witnesses hearing in Pennsylvania

1978In re Estate of Fickert, supra, 461 Pa. at 657 , 337 A.2d at 594 .” In re Estate of Ziel, 467 Pa. 531, 536-37 , 359 A.2d 728, 731 (1976).

1978In re Estate of Fickert, supra, 461 Pa. at 657 , 337 A.2d at 594 .” In re Estate of Ziel, 467 Pa. 531, 536-37 , 359 A.2d 728, 731 (1976).

2009Id., 658 A.2d at 816 . ¶ 6 The procedural posture of the present case is analogous to Harris .

2009Id., 658 A.2d at 816 . ¶ 6 The procedural posture of the present case is analogous to Harris .

1997Without any further discussion, the court in Brinkley concluded that “the statements of the witnesses in defense counsel’s possession were not protected against disclosure by the work product privilege especially in light of the trial court’s narrowly drawn disclosure order.” Id. 1 We do not find Brinkley to be carte blanche authority for mutual discovery.

1987Id.

1986As this court recently stated in Shepley v. Dobbin, 351 Pa.Super. 182 , 505 A.2d 327 (1986), “Particularly where, as in this instance, the evidence is contradictory, the chancellor’s findings deserve even greater weight, since it is he who must necessarily pass on the credibility of witnesses.” 351 Pa.Superior Ct. at 185-186, 505 A.2d at 329 .

1986As this court recently stated in Shepley v. Dobbin, 351 Pa.Super. 182 , 505 A.2d 327 (1986), “Particularly where, as in this instance, the evidence is contradictory, the chancellor’s findings deserve even greater weight, since it is he who must necessarily pass on the credibility of witnesses.” 351 Pa.Superior Ct. at 185-186, 505 A.2d at 329 .

1982The city did submit, as an exhibit, a statement by Mr. Isaac taken by an investigating officer, in which Mr. Isaac claimed that the gun discharged while he and the appellant were struggling in the stairway, although the gun was in the appellant’s right hand. 2 The trial court concluded that the hearsay statements made by the witnesses at the hearing, along with the physical evidence admitted as exhibits, possessed “indicia of reliability sufficient to provide them prima facie circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Consistent with Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27

1982The city did submit, as an exhibit, a statement by Mr. Isaac taken by an investigating officer, in which Mr. Isaac claimed that the gun discharged while he and the appellant were struggling in the stairway, although the gun was in the appellant’s right hand. 2 The trial court concluded that the hearsay statements made by the witnesses at the hearing, along with the physical evidence admitted as exhibits, possessed “indicia of reliability sufficient to provide them prima facie circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Consistent with Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27

1977The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Mayer, 240 Pa.Super. 181 , 362 A.2d 407 (filed April 22, 1976); and Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 233 Pa.Super. 396 , 336 A.2d 632 (1975), for its view that in this instance, the officer’s belief is irrelevant.

1977The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Mayer, 240 Pa.Super. 181 , 362 A.2d 407 (filed April 22, 1976); and Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 233 Pa.Super. 396 , 336 A.2d 632 (1975), for its view that in this instance, the officer’s belief is irrelevant.

1977The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Mayer, 240 Pa.Super. 181 , 362 A.2d 407 (filed April 22, 1976); and Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 233 Pa.Super. 396 , 336 A.2d 632 (1975), for its view that in this instance, the officer’s belief is irrelevant.

1977The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Mayer, 240 Pa.Super. 181 , 362 A.2d 407 (filed April 22, 1976); and Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 233 Pa.Super. 396 , 336 A.2d 632 (1975), for its view that in this instance, the officer’s belief is irrelevant.

1967It cannot be bound by the opinion of the witnesses or the instruction of the court." (at p. 441) In Avins v. Commonwealth, 379 Pa. 202, 206 , 108 A. 2d 788 (1954), it was stated: ". . . we are not to be understood as even implying that the court was bound to accept as verity the estimate of the damage as testified to by any one of the expert witnesses.

1967It cannot be bound by the opinion of the witnesses or the instruction of the court." (at p. 441) In Avins v. Commonwealth, 379 Pa. 202, 206 , 108 A. 2d 788 (1954), it was stated: ". . . we are not to be understood as even implying that the court was bound to accept as verity the estimate of the damage as testified to by any one of the expert witnesses.

1933We are not warranted in interfering with the court’s action unless there has been an abuse of discretion (Warren Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Foley, 294 Pa. 176 , 144 A. 84 ); none appears.

1933We are not warranted in interfering with the court’s action unless there has been an abuse of discretion (Warren Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Foley, 294 Pa. 176 , 144 A. 84 ); none appears.

1924In Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Northumberland County Commissioners, 250 Pa. 515, 525 , Elkin, J., in remanding the record to the court below, because from it the Supreme Court was unable to determine the taxable value of the properties which were the subject of that appeal, said: “We, therefore, agree that the valuations of these six tracts should be reduced to the values testified to by the witnesses at the hearing.

1914In Commonwealth v. Payne, 242 Pa. 394 , Mr. Justice Brown said: “Appellant’s second complaint is that the Commonwealth was permitted to ask one of the witnesses for the defense on cross-examination whether he had been shortly before convicted of robbery and of assault and battery with intent to rob.