Rivera claim in Pennsylvania

2025In Lee this Court explained: According to Appellant, Rivera’s analysis was incorrect because, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the United States Supreme Court “instructed that life- without-parole sentences are sufficiently similar to the death penalty that they may be unconstitutional when applied to people with categorically-diminished culpability based on their offense or characteristics.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. ____________________________________________ 2 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), we

2023According to Appellant, Rivera’s analysis was incorrect because, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the United States Supreme Court “instruct[ed] that life-without-parole sentences are sufficiently similar to the death penalty that they may be unconstitutional when applied to people with categorically-diminished culpability based on their offense or characteristics.” Appellant’s Brief at 15.

2025In Lee this Court explained: According to Appellant, Rivera’s analysis was incorrect because, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the United States Supreme Court “instructed that life- without-parole sentences are sufficiently similar to the death penalty that they may be unconstitutional when applied to people with categorically-diminished culpability based on their offense or characteristics.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. ____________________________________________ 2 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), we

2023According to Appellant, Rivera’s analysis was incorrect because, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the United States Supreme Court “instruct[ed] that life-without-parole sentences are sufficiently similar to the death penalty that they may be unconstitutional when applied to people with categorically-diminished culpability based on their offense or characteristics.” Appellant’s Brief at 15.

2025In Lee this Court explained: According to Appellant, Rivera’s analysis was incorrect because, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the United States Supreme Court “instructed that life- without-parole sentences are sufficiently similar to the death penalty that they may be unconstitutional when applied to people with categorically-diminished culpability based on their offense or characteristics.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. ____________________________________________ 2 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), we

2023According to Appellant, Rivera’s analysis was incorrect because, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the United States Supreme Court “instruct[ed] that life-without-parole sentences are sufficiently similar to the death penalty that they may be unconstitutional when applied to people with categorically-diminished culpability based on their offense or characteristics.” Appellant’s Brief at 15.

2024(Id. at 40-41 (citing Rivera I, 983 A.2d at 1222 ).) The court emphasized that these conclusions were not at all dependent on Ott’s testimony. [J-16-2024] - 18 The PCRA court reiterated that, when Ott’s testimony is considered within the context of the entirety of Rivera’s trial, Ott was not a critical witness for the Commonwealth.

2024The PCRA court pointed out, however, that the Court in Rivera II concluded that Attorney Reynolds’ cross-examination of Ott “led Ott to acknowledge specifically that [Rivera] never indicated that he knew his pursuer was a police officer at the moment he shot him.” (Id. at 39-40 (quoting Rivera II, 108 A.3d at 799 ).) Thus, in the PCRA court’s view, Rivera’s “self[-]defense claim was not disproven on the basis that [Rivera] knew the decedent was a police officer.” (Id. at 40.) Next, the PCRA court explained that the Court in Rivera I held that the Commonwealth disproved Rivera’s claim of self-d

2024The PCRA court pointed out, however, that the Court in Rivera II concluded that Attorney Reynolds’ cross-examination of Ott “led Ott to acknowledge specifically that [Rivera] never indicated that he knew his pursuer was a police officer at the moment he shot him.” (Id. at 39-40 (quoting Rivera II, 108 A.3d at 799 ).) Thus, in the PCRA court’s view, Rivera’s “self[-]defense claim was not disproven on the basis that [Rivera] knew the decedent was a police officer.” (Id. at 40.) Next, the PCRA court explained that the Court in Rivera I held that the Commonwealth disproved Rivera’s claim of self-d

2023(Id.) After granting Rivera’s motion for reconsideration and withdrawing its prior panel decision, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court then affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. 3 See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 255 A.3d 497 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2019Rivera also cites Commonwealth v. Savage, 418 A.2d 629, 632 (Pa. Super. 1980), and Commonwealth v. Mayo, 414 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. 1979), for the propositions that pointing a gun at a victim or scratching a victim with a knife without drawing blood are not sufficient to establish an intent to cause serious bodily injury.3 Rivera’s claim is based on the premise that each individual part ____________________________________________ 3 We note that in Mayo, the defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which required proof of intent to cause “bodily injury” instead of “ser

2019Rivera also cites Commonwealth v. Savage, 418 A.2d 629, 632 (Pa. Super. 1980), and Commonwealth v. Mayo, 414 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. 1979), for the propositions that pointing a gun at a victim or scratching a victim with a knife without drawing blood are not sufficient to establish an intent to cause serious bodily injury.3 Rivera’s claim is based on the premise that each individual part ____________________________________________ 3 We note that in Mayo, the defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which required proof of intent to cause “bodily injury” instead of “ser

2017Indeed, the Rivera Court stated that “not only does Barfíeld fail to support Rivera’s claim [on the facts], it also sets out a reasoned analysis of why Rivera’s conduct is punishable under the kidnapping statute.” Id. at 1100 .