witnesses hearing in Kansas

2007The court listed certain factors that should be considered in this determination: “(1) length of anticipated separation the parents may face, (2) the presence or absence of parental consent to State assistance, (3) the presence or absence of disputed facts, (4) the parents’ ability to cope with relevant documents and to question the State’s witnesses at the hearing.” 230 Kan. at 68 .

1991The Cooper court, in addition to the balancing test, set forth four additional factors when considering whether to appoint counsel: "(1) length of anticipated separation the parents may face, (2) the presence or absence of parental consent to State assistance, (3) the presence or absence of disputed facts, (4) the parents' ability to cope with relevant documents and to question the State's witnesses at the hearing." 230 Kan. at 68 .

1926S. 60-2830, 60-2832, 60-2835; Business Blocks Co. v. Gregory, 102 Kan. 33 , 169 Pac. 191 ), and the fact that the state’s witnesses at the hearing before the commissioner sought to change, qualify or repudiate the testimony they had theretofore given does not necessarily destroy the evidential significance attaching to the seemingly disinterested testimony they had given in the first instance bearing on the matter in issue.

1926S. 60-2830, 60-2832, 60-2835; Business Blocks Co. v. Gregory, 102 Kan. 33 , 169 Pac. 191 ), and the fact that the state’s witnesses at the hearing before the commissioner sought to change, qualify or repudiate the testimony they had theretofore given does not necessarily destroy the evidential significance attaching to the seemingly disinterested testimony they had given in the first instance bearing on the matter in issue.

1926(State v. Taylor, 119 Kan. 260 , 237 Pac. 1053 ; Di Carlo v. United States, 6 Fed. [2d.] 364.) Whatever zeal or success the defendant may have shown in prosecuting liquor cases before the district court or elsewhere, the conclusion is unavoidable that he failed in his duty to prosecute to a,conclusion sincerely or diligently a large number of cases instituted by him before these justices of the peace (State, ex rel., v. Baird, 117 Kan. 549 , 231 Pac. 1021 ); and the oft-repeated extortion from persons accused of crime of large sums of money by the justices and their disbursement to constables

1926(State v. Taylor, 119 Kan. 260 , 237 Pac. 1053 ; Di Carlo v. United States, 6 Fed. [2d.] 364.) Whatever zeal or success the defendant may have shown in prosecuting liquor cases before the district court or elsewhere, the conclusion is unavoidable that he failed in his duty to prosecute to a,conclusion sincerely or diligently a large number of cases instituted by him before these justices of the peace (State, ex rel., v. Baird, 117 Kan. 549 , 231 Pac. 1021 ); and the oft-repeated extortion from persons accused of crime of large sums of money by the justices and their disbursement to constables

1926(State v. Taylor, 119 Kan. 260 , 237 Pac. 1053 ; Di Carlo v. United States, 6 Fed. [2d.] 364.) Whatever zeal or success the defendant may have shown in prosecuting liquor cases before the district court or elsewhere, the conclusion is unavoidable that he failed in his duty to prosecute to a,conclusion sincerely or diligently a large number of cases instituted by him before these justices of the peace (State, ex rel., v. Baird, 117 Kan. 549 , 231 Pac. 1021 ); and the oft-repeated extortion from persons accused of crime of large sums of money by the justices and their disbursement to constables

1926(State v. Taylor, 119 Kan. 260 , 237 Pac. 1053 ; Di Carlo v. United States, 6 Fed. [2d.] 364.) Whatever zeal or success the defendant may have shown in prosecuting liquor cases before the district court or elsewhere, the conclusion is unavoidable that he failed in his duty to prosecute to a,conclusion sincerely or diligently a large number of cases instituted by him before these justices of the peace (State, ex rel., v. Baird, 117 Kan. 549 , 231 Pac. 1021 ); and the oft-repeated extortion from persons accused of crime of large sums of money by the justices and their disbursement to constables

1925In McLean v. McLean, 92 Kan. 326, 331 , 140 Pac. 847 , the court said: “It is especially urged that the court erred in permitting several witnesses to testify that there was a general rumor and understanding in the Kentucky neighborhood among the neighbors and friends of the decedent that he was the father of the child; also in permitting the witnesses for the defense to be asked, over appellants’ objection, if such rumor and understanding did not exist in the neighborhood.

1925In McLean v. McLean, 92 Kan. 326, 331 , 140 Pac. 847 , the court said: “It is especially urged that the court erred in permitting several witnesses to testify that there was a general rumor and understanding in the Kentucky neighborhood among the neighbors and friends of the decedent that he was the father of the child; also in permitting the witnesses for the defense to be asked, over appellants’ objection, if such rumor and understanding did not exist in the neighborhood.

1909The plaintiff, however, relies upon the case of Guern sey v. Davis, 67 Kan. 378 , the syllabus of which reads as follows: “In an action by a principal against his agent for a breach of duty, an allegation of a specific direction to the agent is sufficiently established by showing that the •agent’s duty in all cases covered the transaction in suit, and an instruction to the jury hypothesizing a •specific direction in the particular case is warranted by •such evidence.” This is good law, but it applies only in cases of true •agency, and under the findings of fact the court is not concerned with