incorporated a culpability requirement of criminal negligence. 2001See Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa.Super. 282 , 419 A.2d 457 (1980)(plurality). 21 The lead opinion, authored by then-President Judge Cercone, endorsed the proposition, advocated by the majority herein, that the General Assembly did not intend to impose absolute liability for homicide by vehicle, but rather, incorporated a culpability requirement of criminal negligence. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cordoba-Hincapiegreen2 sentences2001See Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 515 (recognizing that “[t]he cases, despite their uneven nature, impart a clear message that there is a continuing constitutional importance to the mens rea principle^] [t]he outer limits of what is permissible have not been drawn, but such limits certainly exist”). 41 The majority, and Field and Heck before it, successfully surmounted the complexities here involved by divining a culpability requirement where none was indicated, doing so without reference to the conventional tools of statutory construction or strict liability analysis. 2001However, given the fairly widespread imposition of strict liability in the enhanced gradation of offenses resulting in highway deaths, and the lack of clarity at the federal and state levels concerning the conformance of such with constitutional precepts given the severity of the penalties imposed, see generally Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 515, it appears that, by omitting a culpability term, the General Assembly sought to impose the least stringent culpability requirement permissible. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kochgreen2 sentences2001In the lead opinion, after expressing his disagreement with Field’s reasoning, see id. at 355 , 443 A.2d at 1160 (stating that, “[i]n effect, our supreme court has saved section 3732 from the due process challenge of criminal liability without fault by a bootstrap analysis”), Judge Wickersham concluded that this Court had effectively inserted a culpability requirement akin to civil negligence into Section 3732. 2001In the lead opinion, after expressing his disagreement with Field’s reasoning, see id. at 355 , 443 A.2d at 1160 (stating that, “[i]n effect, our supreme court has saved section 3732 from the due process challenge of criminal liability without fault by a bootstrap analysis”), Judge Wickersham concluded that this Court had effectively inserted a culpability requirement akin to civil negligence into Section 3732. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Heckgreen2 sentences2001See id. 19 Specifical ly, in responding to the criticism concerning the erroneous derivation of a culpability requirement from the offense underlying the homicide by vehicle charge, the Court stated, “[t]his criticism was unwarranted because the discussions of culpability in Field ... were not relevant to the issues which had been presented.” Id. at 199, 535 A.2d at 579 . 2001See id. [19] Specifically, in responding to the criticism concerning the erroneous derivation of a culpability requirement from the offense underlying the homicide by vehicle charge, the Court stated, "[t]his criticism was unwarranted because the discussions of culpability in Field ... were not relevant to the issues which had been presented." Id. at 199, 535 A.2d at 579 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Houtzgreen2 sentences2001See id. 19 Specifical ly, in responding to the criticism concerning the erroneous derivation of a culpability requirement from the offense underlying the homicide by vehicle charge, the Court stated, “[t]his criticism was unwarranted because the discussions of culpability in Field ... were not relevant to the issues which had been presented.” Id. at 199, 535 A.2d at 579 . 2001See id. [19] Specifically, in responding to the criticism concerning the erroneous derivation of a culpability requirement from the offense underlying the homicide by vehicle charge, the Court stated, "[t]his criticism was unwarranted because the discussions of culpability in Field ... were not relevant to the issues which had been presented." Id. at 199, 535 A.2d at 579 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Crawford
green
2 sentences2016Crawford, 24 A.3d at 402 . 2015More recently, in Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d 396 (Pa.Super.2011), we cited Tomey and stated: The culpability requirement of Section 5511 is wantonness or cruelty. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Com. v. Springer
green
2 sentences2015Commonwealth v. Tomey, 884 A.2d 291, 294 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 781, 906 A.2d 542 (2006). 2015Commonwealth v. Tomey, 884 A.2d 291, 294 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 781, 906 A.2d 542 (2006). | 2 | 2011–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Cardwell
green
1 sentence2021The panel specifically rejected Mother’s argument that, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(2)(ii),6 in order to satisfy the culpability requirement 4 This three-part test was first set forth by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. 1986). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Austin v. United States
green
2 sentences2017Austin, 509 U.S. at 625-26 , 113 S.Ct. 2801 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 2017Austin, 509 U.S. at 625-26 , 113 S.Ct. 2801 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Parmar
green
