side bar in Pennsylvania

2005That request was denied. ¶ 19 Resolution of the above issue is complicated by the fact that although trial counsel promptly sought a mistrial due to the non-disclosure of the license identification, thereby preserving the challenge for appellate review, post-trial/initial appeals counsel neglected to include this issue in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P 1925 statement of matters complained of on appeal, thus rendering the issue waived under Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415 , 719 A.2d 306 (1998).

2005That request was denied. ¶ 19 Resolution of the above issue is complicated by the fact that although trial counsel promptly sought a mistrial due to the non-disclosure of the license identification, thereby preserving the challenge for appellate review, post-trial/initial appeals counsel neglected to include this issue in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P 1925 statement of matters complained of on appeal, thus rendering the issue waived under Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415 , 719 A.2d 306 (1998).

2002Walters v. Appelman, 230 A.D.2d 911, 912 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 879, 881 (1996) (instead of granting a mistrial sua sponte after the trial court became irritated with defense counsel, the trial court could have called a side bar and imposed sanctions or threatened to punish defense counsel for contempt); United States v. Bristol, 325 A.2d 183 , 187 n. 4 (D.C.1974) (where counsel’s trial conduct bordered on being obnoxious and was undoubtedly frustrating to the trial court, other means of censure and discipline other than mistrial were available to the court; consequently, sua sponte mistrial was not m

1993Clark v. Hoerner, 362 Pa.Super. 588 , 525 A.2d 377 (1987).

1993Clark v. Hoerner, 362 Pa.Super. 588 , 525 A.2d 377 (1987).

1984Further, it is without merit because a witness’s credibility may not be impeached by prior acts of misconduct which have not lead to convictions, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 475 Pa. 604 , 381 A.2d 438 (1977), and then only if the convictions involve crimes of dishonesty or false statements.

1984Further, it is without merit because a witness’s credibility may not be impeached by prior acts of misconduct which have not lead to convictions, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 475 Pa. 604 , 381 A.2d 438 (1977), and then only if the convictions involve crimes of dishonesty or false statements.

1981Commonwealth v. Hobson, 484 Pa. 250 , 398 A.2d 1364 (1979); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114.

1981Commonwealth v. Hobson, 484 Pa. 250 , 398 A.2d 1364 (1979); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114.

1979Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Danzy, 234 Pa.Super. 633 , 340 A.2d 494 (1975), allocatur denied September 18, 1975, we implicitly recognized the lack of prejudice in these circumstances so long as the testimony merely reflected that the date of the fingerprint comparison was subsequent to the time of arrest.

1979Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Danzy, 234 Pa.Super. 633 , 340 A.2d 494 (1975), allocatur denied September 18, 1975, we implicitly recognized the lack of prejudice in these circumstances so long as the testimony merely reflected that the date of the fingerprint comparison was subsequent to the time of arrest.

1970At a side bar conference, both counsel for the defense and the Commonwealth agreed that the application should be granted in that the statements were elicited in violation of the standards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

1970At a side bar conference, both counsel for the defense and the Commonwealth agreed that the application should be granted in that the statements were elicited in violation of the standards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

1961When asked if he were not correct in this assumption, defense counsel stated that the witness would show that the girl “is known throughout the community to have openly petted and similar types of conduct. . . .” Of course, the witness could not have testified as to specific acts on the part of the young lady: Com. v. Sutton, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 105 , 90 A. 2d 264 .

1961When asked if he were not correct in this assumption, defense counsel stated that the witness would show that the girl “is known throughout the community to have openly petted and similar types of conduct. . . .” Of course, the witness could not have testified as to specific acts on the part of the young lady: Com. v. Sutton, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 105 , 90 A. 2d 264 .

1948Tt is the burden of the plaintiff to produce evidence of circumstances “so strong as to preclude the possibility of injury in any other way and provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion” that the [accident] was caused by the negligence of defendant in the manner alleged: Pfendler v. Speer, 323 Pa. 443, 448 , 185 A. 618 ; Houston v. Republican Athletic Association et al., 343 Pa. 218 , *501 220, 22 A. 2d 715’: Stauffer v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 355 Pa. 24, 29 , 47 A. 2d 817, 819 .” A very careful study of this entire record has forced us to conclude that the evidence produc

1948Tt is the burden of the plaintiff to produce evidence of circumstances “so strong as to preclude the possibility of injury in any other way and provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion” that the [accident] was caused by the negligence of defendant in the manner alleged: Pfendler v. Speer, 323 Pa. 443, 448 , 185 A. 618 ; Houston v. Republican Athletic Association et al., 343 Pa. 218 , *501 220, 22 A. 2d 715’: Stauffer v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 355 Pa. 24, 29 , 47 A. 2d 817, 819 .” A very careful study of this entire record has forced us to conclude that the evidence produc

1948Tt is the burden of the plaintiff to produce evidence of circumstances “so strong as to preclude the possibility of injury in any other way and provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion” that the [accident] was caused by the negligence of defendant in the manner alleged: Pfendler v. Speer, 323 Pa. 443, 448 , 185 A. 618 ; Houston v. Republican Athletic Association et al., 343 Pa. 218 , *501 220, 22 A. 2d 715’: Stauffer v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 355 Pa. 24, 29 , 47 A. 2d 817, 819 .” A very careful study of this entire record has forced us to conclude that the evidence produc

