first opportunity challenge in Pennsylvania

2012See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274 , 865 A.2d 761 , 775 n. 7 (2004) (providing that when appellant was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal, the PCRA proceeding is the first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of prior counsel and the analysis of such issue does not involve a layered claim of ineffectiveness).

2012See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274 , 865 A.2d 761 , 775 n. 7 (2004) (providing that when appellant was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal, the PCRA proceeding is the first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of prior counsel and the analysis of such issue does not involve a layered claim of ineffectiveness).

2009Appellee did not raise the specific issues of whether the Tumer/Finley letter was valid and whether the PCRA court erred by granting counsel’s request to withdraw from the case. 3 In a memorandum opinion filed January 26, 2006, the Superior Court held that, notwithstanding that Appellee did not raise a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness before the PCRA court, the claim was not waived because “the pro se appeal from the denial of the PCRA order is the first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel.” Slip Op. at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233 , 724 A.2d 293, 30

2009Accord Pursell, 724 A.2d at 302 (holding that our Court may review claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel in a capital appeal from the denial of PCRA relief because it is the first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel).

1981Normally, where the record shows, as in the instant case, that the accused had not been informed “by the lower court or his counsel of the right to petition to withdraw his guilty plea, or the right to the assistance of counsel in filing such a petition, and of the consequences of not filing such a petition,” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 258 Pa.Super. 214, 217 , 392 A.2d 760, 762 (1978) (emphasis in original), we have applied the following principles: “In such situations appellants are treated in the same fashion as those whose appeals were pending when we decided Commonwealth v. Roberts, [ 237 Pa

1981Normally, where the record shows, as in the instant case, that the accused had not been informed “by the lower court or his counsel of the right to petition to withdraw his guilty plea, or the right to the assistance of counsel in filing such a petition, and of the consequences of not filing such a petition,” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 258 Pa.Super. 214, 217 , 392 A.2d 760, 762 (1978) (emphasis in original), we have applied the following principles: “In such situations appellants are treated in the same fashion as those whose appeals were pending when we decided Commonwealth v. Roberts, [ 237 Pa

1980Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra; Commonwealth v. Kitis, 241 Pa.Super. 537 , 358 A.2d 73 (1976); Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 238 Pa.Super. 368 , 357 A.2d 155 (1976).

1980Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra; Commonwealth v. Kitis, 241 Pa.Super. 537 , 358 A.2d 73 (1976); Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 238 Pa.Super. 368 , 357 A.2d 155 (1976).

2015See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 603 Pa. 1 , 981 A.2d 875 , 880 n. 4 (2009).

2015See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 603 Pa. 1 , 981 A.2d 875 , 880 n. 4 (2009).

2010Claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness have been reviewed, although set forth for the first time on appeal, because it was the first opportunity to posit the issue. 6 Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Malone, 823 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 (1998); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233 , 724 A.2d 293 (1999); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 557 Pa. 195 , 732 A.2d 1161 (1999).

2009Appellee did not raise the specific issues of whether the Tumer/Finley letter was valid and whether the PCRA court erred by granting counsel’s request to withdraw from the case. 3 In a memorandum opinion filed January 26, 2006, the Superior Court held that, notwithstanding that Appellee did not raise a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness before the PCRA court, the claim was not waived because “the pro se appeal from the denial of the PCRA order is the first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel.” Slip Op. at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233 , 724 A.2d 293, 30

2009Appellee did not raise the specific issues of whether the Turner/Finley letter was valid and whether the PCRA court erred by granting counsel's request to withdraw from the case. [3] In a memorandum opinion filed January 26, 2006, the Superior Court held that, notwithstanding that Appellee did not raise a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness before the PCRA court, the claim was not waived because "the pro se appeal from the denial of the PCRA order is the first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel." Slip Op. at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233 , 724 A.2d 293,

2008The grantor in Royer included the following language in a deed conveying a farm to his grantee: "[T]he Grantors herein agree that if they decide to sell the remainder of the farm, containing an estimated Twenty (20) acres, more or less, together with a house, bam and outbuildings, that they will give the first opportunity and privilege to the Grantee herein to purchase the same at a fixed sum of Six Thousand ($6,000) Dollars.” Id. at 781-782.

1999See Commonwealth v. Green, 551 Pa. 88 , 709 A.2d 382 (1998) (repeating that the claim of ineffectiveness must be raised at earliest stage in proceedings at which counsel whose effectiveness is challenged no longer represents appellant). 6 .

1999See Commonwealth v. Green, 551 Pa. 88 , 709 A.2d 382 (1998) (repeating that the claim of ineffectiveness must be raised at earliest stage in proceedings at which counsel whose effectiveness is challenged no longer represents appellant). 6 .