2 sentences2010Nevertheless, we acknowledge this Court's previous *282 pronouncement that "the bribery statute does not specify the level of culpability applicable to the material elements of this offense[,]" see Parmar, 672 A.2d at 318 , and its consequent engrafting of the culpability standard of 18 Pa.C.S. § 302 as the applicable measure of intent under section 4701. 2010Nevertheless, we acknowledge this Court’s previ ous pronouncement that “the bribery statute does not specify the level of culpability applicable to the material elements of this offense[,]” see Parmar, 672 A.2d at 318 , and its consequent engrafting of the culpability standard of 18 Pa.C.S. § 302 as the applicable measure of intent under section 4701. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Staples v. United States
green
2 sentences2007Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). 2007Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Morissette v. United States
green
2 sentences2007Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). 2007Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Commonwealth v. Gallagher
green
1 sentence2006Thereafter, sentence was imposed, a notice of appeal was filed, and Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on the strength of Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 874 A.2d 49 (Pa.Super.2005), allocatur granted, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3247 . ¶ 9 In Gallagher , this Court addressed for the first time whether the culpability requirement of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302 should be applied to the “luring” element of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2910. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Heckman
green
2 sentences1995There, we stated: "While we agree that § 1543(b) does not include a culpability requirement in its definition, we cannot agree that such a requirement is ‘patently inconsistent’ with effective enforcement of driving under suspension---- [W]e do not hold that actual notice of suspension is no longer necessary.” Id. at 347 n. 6, 590 A.2d at 1267 n. 6. 1995There, we stated: "While we agree that § 1543(b) does not include a culpability requirement in its definition, we cannot agree that such a requirement is `patently inconsistent' with effective enforcement of driving under suspension.... [W]e do not hold that actual notice of suspension is no longer necessary." Id. at 347 n. 6, 590 A.2d at 1267 n. 6. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hicks v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1987In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to “borrow from concepts of tort law” and that such a “borrowing” was constitutional, to wit: By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce d 1987In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to “borrow from concepts of tort law” and that such a “borrowing” was constitutional, to wit: By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce d | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Commonwealth v. Hicks
green
2 sentences1987In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to “borrow from concepts of tort law” and that such a “borrowing” was constitutional, to wit: By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce d 1987In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to “borrow from concepts of tort law” and that such a “borrowing” was constitutional, to wit: By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce d | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Volkswagenwerk A. G. v. Falzon
green
2 sentences1987In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to "borrow from concepts of tort law" and that such a "borrowing" was constitutional, to wit: By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce d 1987In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to “borrow from concepts of tort law” and that such a “borrowing” was constitutional, to wit: By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce d | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Commonwealth v. Black
green
2 sentences1979Section 302 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §302, sets forth the general rule that a culpability element is necessary for conviction under the Crimes Code, and various cases have held that where a Crimes Code provision is silent as to a culpability requirement one will be inferred: Waldron Appeal, 237 Pa. Superior Ct. 298 , 353 A. 2d 43 (1975); Com. v. Black, 251 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 380 A. 2d 911 (1977). 1979Section 302 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §302, sets forth the general rule that a culpability element is necessary for conviction under the Crimes Code, and various cases have held that where a Crimes Code provision is silent as to a culpability requirement one will be inferred: Waldron Appeal, 237 Pa. Superior Ct. 298 , 353 A. 2d 43 (1975); Com. v. Black, 251 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 380 A. 2d 911 (1977). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Waldron Appeal
green
2 sentences1979Section 302 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §302, sets forth the general rule that a culpability element is necessary for conviction under the Crimes Code, and various cases have held that where a Crimes Code provision is silent as to a culpability requirement one will be inferred: Waldron Appeal, 237 Pa. Superior Ct. 298 , 353 A. 2d 43 (1975); Com. v. Black, 251 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 380 A. 2d 911 (1977). 1979Section 302 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §302, sets forth the general rule that a culpability element is necessary for conviction under the Crimes Code, and various cases have held that where a Crimes Code provision is silent as to a culpability requirement one will be inferred: Waldron Appeal, 237 Pa. Superior Ct. 298 , 353 A. 2d 43 (1975); Com. v. Black, 251 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 380 A. 2d 911 (1977). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.