outstanding claim in Pennsylvania

1932As was said in Williams v. Cook, 289 Pa. 207 : “The mere authority to collect interest does not give the fight to accept principal in satisfaction of the outstanding claim:” Mynick v. Bickings, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 401 ; Browne et al. v. Hoekstra, 279 Pa. 418 .

1927The Superior Court therefore held that it could not say there was an abuse of discretion in refusing to open the judgment.) The mere authority to collect interest does not give the right to accept principal in satisfaction of the outstanding claim: Browne v. Hoekstra, 279 Pa. 418 ; Mynick v. Bickings, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 401 .

1932As was said in Williams v. Cook, 289 Pa. 207 : “The mere authority to collect interest does not give the fight to accept principal in satisfaction of the outstanding claim:” Mynick v. Bickings, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 401 ; Browne et al. v. Hoekstra, 279 Pa. 418 .

1927The Superior Court therefore held that it could not say there was an abuse of discretion in refusing to open the judgment.) The mere authority to collect interest does not give the right to accept principal in satisfaction of the outstanding claim: Browne v. Hoekstra, 279 Pa. 418 ; Mynick v. Bickings, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 401 .

2021Steffy, supra. Schuster’s proposed instruction only applies in situations where a defendant has no knowledge of an outstanding violation or warrant.

2019Id. at 9a.

2016Id. (citing Mihelic v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 399 A.2d 825, 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979)). 5 Mentioning numerous times his unfamiliarity with unemployment compensation procedure, Claimant explained that he only learned after his Kensington hearing that he had an outstanding claim relating to his relationship with the Company for which he would have to file a separate appeal.5 Claimant 5 Claimant testified: C …I was told that I had—I knew that I had that particular issue was—I had won that appeal, okay and when I called to start to receive benefits they said oh by the way you have

1956Coal Co., 124 Pa. Superior Ct. 21 , 187 A. 452 , we held, under the facts of that case that an outstanding rule to open the judgment did not operate as a waiver of a vital defect in the confession of the judgment, nor preclude an endorser of the note from subsequently moving to strike off the judgment.

1956Coal Co., 124 Pa. Superior Ct. 21 , 187 A. 452 , we held, under the facts of that case that an outstanding rule to open the judgment did not operate as a waiver of a vital defect in the confession of the judgment, nor preclude an endorser of the note from subsequently moving to strike off the judgment.

1947This principle lias been crystallized in the Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 170, comment h, (p. 435) thus: ‘The trustee violates his duty to the beneficiary if he sells to himself as trustee his individual property.’ We have always held to this principle: Painter v. Henderson, 7 Pa. 48 ; Everhart v. Searle, 71 Pa. 256 .

1947This principle lias been crystallized in the Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 170, comment h, (p. 435) thus: ‘The trustee violates his duty to the beneficiary if he sells to himself as trustee his individual property.’ We have always held to this principle: Painter v. Henderson, 7 Pa. 48 ; Everhart v. Searle, 71 Pa. 256 .

1947The rule prohibiting trustees from purchasing their individual property has been clearly and unequivocally stated by the Supreme Court in Tracy et al. v. Central Trust Co., 327 Pa. 77 (1937), in which Justice Schaffer, speaking for an unanimous court, said (p. 79): “It has long been an outstanding principle of the law of trusts that a trustee violates his duty to the trust estate if he sells to himself as trustee property which he individually owns.

1932As was said in Williams v. Cook, 289 Pa. 207 : “The mere authority to collect interest does not give the fight to accept principal in satisfaction of the outstanding claim:” Mynick v. Bickings, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 401 ; Browne et al. v. Hoekstra, 279 Pa. 418 .

1927And the attorney ordinarily has no right to assign a mortgage or judgment without authority, express or implied, to so act: Bosler v. Searight, 149 Pa. 241 .

1927Whether his conduct may be said to indicate fraud, or not, the circumstances made out such a case as justified equitable intervention, and the decree restraining interference with the lessee’s occupancy, until the hearing of the appeal from the magistrate, having been based on reasonable grounds, will not now be interfered with: Bixler v. Swartz, 257 Pa. 300 .

1924Even when the conveyance has been made, the vendee is entitled to redress, if an outstanding claim exists, where he takes without notice of the defect, and there is no presumption that he possesses information in regard to it: Hannan v. Carroll, 277 Pa. 32 .