culpability requirement in North Dakota

2014“Whether an offense is punishable without proof of intent, knowledge, willfulness, or negligence is a question of legislative intent to be determined by the language of the statute in connection with its manifest purpose and design.” State v. Olson, 356 N.W.2d 110, 112 (N.D.1984).

2000Cf. State v. Olson, 356 N.W.2d 110, 112 (N.D.1984) (stating the absence of a culpability requirement in section 39-08-07 creates a strict liability offense when a driver strikes an unattended vehicle and fails to notify the vehicle’s owner). *151 [¶ 22] In discussing actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol under section 39-08-01, and application of the presumptions of intoxication contained in section 39-20-07, this Court has stated, “We are not here concerned with a crime dependant upon the accused’s intent.

2026The default willfulness requirement in the criminal code “will not be read into other chapters unless the Legislature has specifically so stated.” State v. Montplaisir, 2015 ND 237, ¶ 32 , 869 N.W.2d 435 (quoting State v. Holte, 2001 ND 133, ¶ 8 , 631 N.W.2d 595 ). “[W]hen a statute outside of Title 12.1, N.D.C.C., does not specify a culpability requirement, the offense is a strict liability offense for which no proof of intent is needed[.]” State v. Kleppe, 2011 ND 141, ¶ 14 , 800 N.W.2d 311 2 (citing Holte, ¶ 10).

2026The default willfulness requirement in the criminal code “will not be read into other chapters unless the Legislature has specifically so stated.” State v. Montplaisir, 2015 ND 237, ¶ 32 , 869 N.W.2d 435 (quoting State v. Holte, 2001 ND 133, ¶ 8 , 631 N.W.2d 595 ). “[W]hen a statute outside of Title 12.1, N.D.C.C., does not specify a culpability requirement, the offense is a strict liability offense for which no proof of intent is needed[.]” State v. Kleppe, 2011 ND 141, ¶ 14 , 800 N.W.2d 311 2 (citing Holte, ¶ 10).

2011See, e.g., State v. Skarsgard, 2007 ND 159, ¶ 7 , 740 N.W.2d 64 (applying definition of “offense” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(20) to N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-01 and 39-06-42); State v. Benson, 376 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1985) (stating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02 was an “appropriate source” to define “intent” outside of Title 12.1); Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614, 622 (N.D.1981) (applying Title 12.1 to other code sections when the sections are penal in nature); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 1-01-09,1-02-03. [¶ 30] Here, in its order denying the State’s motion in limine, the trial court concluded that N.D.C.C. § 39-

2011See, e.g., State v. Skarsgard, 2007 ND 159, ¶ 7 , 740 N.W.2d 64 (applying definition of “offense” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(20) to N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-01 and 39-06-42); State v. Benson, 376 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1985) (stating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02 was an “appropriate source” to define “intent” outside of Title 12.1); Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614, 622 (N.D.1981) (applying Title 12.1 to other code sections when the sections are penal in nature); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 1-01-09,1-02-03. [¶ 30] Here, in its order denying the State’s motion in limine, the trial court concluded that N.D.C.C. § 39-

2011See, e.g., State v. Skarsgard, 2007 ND 159, ¶ 7 , 740 N.W.2d 64 (applying definition of “offense” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(20) to N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-01 and 39-06-42); State v. Benson, 376 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1985) (stating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02 was an “appropriate source” to define “intent” outside of Title 12.1); Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614, 622 (N.D.1981) (applying Title 12.1 to other code sections when the sections are penal in nature); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 1-01-09,1-02-03. [¶ 30] Here, in its order denying the State’s motion in limine, the trial court concluded that N.D.C.C. § 39-

2011See, e.g. , State v. Skarsgard , 2007 ND 159, ¶ 7 , 740 N.W.2d 64 (applying definition of “offense” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(20) to N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-01 and 39-06-42); State v. Benson , 376 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1985) (stating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02 was an “appropriate source” to define “intent” outside of Title 12.1); Snortland v. Crawford , 306 N.W.2d 614, 622 (N.D. 1981) (applying Title 12.1 to other code sections when the sections are penal in nature); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 1-01-09, 1-02-03. [¶30] Here, in its order denying the State’s motion in limine, the trial court concluded that N.D.C.C.

