culpability requirement in Colorado

11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2000 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

Case	Followed	Cited
People v. Noblegreen colo · 1981 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000We have recognized that "(allthough this distinction between an awareness of one's conduct or cireumstance, on the one hand, and an awareness of the result of one's conduct, on the other, at times may be a subtle one, it is a distinction recognized by the Colorado Criminal Code itself." People v. Noble, 635 P.2d 203, 210 (Colo.1981). 2000We have recognized that "[a]lthough this distinction between an awareness of one's conduct or circumstance, on the one hand, and an awareness of the result of one's conduct, on the other, at times may be a subtle one, it is a distinction recognized by the Colorado Criminal Code itself." People v. Noble, 635 P.2d 203, 210 (Colo.1981).	1	1
People v. Thomasgreen colo · 1986 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 1 sentence 1998See id. at 975 . 6 Here, however, the culpability requirement for conspiracy and that for the crime of reckless manslaughter conflict.	1	1
People v. Mingogreen colo · 1978 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988Moreover, the statute also provided that "[a]ll murder ... perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and indicating a depraved mind, regardless of human life, shall be deemed murder of the first degree, and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree." Id. [3] See, "An Act Enacting the Colorado Criminal Code", ch. 121, §§ 40-1-101 to XX-XX-XXX, 1971 Colo.Sess.Laws 388 (codified at C.R.S. §§ 40-1-101 to XX-XX-XXX (1971 Supp.)). [4] The four concepts are "purposely [or intentionally]," "knowingly," "recklessly" and "negligently." See § 18-1-501(3) 1988Moreover, the statute also provided that "[a]ll murder ... perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and indicating a depraved mind, regardless of human life, shall be deemed murder of the first degree, and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree." Id. [3] See, "An Act Enacting the Colorado Criminal Code", ch. 121, §§ 40-1-101 to XX-XX-XXX, 1971 Colo.Sess.Laws 388 (codified at C.R.S. §§ 40-1-101 to XX-XX-XXX (1971 Supp.)). [4] The four concepts are "purposely [or intentionally]," "knowingly," "recklessly" and "negligently." See § 18-1-501(3)	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (18)

