culpability requirement in Indiana

2019Wiltshire, however, argues that any touching was accidental, and “[t]here is no evidence [that] allow[ed] the jury to conclude that the touching was accompanied with the intent to arouse or satisfy [Wiltshire’s] sexual desires.” 1 Id. at 7 (internal quotations omitted). [9] Wiltshire appears to challenge the “intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires” element of the offense, along with the scienter requirement that the act must be done “knowingly or intentionally.” Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that the culpability requirement of the child molesting statute is “knowingly or i

2015He reasons that if he were asleep, then he could not have acted knowingly or had the requisite intent. [32] Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that the culpability requirement of the child molesting statute is “knowingly or intentionally.” See Loual- *833 len v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind.2002) (concluding that it was not error to instruct the jury that defendant could be convicted pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-42-4—3(b) for “knowingly or intentionally” molesting a child); see also Cardwell v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (“Regardless of the fact that there is no sp

2013In contrast, aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty for the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but do not require proof of culpability.” D.H. v. State, 932 N.E.2d 236, 238-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (citing Markley v. State, 421 N.E.2d 20, 21-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that the culpability requirement did not apply to the aggravating circumstance of “serious bodily injury,” enhancing a battery to a Class C felony)); see also Owens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 538, 542-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “bodily injury to a law enforcement offi

2010Id. (finding that the culpability requirement did not apply to the aggravating circumstance of "serious bodily injury," enhancing a battery to a class C felony); see also Owens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 538, 542-43 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (finding that "bodily injury to a law enforcement officer" is an aggravating circumstance of battery that "increases the penalty for the offense committed without proof of any culpability separate from the culpability required for the conduct elements of the offense").

2015He reasons that if he were asleep, then he could not have acted knowingly or had the requisite intent. [32] Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that the culpability requirement of the child molesting statute is “knowingly or intentionally.” See Loual- *833 len v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind.2002) (concluding that it was not error to instruct the jury that defendant could be convicted pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-42-4—3(b) for “knowingly or intentionally” molesting a child); see also Cardwell v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (“Regardless of the fact that there is no sp

2004In order to adjudicate C.L.Y. of Attempted Child Molesting as a Class B felony, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that C.L.Y. was acting with the culpability required for commission of Child Molesting as a Class B felony and that he engaged in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. 11 Our supreme court has found that the culpability requirement of the child molesting statute is "knowingly or intentionally." See Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind.2002) (concluding that it was not error to instruct the jury that defendant coul

2013In contrast, aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty for the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but do not require proof of culpability.” D.H. v. State, 932 N.E.2d 236, 238-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (citing Markley v. State, 421 N.E.2d 20, 21-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that the culpability requirement did not apply to the aggravating circumstance of “serious bodily injury,” enhancing a battery to a Class C felony)); see also Owens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 538, 542-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “bodily injury to a law enforcement offi

2010Id. (finding that the culpability requirement did not apply to the aggravating circumstance of "serious bodily injury," enhancing a battery to a class C felony); see also Owens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 538, 542-43 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (finding that "bodily injury to a law enforcement officer" is an aggravating circumstance of battery that "increases the penalty for the offense committed without proof of any culpability separate from the culpability required for the conduct elements of the offense").

2020Where typically, the culpability requirement for the attempt of a crime is that of the specific crime attempted, for convictions of attempted murder our supreme court “has emphasized the importance of requiring specific intent to kill . . . despite [] the culpability requirement for murder includ[ing] the lesser standard of ‘knowingly.’” Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [15] Specific intent to kill “may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.” Reese v. State, 939 N.E.2d 695, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), tra

2015“However, our supreme court has emphasized the importance of requiring specific intent to kill before a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder, despite that the culpability requirement for murder includes Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1506-CR-592 | December 31, 2015 Page 5 of 8 the lesser standard of ‘knowingly.’” Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [13] The State charged that on or about December 2, 2014, Davis “did attempt to commit the crime of Murder, which is to intentionally kill another human being, namely: George Po

2019Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

2012Id.

2016See id.

2013Id. (citing Markley v. State, 421 N.E.2d 20, 21-22 (Ind.Ct.App.1981)).

2020“Discharging a weapon in the direction of a victim is substantial evidence from which a jury can infer intent to kill.” Id. [16] Here, Neal admitted to Detective Kronewitter that he was armed with a gun when he arrived at Frank’s Place, and a gun matching his description was later recovered from the scene.

2020Where typically, the culpability requirement for the attempt of a crime is that of the specific crime attempted, for convictions of attempted murder our supreme court “has emphasized the importance of requiring specific intent to kill . . . despite [] the culpability requirement for murder includ[ing] the lesser standard of ‘knowingly.’” Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [15] Specific intent to kill “may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.” Reese v. State, 939 N.E.2d 695, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), tra

2018“The culpability requirement [of I.C. § 35-42-2-1] applies to the conduct prohibited by the statute, not to the result of that conduct.” Lowden v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1220, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [25] The conduct prohibited by the battery statute is touching in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.

2016Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008). [13] Because intent is a mental state, “the trier of fact often must infer its existence from surrounding circumstances when determining whether the requisite intent exists.” Goodner v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ind. 1997).

2016Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008). [13] Because intent is a mental state, “the trier of fact often must infer its existence from surrounding circumstances when determining whether the requisite intent exists.” Goodner v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ind. 1997).

2013In contrast, aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty for the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but do not require proof of culpability.” D.H. v. State, 932 N.E.2d 236, 238-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (citing Markley v. State, 421 N.E.2d 20, 21-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that the culpability requirement did not apply to the aggravating circumstance of “serious bodily injury,” enhancing a battery to a Class C felony)); see also Owens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 538, 542-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “bodily injury to a law enforcement offi

2013In contrast, aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty for the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but do not require proof of culpability.” D.H. v. State, 932 N.E.2d 236, 238-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (citing Markley v. State, 421 N.E.2d 20, 21-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that the culpability requirement did not apply to the aggravating circumstance of “serious bodily injury,” enhancing a battery to a Class C felony)); see also Owens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 538, 542-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “bodily injury to a law enforcement offi

2012See Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1257 (Ind.2008).

2007However, our supreme court has emphasized the importance of requiring specific intent to kill before a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder, despite that the culpability requirement for murder includes the lesser standard of “knowingly.” Booker v. State, 741 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citing Zickefoose v. State, 270 Ind. 618 , 388 N.E.2d 507 (Ind.1979)).