2011See, e.g., State v. Skarsgard, 2007 ND 159, ¶ 7 , 740 N.W.2d 64 (applying definition of “offense” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(20) to N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-01 and 39-06-42); State v. Benson, 376 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1985) (stating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02 was an “appropriate source” to define “intent” outside of Title 12.1); Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614, 622 (N.D.1981) (applying Title 12.1 to other code sections when the sections are penal in nature); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 1-01-09,1-02-03. [¶ 30] Here, in its order denying the State’s motion in limine, the trial court concluded that N.D.C.C. § 39-

2011See, e.g. , State v. Skarsgard , 2007 ND 159, ¶ 7 , 740 N.W.2d 64 (applying definition of “offense” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(20) to N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-01 and 39-06-42); State v. Benson , 376 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1985) (stating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02 was an “appropriate source” to define “intent” outside of Title 12.1); Snortland v. Crawford , 306 N.W.2d 614, 622 (N.D. 1981) (applying Title 12.1 to other code sections when the sections are penal in nature); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 1-01-09, 1-02-03. [¶30] Here, in its order denying the State’s motion in limine, the trial court concluded that N.D.C.C.

2011"Strict liability does not necessarily preclude affirmative defenses, but an affirmative defense will rarely apply." State v. Ness, 2009 ND 182, ¶15 , 774 N.W.2d 254 ; see Olson, at ¶11 (noting an affirmative defense of unwitting, innocent, or mistaken conduct may be presented when a defendant is charged with violating a domestic violence protection order under N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-06); State v. Brandner, 551 N.W.2d 284, 287 (N.D.1996) (holding affirmative defense of unwitting or unknowing possession applicable to prosecution for possession of illegal fish-traps); State v. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d

2009See State v. Holte, 2001 ND 133, ¶ 10 , 631 N.W.2d 595 (generally when a specific culpability requirement is not given the offense is a strict liability offense for which no proof of intent is required); State v. Brandner, 551 N.W.2d 284, 287 (N.D.1996).

2002We have held “it is proper for the Legislature to enact laws making the violation thereof a matter of strict criminal liability without a culpability requirement. ...” State v. McDowell, 312 N.W.2d 301, 306 (N.D.1981).

1989Any person violating this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” Initially, we note that in State v. McDowell, 312 N.W.2d 301 (N.D.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981 , 103 S.Ct. 318 , 74 L.Ed.2d 294 (1982), this Court determined that it was proper for the Legislature to enact laws making the violation thereof a *270 matter of strict criminal liability without a culpability requirement.

1984The fact that *709 the culpability requirements were the same was irrelevant because the operative grading language (the phrase “the circumstances manifest his extreme indifference to the value of human life”) provided “an understandable and distinct definition of what circumstances are necessary to bring the act within the felony offense.” State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364, 368-69 (N.D.1977).

1981Section 12.1-16-02, NDCC, sets out the culpability requirement for manslaughter and, therefore, the rationale employed in State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1977), is not applicable.

2026The default willfulness requirement in the criminal code “will not be read into other chapters unless the Legislature has specifically so stated.” State v. Montplaisir, 2015 ND 237, ¶ 32 , 869 N.W.2d 435 (quoting State v. Holte, 2001 ND 133, ¶ 8 , 631 N.W.2d 595 ). “[W]hen a statute outside of Title 12.1, N.D.C.C., does not specify a culpability requirement, the offense is a strict liability offense for which no proof of intent is needed[.]” State v. Kleppe, 2011 ND 141, ¶ 14 , 800 N.W.2d 311 2 (citing Holte, ¶ 10).

