type of chemical test in Pennsylvania

2002Tarka v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 756 A.2d 138 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) (licensee’s request for a urinalysis in lieu of a breath test because of allegation that medication for blood poisoning would taint test results did not support his refusal to submit to breath test as requested by police officer); Mooney v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 654 A.2d 47 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994) (licensee’s fear of needles was insufficient reason to refuse to submit to blood test because police have unfettered discretion in determining which test to administer); Kosty

2002Tarka v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 756 A.2d 138 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) (licensee’s request for a urinalysis in lieu of a breath test because of allegation that medication for blood poisoning would taint test results did not support his refusal to submit to breath test as requested by police officer); Mooney v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 654 A.2d 47 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994) (licensee’s fear of needles was insufficient reason to refuse to submit to blood test because police have unfettered discretion in determining which test to administer); Kosty

1991Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Penich, 112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 303, 535 A.2d 296 (1988).

1988We held further in Penich , that a police officer must have reasonable grounds for requesting a motorist “to submit to a different type of chemical test other than the one originally chosen and administered regardless of the number of times the initial type of test is permissibly given.” Id. 5 *298 Testing of breath, blood, or urine amounts to a search, and Seizure.

2017Once the police officer selects the type of test to be administered, however, his or her discretion is curbed. . . .[Department of Transportation v. McFarren, 525 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1986)] requires a reasonable reason whenever a police officer requests a licensee to submit to a different type of chemical test other than the one originally chosen and administered . . . .

1988Id. at 415 n. 1, 525 A.2d at 1187 n. 1. ' Under McFarren , a police officer has unfettered discretion to elect the type of chemical test administered to the licensee: urine, blood, or breath.

1999Matthews v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa.Cmwlth. 403 , 540 A.2d 349 (1988). .

1999Matthews v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa.Cmwlth. 403 , 540 A.2d 349 (1988). .

1994Licensee acknowledges that this court has plainly held that a fear of needles is an insufficient reason for refusing a blood test, e.g., Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Montgomery, 113 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 421, 537 A.2d 111 , appeal denied, 520 Pa. 608 , 553 A.2d 970 (1988), that a licensee cannot choose the type of chemical testing that will be administered, e.g., McCullough v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 415, 551 A.2d 1170 (1988), and that a police officer has the option to choose the type of chemical testing.

1992McCullough v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 415, 551 A.2d 1170 (1988); Department of Transportation, *7 Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Curran, 107 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 1, 526 A.2d 1265 (1987).

1994Of all the decisions on the subject that I have been able to find, the following five cases are not exactly on this issue, and the full discretion given to the police officer in each of them is dictum and, therefore, not precedential: Sladic v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 164 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 619, 643 A.2d 1155 (1994); Kostyk v. Department of Transportation, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 455, 570 A.2d 644 (1990); Pearson v. Commonwealth, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 91, 551 A.2d 394 (1988); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Curran, 107 Pa.Commonw

1992McCullough v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 415, 551 A.2d 1170 (1988); Department of Transportation, *7 Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Curran, 107 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 1, 526 A.2d 1265 (1987).

2015Supporting this decision was well-established precedent of the intermediate court that “Section 1547 does not afford a [motorist] a choice among the three tests listed; rather, it is the police officer who has the option to choose the type of chemical test to be administered.” Tarka v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 756 A.2d 138, 141 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) (citation omitted) overruled on other grounds by Orloff v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 912 A.2d 918 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006).

2014Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Boucher, 691 A.2d 450 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). 7 This Court has consistently held that Section 1547 does not afford a driver a choice among the three tests noted under that section; rather, it is the police officer who has the option to choose the type of chemical test to administer.