1948Tt is the burden of the plaintiff to produce evidence of circumstances “so strong as to preclude the possibility of injury in any other way and provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion” that the [accident] was caused by the negligence of defendant in the manner alleged: Pfendler v. Speer, 323 Pa. 443, 448 , 185 A. 618 ; Houston v. Republican Athletic Association et al., 343 Pa. 218 , *501 220, 22 A. 2d 715’: Stauffer v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 355 Pa. 24, 29 , 47 A. 2d 817, 819 .” A very careful study of this entire record has forced us to conclude that the evidence produc

1948Tt is the burden of the plaintiff to produce evidence of circumstances “so strong as to preclude the possibility of injury in any other way and provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion” that the [accident] was caused by the negligence of defendant in the manner alleged: Pfendler v. Speer, 323 Pa. 443, 448 , 185 A. 618 ; Houston v. Republican Athletic Association et al., 343 Pa. 218 , *501 220, 22 A. 2d 715’: Stauffer v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 355 Pa. 24, 29 , 47 A. 2d 817, 819 .” A very careful study of this entire record has forced us to conclude that the evidence produc

1948Tt is the burden of the plaintiff to produce evidence of circumstances “so strong as to preclude the possibility of injury in any other way and provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion” that the [accident] was caused by the negligence of defendant in the manner alleged: Pfendler v. Speer, 323 Pa. 443, 448 , 185 A. 618 ; Houston v. Republican Athletic Association et al., 343 Pa. 218 , *501 220, 22 A. 2d 715’: Stauffer v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 355 Pa. 24, 29 , 47 A. 2d 817, 819 .” A very careful study of this entire record has forced us to conclude that the evidence produc

1937It is manifest that to permit the witnesses to answer the questions, and to tell the whole truth about the transaction, as they under their oaths were required to do, would be to lay before the jury the fact that defendant was protected by insurance, something which we have said must not be brought out upon the trial: Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49 , 69 A. 55 ; Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa. 593 , 80 A. 1113 ; Curran v. Lorch, 243 Pa. 247 , 90 A. 62 .

1937It is manifest that to permit the witnesses to answer the questions, and to tell the whole truth about the transaction, as they under their oaths were required to do, would be to lay before the jury the fact that defendant was protected by insurance, something which we have said must not be brought out upon the trial: Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49 , 69 A. 55 ; Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa. 593 , 80 A. 1113 ; Curran v. Lorch, 243 Pa. 247 , 90 A. 62 .

1937It is manifest that to permit the witnesses to answer the questions, and to tell the whole truth about the transaction, as they under their oaths were required to do, would be to lay before the jury the fact that defendant was protected by insurance, something which we have said must not be brought out upon the trial: Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49 , 69 A. 55 ; Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa. 593 , 80 A. 1113 ; Curran v. Lorch, 243 Pa. 247 , 90 A. 62 .

1937It is manifest that to permit the witnesses to answer the questions, and to tell the whole truth about the transaction, as they under their oaths were required to do, would be to lay before the jury the fact that defendant was protected by insurance, something which we have said must not be brought out upon the trial: Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49 , 69 A. 55 ; Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa. 593 , 80 A. 1113 ; Curran v. Lorch, 243 Pa. 247 , 90 A. 62 .

1937It is manifest that to permit the witnesses to answer the questions, and to tell the whole truth about the transaction, as they under their oaths were required to do, would be to lay before the jury the fact that defendant was protected by insurance, something which we have said must not be brought out upon the trial: Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49 , 69 A. 55 ; Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa. 593 , 80 A. 1113 ; Curran v. Lorch, 243 Pa. 247 , 90 A. 62 .

1937It is manifest that to permit the witnesses to answer the questions, and to tell the whole truth about the transaction, as they under their oaths were required to do, would be to lay before the jury the fact that defendant was protected by insurance, something which we have said must not be brought out upon the trial: Hollis v. United States Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49 , 69 A. 55 ; Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa. 593 , 80 A. 1113 ; Curran v. Lorch, 243 Pa. 247 , 90 A. 62 .

1937In Creighton v. Bloom, 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 84 , 165 A. 51 , the rope which dangled from defendant’s truck and wrapped itself around the side bar of the ladder and caused the support to collapse, was an integral part of defendant’s load or equipment.

1937In Creighton v. Bloom, 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 84 , 165 A. 51 , the rope which dangled from defendant’s truck and wrapped itself around the side bar of the ladder and caused the support to collapse, was an integral part of defendant’s load or equipment.

1926So that a fair and impartial trial might be had, the Commonwealth was permitted to exercise a peremptory challenge, and remove him, the court stating that had it not been made, it would of its own motion have withdrawn the juror in the exercise of judicial discretion: Com. v. Henderson, 242 Pa. 372 .

1910The other side of the rule is approved in Norwegian Street, 81 Pa. 349 , in the following language: ' There is a class of cases which hold that whether a stat ute is to be regarded as directory or not, is made to depend upon the employment or failure to employ negative words which import that an act should be done in a particular manner of time and not otherwise.’ Perhaps Lord Mansfield’s rule in Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Burr, 445, is a better one (and this is the second rule we have in view), that, whether a statute is mandatory or not depends on whether the thing directed to be done is the essence

1828In this country, in our own courts, the law is established in the same way, In Pollock v. Hall, 3 Yeates, 42 , Chief Justice Shippen says, discontinuances are the acts' of th.e court, and subject to their discretion.