2019See Walter , 391 N.W.2d at 159 . [¶11] In Walter , this court distinguished Shinault v. Commonwealth , 228 Va. 269 , 321 S.E.2d 652 (1984), which examined a North Carolina DUI statute to determine whether it was "substantially similar" to a Virginia offense and thus counted as a prior enhancing offense.

2019See Walter , 391 N.W.2d at 159 . [¶11] In Walter , this court distinguished Shinault v. Commonwealth , 228 Va. 269 , 321 S.E.2d 652 (1984), which examined a North Carolina DUI statute to determine whether it was "substantially similar" to a Virginia offense and thus counted as a prior enhancing offense.

2019See Walter , 391 N.W.2d at 159 . [¶11] In Walter , this court distinguished Shinault v. Commonwealth , 228 Va. 269 , 321 S.E.2d 652 (1984), which examined a North Carolina DUI statute to determine whether it was "substantially similar" to a Virginia offense and thus counted as a prior enhancing offense.

2011"Strict liability does not necessarily preclude affirmative defenses, but an affirmative defense will rarely apply." State v. Ness, 2009 ND 182, ¶15 , 774 N.W.2d 254 ; see Olson, at ¶11 (noting an affirmative defense of unwitting, innocent, or mistaken conduct may be presented when a defendant is charged with violating a domestic violence protection order under N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-06); State v. Brandner, 551 N.W.2d 284, 287 (N.D.1996) (holding affirmative defense of unwitting or unknowing possession applicable to prosecution for possession of illegal fish-traps); State v. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d

2011"Strict liability does not necessarily preclude affirmative defenses, but an affirmative defense will rarely apply." State v. Ness, 2009 ND 182, ¶15 , 774 N.W.2d 254 ; see Olson, at ¶11 (noting an affirmative defense of unwitting, innocent, or mistaken conduct may be presented when a defendant is charged with violating a domestic violence protection order under N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-06); State v. Brandner, 551 N.W.2d 284, 287 (N.D.1996) (holding affirmative defense of unwitting or unknowing possession applicable to prosecution for possession of illegal fish-traps); State v. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d

2001The trial court erred in ruling the State has to prove Dvorak “willfully” violated the protection order and in proposing to so instruct the jury. rv [¶ 11] Strict liability offenses have a “generally disfavored status.” State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 111 (N.D.1980).

2000Rather, we are concerned with a strict liability crime of control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” State v. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d 86, 90 (N.D.1991).

1997State v. Fridley, 335 N.W.2d 785, 789 (N.D.1983). [¶ 30] Strict liability does not always preclude affirmative defenses.

1997E.g., State v. Nygaard, 447 N.W.2d 267, 271 (N.D.1989) (excuse based on a “mistaken belief’ is not available for strict-liability offense of failing to stop after an accident). [¶ 31] Section 62.1-02-01 does not have a culpability requirement.

1986Neither the requested instruction nor the language in State v. Leidholm, supra, establishes a culpability requirement as an element of self-defense. 1 Rather, that instruction and language is an explanation of the relationship of the law on manslaughter, negligent homicide, and self-defense, and the definitions of recklessly and negligently. 2 We have reviewed the instructions given by the trial court, and we believe that the substance of that relationship was embodied in those instructions. 3 We conclude that the instructions *46 given by the trial court, as a whole, correctly and adequately

1986The trial court refused to give the requested instruction tracking the language in State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 821 (N.D.1983), because the language "put a culpability requirement onto a defense which doesn’t make any sense that actually the culpability requirement in this case lies within the definition of the crime itself." In Leidholm , we spoke of "elements of self-defense.” The trial court apparently assumed that by using the term "element” we were creating culpability requirements additional to those established by Section 12.1 — 16— 02, N.D.C.C. [manslaughter], and Section 12.1-16