2005“Reasonability is a question of law for the court to decide based upon the unique facts of each case.” PennDOT v. Harbaugh, 141 Pa. Commw. 288 , 294-95 n.6, 595 A.2d 715 , 718 n.6 (1991). 3 As amatter of first impression, the court in Karabinos further held that when a driver is requested to take a different type of chemical test, other than the one originally chosen and previously administered, the driver must be advised of the reason for the second test “in order to dispel the licensee’s possible, and reasonable, subjective belief that he fulfilled his obligation under the Implied Consent La

2005“Reasonability is a question of law for the court to decide based upon the unique facts of each case.” PennDOT v. Harbaugh, 141 Pa. Commw. 288 , 294-95 n.6, 595 A.2d 715 , 718 n.6 (1991). 3 As amatter of first impression, the court in Karabinos further held that when a driver is requested to take a different type of chemical test, other than the one originally chosen and previously administered, the driver must be advised of the reason for the second test “in order to dispel the licensee’s possible, and reasonable, subjective belief that he fulfilled his obligation under the Implied Consent La

2002Tarka v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 756 A.2d 138 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) (licensee’s request for a urinalysis in lieu of a breath test because of allegation that medication for blood poisoning would taint test results did not support his refusal to submit to breath test as requested by police officer); Mooney v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 654 A.2d 47 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994) (licensee’s fear of needles was insufficient reason to refuse to submit to blood test because police have unfettered discretion in determining which test to administer); Kosty

2000Gross, 605 A.2d at 436 .

1994Of all the decisions on the subject that I have been able to find, the following five cases are not exactly on this issue, and the full discretion given to the police officer in each of them is dictum and, therefore, not precedential: Sladic v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 164 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 619, 643 A.2d 1155 (1994); Kostyk v. Department of Transportation, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 455, 570 A.2d 644 (1990); Pearson v. Commonwealth, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 91, 551 A.2d 394 (1988); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Curran, 107 Pa.Commonw

1994Licensee acknowledges that this court has plainly held that a fear of needles is an insufficient reason for refusing a blood test, e.g., Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Montgomery, 113 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 421, 537 A.2d 111 , appeal denied, 520 Pa. 608 , 553 A.2d 970 (1988), that a licensee cannot choose the type of chemical testing that will be administered, e.g., McCullough v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 415, 551 A.2d 1170 (1988), and that a police officer has the option to choose the type of chemical testing.

1994Of all the decisions on the subject that I have been able to find, the following five cases are not exactly on this issue, and the full discretion given to the police officer in each of them is dictum and, therefore, not precedential: Sladic v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 164 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 619, 643 A.2d 1155 (1994); Kostyk v. Department of Transportation, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 455, 570 A.2d 644 (1990); Pearson v. Commonwealth, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 91, 551 A.2d 394 (1988); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Curran, 107 Pa.Commonw

1994Of all the decisions on the subject that I have been able to find, the following five cases are not exactly on this issue, and the full discretion given to the police officer in each of them is dictum and, therefore, not precedential: Sladic v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 164 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 619, 643 A.2d 1155 (1994); Kostyk v. Department of Transportation, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 455, 570 A.2d 644 (1990); Pearson v. Commonwealth, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 91, 551 A.2d 394 (1988); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Curran, 107 Pa.Commonw

1988McFarren, citing Commonwealth v. Funk, 254 Pa. Superior Ct. 233 , 385 A.2d 995 (1978).

1988McFarren, citing Commonwealth v. Funk, 254 Pa. Superior Ct. 233 , 385 A.2d 995 (1978).

1988This court has recently held that, when a police officer requests a licensee to submit to a breath test, the officer must administer the test twice, in accordance with 67 Pa. Code §77.24 , Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Penich, 112 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 303 , 535 A.2d 296 (1988); and that requests for a second breath test, pursuant to DOT regulation, are per se reasonable under McFarren, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Bush, 112 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 510 , 535 A.2d 754 (1988).

1988This court has recently held that, when a police officer requests a licensee to submit to a breath test, the officer must administer the test twice, in accordance with 67 Pa. Code §77.24 , Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Penich, 112 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 303 , 535 A.2d 296 (1988); and that requests for a second breath test, pursuant to DOT regulation, are per se reasonable under McFarren, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Bush, 112 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 510 , 535 A.2d 754 (1988).