Case	Cited	Years
People v. Marcy red colo · 1981 2 sentences 1988"The distinction, if any, between the culpable mental state for the two offenses is one without a sufficiently pragmatic difference to permit an intelligent and uniform application of the law." Marcy, 628 P.2d at 78 . 1983Furthermore, our statutes define ‘intentionally’ as ‘when his conscious object is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct,’ 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963,40-1-601(6), which we read to mean that the conduct creating the grave risk of death be consciously done.” In People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo.1981), we elaborated further on the culpability requirement of extreme indifference murder, as that crime was originally defined in the Colorado Criminal Code and is applicable here.	2	1983–1988
People v. Schuett green colo · 1992 2 sentences 1995Id. 1995Id.	1	1995–1995
People v. Ledman green colo · 1981 1 sentence 1986While we have held that the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition may be limited to specific intent crimes, People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo.1981), a defendant can offer impaired mental condition evidence to contest the culpability requirement for non-specific intent crimes, Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1225 , 103 S.Ct. 1232 , 75 L.Ed.2d 466 (1983).	1	1986–1986
Hendershott v. People green colo · 1982 1 sentence 1986While we have held that the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition may be limited to specific intent crimes, People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo.1981), a defendant can offer impaired mental condition evidence to contest the culpability requirement for non-specific intent crimes, Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1225 , 103 S.Ct. 1232 , 75 L.Ed.2d 466 (1983).	1	1986–1986
Rent-It Corp. v. Clark green scotus · 1983 1 sentence 1986While we have held that the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition may be limited to specific intent crimes, People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo.1981), a defendant can offer impaired mental condition evidence to contest the culpability requirement for non-specific intent crimes, Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1225 , 103 S.Ct. 1232 , 75 L.Ed.2d 466 (1983).	1	1986–1986
Parratt v. Holtan green scotus · 1983 1 sentence 1986While we have held that the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition may be limited to specific intent crimes, People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo.1981), a defendant can offer impaired mental condition evidence to contest the culpability requirement for non-specific intent crimes, Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1225 , 103 S.Ct. 1232 , 75 L.Ed.2d 466 (1983).	1	1986–1986
Brainerd v. Burger green scotus · 1983 1 sentence 1986While we have held that the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition may be limited to specific intent crimes, People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo.1981), a defendant can offer impaired mental condition evidence to contest the culpability requirement for non-specific intent crimes, Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1225 , 103 S.Ct. 1232 , 75 L.Ed.2d 466 (1983).	1	1986–1986
United States v. Pomponio green scotus · 1976 1 sentence 1985The Blair opinion cited United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 , 97 S.Ct. 769 , 50 L.Ed.2d 771 (1976), on remand, 563 F.2d 659 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 , 98 S.Ct. 1521 , 55 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978), in support of the statement that "[g]ood faith is not a proper defense in this case.” Pomponio was a tax fraud case and the instruction there stated that good motive alone is never a defense to a crime except as it bears on intent.	1	1985–1985
United States v. Peter Pomponio, Paul Pomponio green ca4 · 1977 1 sentence 1985The Blair opinion cited United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 , 97 S.Ct. 769 , 50 L.Ed.2d 771 (1976), on remand, 563 F.2d 659 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 , 98 S.Ct. 1521 , 55 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978), in support of the statement that "[g]ood faith is not a proper defense in this case.” Pomponio was a tax fraud case and the instruction there stated that good motive alone is never a defense to a crime except as it bears on intent.	1	1985–1985
Colbert v. United States neutral scotus · 1977 1 sentence 1985The Blair opinion cited United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 , 97 S.Ct. 769 , 50 L.Ed.2d 771 (1976), on remand, 563 F.2d 659 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 , 98 S.Ct. 1521 , 55 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978), in support of the statement that "[g]ood faith is not a proper defense in this case.” Pomponio was a tax fraud case and the instruction there stated that good motive alone is never a defense to a crime except as it bears on intent.	1	1985–1985
Coastal States Petrochemical Co. v. United States green scotus · 1978 1 sentence 1985The Blair opinion cited United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 , 97 S.Ct. 769 , 50 L.Ed.2d 771 (1976), on remand, 563 F.2d 659 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 , 98 S.Ct. 1521 , 55 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978), in support of the statement that "[g]ood faith is not a proper defense in this case.” Pomponio was a tax fraud case and the instruction there stated that good motive alone is never a defense to a crime except as it bears on intent.	1	1985–1985
Pomponio v. United States green scotus · 1978 1 sentence 1985The Blair opinion cited United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 , 97 S.Ct. 769 , 50 L.Ed.2d 771 (1976), on remand, 563 F.2d 659 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 , 98 S.Ct. 1521 , 55 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978), in support of the statement that "[g]ood faith is not a proper defense in this case.” Pomponio was a tax fraud case and the instruction there stated that good motive alone is never a defense to a crime except as it bears on intent.	1	1985–1985
Frakes v. United States green scotus · 1978 1 sentence 1985The Blair opinion cited United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 , 97 S.Ct. 769 , 50 L.Ed.2d 771 (1976), on remand, 563 F.2d 659 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 , 98 S.Ct. 1521 , 55 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978), in support of the statement that "[g]ood faith is not a proper defense in this case.” Pomponio was a tax fraud case and the instruction there stated that good motive alone is never a defense to a crime except as it bears on intent.	1	1985–1985
People v. Harfmann green coloctapp · 1981 1 sentence 1983People v. Harfmann, 633 P.2d 500 (Colo.App.1981).	1	1983–1983
People v. DelGuidice green colo · 1979 1 sentence 1981In People v. Del Guidice, Colo., 606 P.2d 840 (1979), we held that the affirmative defense of voluntary or self-induced intoxication is not applicable to second-degree murder, which requires the culpability of knowledge, and evidence of such condition is not admissible to negate the culpability requirement for that offense.	1	1981–1981
People v. Quick green colo · 1976 2 sentences 1981People v. Quick, 190 Colo. 171 , 544 P.2d 629 (1976). 1981People v. Quick, 190 Colo. 171 , 544 P.2d 629 (1976).	1	1981–1981
People v. Hulse green colo · 1976 2 sentences 1979The primary differences between the statutes are that the former applies only to operation of a motor vehicle, People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302 , 557 P.2d 1205 (1976), and that the vehicular homicide statutes uses the culpability standard of “recklessly” while the standard applicable in the lesser offense is “criminally negligent.” People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277 , 534 P.2d 316 (1975), held that any distinction between the statutory terms “reckless” and “criminally negligent” was a “distinction without a sufficiently pragmatic difference.” However, after Calvaresi , the General Assembly redef 1979The primary differences between the statutes are that the former applies only to operation of a motor vehicle, People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302 , 557 P.2d 1205 (1976), and that the vehicular homicide statutes uses the culpability standard of “recklessly” while the standard applicable in the lesser offense is “criminally negligent.” People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277 , 534 P.2d 316 (1975), held that any distinction between the statutory terms “reckless” and “criminally negligent” was a “distinction without a sufficiently pragmatic difference.” However, after Calvaresi , the General Assembly redef	1	1979–1979
People v. CALVAREST green colo · 1975 2 sentences 1979The primary differences between the statutes are that the former applies only to operation of a motor vehicle, People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302 , 557 P.2d 1205 (1976), and that the vehicular homicide statutes uses the culpability standard of “recklessly” while the standard applicable in the lesser offense is “criminally negligent.” People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277 , 534 P.2d 316 (1975), held that any distinction between the statutory terms “reckless” and “criminally negligent” was a “distinction without a sufficiently pragmatic difference.” However, after Calvaresi , the General Assembly redef 1979The primary differences between the statutes are that the former applies only to operation of a motor vehicle, People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302 , 557 P.2d 1205 (1976), and that the vehicular homicide statutes uses the culpability standard of “recklessly” while the standard applicable in the lesser offense is “criminally negligent.” People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277 , 534 P.2d 316 (1975), held that any distinction between the statutory terms “reckless” and “criminally negligent” was a “distinction without a sufficiently pragmatic difference.” However, after Calvaresi , the General Assembly redef	1	1979–1979

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501 (9) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-2-101 (4) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-102 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-105 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-407 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-503 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-102 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IN 27 (1984–2020) ND 26 (1981–2026) NJ 18 (1987–2024) PA 17 (1979–2021) CO 11 (1979–2000) TX 11 (1994–2021) CA 8 (1989–2025) UT 8 (1992–2014) OR 6 (1978–2022) MI 6 (1996–2025) TN 4 (1999–2019) NM 4 (2005–2025) AL 4 (1981–2004) IA 3 (1980–2025) OH 3 (2005–2021) NY 3 (2014–2022) WA 3 (1983–2003) MD 2 (1993–1994) MT 2 (1993–1993) NH 2 (1986–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check