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9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reed v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998We further stated: “The government’s ... purpose in eliciting on direct examination of its witnesses that they had made statements inconsistent with their trial testimony was to ‘take the sting out’ of anticipated impeachment of the witnesses by the defense.” Id. 1998We further stated: "The government's ... purpose in eliciting on direct examination of its witnesses that they had made statements inconsistent with their trial testimony was to `take the sting out' of anticipated impeachment of the witnesses by the defense." Id. | 1 | 2 |
Friends of McMillan Park v. DC Mayor's Agent for Historic Preservation & Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Developmentgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., FOMP II, 207 A.3d at 1177 (affirming Mayor’s Agent’s findings where “the applicants’ witnesses at the hearing provided ample indication that they had considered numerous alternatives and that no other design could provide the same level of benefits with less demolition”). iii. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998Before allowing the brief reference to the prior beating as an explanation of M.A.’s recantation, the trial judge made a determination that the probative value of the explanation was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. 1996) (en banc). 1998Before allowing the brief reference to the prior beating as an explanation of M.A.'s recantation, the trial judge made a determination that the probative value of the explanation was not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. 1996) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. District of Columbia Department of Human Servicesgreen1 sentence1998See 5 DCMR § 2009.12(e) (“The testimony given at the hearing shall be under oath or affirmation”); Harrison v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Servs., 472 A.2d 405, 406 (D.C.1984); Dietrich, supra, 293 A.2d at 474 . | 1 | 1 |
Beale v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1994See also Beale, supra, 465 A.2d at 800 . 1994See also Beale, supra, 465 A.2d at 800 . | 1 | 1 |
Mike Palm, Inc. v. Interdonatogreen1 sentence1994“Resolution of ... the witnesses’ credibility ... [is an issue] left to the jury.” Mike Palm, Inc. v. Interdonato, 547 A.2d 1016, 1021 (D.C.1988) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Harvey v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) (“If in this brief reference to appellant’s inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure”); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 (“The prosecutor’s failure to seek court permission for a ‘missing witness’ argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross’s absence but ‘did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant’ ” (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d a 1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) ("If in this brief reference to appellant's inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure"); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 ("The prosecutor's failure to seek court permission for a `missing witness' argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross's absence but `did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant'" (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d at | 1 | 1 |
Conyers v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) (“If in this brief reference to appellant’s inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure”); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 (“The prosecutor’s failure to seek court permission for a ‘missing witness’ argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross’s absence but ‘did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant’ ” (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d a 1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) ("If in this brief reference to appellant's inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure"); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 ("The prosecutor's failure to seek court permission for a `missing witness' argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross's absence but `did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant'" (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d at | 1 | 1 |
Logan v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) (“If in this brief reference to appellant’s inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure”); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 (“The prosecutor’s failure to seek court permission for a ‘missing witness’ argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross’s absence but ‘did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant’ ” (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d a 1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) ("If in this brief reference to appellant's inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure"); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 ("The prosecutor's failure to seek court permission for a `missing witness' argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross's absence but `did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant'" (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d at | 1 | 1 |
Parks v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) (“If in this brief reference to appellant’s inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure”); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 (“The prosecutor’s failure to seek court permission for a ‘missing witness’ argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross’s absence but ‘did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant’ ” (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d a 1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) (“If in this brief reference to appellant’s inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure”); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 (“The prosecutor’s failure to seek court permission for a ‘missing witness’ argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross’s absence but ‘did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant’ ” (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d a | 1 | 1 |
Fleming v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) (“If in this brief reference to appellant’s inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure”); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 (“The prosecutor’s failure to seek court permission for a ‘missing witness’ argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross’s absence but ‘did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant’ ” (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d a 1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) ("If in this brief reference to appellant's inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure"); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 ("The prosecutor's failure to seek court permission for a `missing witness' argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross's absence but `did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant'" (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d at | 1 | 1 |
Kitt v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982We have stated that any party is entitled “to bring out on direct examination damaging information about ... his witness,” Kitt v. United States, D.C.App., 379 A.2d 973, 975 (1977), and that the eliciting of a witness’ prior convictions on direct examination does not constitute impeachment of the witness, but rather is an effort to enhance the witness’ credibility. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carlton E. Bryant, United States of America v. William E. Turnergreen2 sentences1976Even were we to agree that testimony concerning the complainant’s alleged extrinsic sexual activity would have been of some exculpatory benefit to appellant (which we do not) [cf. United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 137-38 , 439 F.2d 642, 647-48 (1971)], we find his argument to be without merit. 1976Even were we to agree that testimony concerning the complainant’s alleged extrinsic sexual activity would have been of some exculpatory benefit to appellant (which we do not) [cf. United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 137-38 , 439 F.2d 642, 647-48 (1971)], we find his argument to be without merit. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1976Appellant further contends that his defense was improperly prejudiced by the government's unwillingness to grant the witnesses immunity for their testimony [ see 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (1970)], and that by depriving him of "plainly exculpatory material" such failure transgressed the due process principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L. 1976Appellant further contends that his defense was improperly prejudiced by the government's unwillingness to grant the witnesses immunity for their testimony [ see 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (1970)], and that by depriving him of "plainly exculpatory material" such failure transgressed the due process principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L. | 2 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Agurs
green
2 sentences1976Appellant further contends that his defense was improperly prejudiced by the government’s unwillingness to grant the witnesses immunity for their testimony [see 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (1970)], and that by depriving him of “plainly exculpatory material” such failure transgressed the due process principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) [limited in United States v. Agurs, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)]. 1976Appellant further contends that his defense was improperly prejudiced by the government’s unwillingness to grant the witnesses immunity for their testimony [see 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (1970)], and that by depriving him of “plainly exculpatory material” such failure transgressed the due process principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) [limited in United States v. Agurs, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)]. | 2 | 1976–1976 |
Dietrich v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment
green
2 sentences1998See 5 DCMR § 2009.12(e) (“The testimony given at the hearing shall be under oath or affirmation”); Harrison v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Servs., 472 A.2d 405, 406 (D.C.1984); Dietrich, supra, 293 A.2d at 474 . 1998See 5 DCMR § 2009.12(e) (“The testimony given at the hearing shall be under oath or affirmation”); Harrison v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Servs., 472 A.2d 405, 406 (D.C.1984); Dietrich, supra, 293 A.2d at 474 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Heckler
green
1 sentence1994The court has also held that “[t]he rule against impeachment of one’s own witness forbids an attack on the credibility of the witness; the rule is not violated by the eliciting of evidence adverse to the witness’ credibility as a matter of strategy.” Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C.1982) (proper for government “to ‘take the sting out’ of anticipated impeachment of the witnesses by the defense”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839 , 104 S.Ct. 132 , 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Reed v. United States
green
1 sentence1994The court has also held that “[t]he rule against impeachment of one’s own witness forbids an attack on the credibility of the witness; the rule is not violated by the eliciting of evidence adverse to the witness’ credibility as a matter of strategy.” Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C.1982) (proper for government “to ‘take the sting out’ of anticipated impeachment of the witnesses by the defense”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839 , 104 S.Ct. 132 , 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lee v. United States
green
1 sentence1994The court has also held that “[t]he rule against impeachment of one’s own witness forbids an attack on the credibility of the witness; the rule is not violated by the eliciting of evidence adverse to the witness’ credibility as a matter of strategy.” Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C.1982) (proper for government “to ‘take the sting out’ of anticipated impeachment of the witnesses by the defense”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839 , 104 S.Ct. 132 , 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
DiSilvestro v. Veterans' Administration
green
2 sentences1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) (“If in this brief reference to appellant’s inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure”); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 (“The prosecutor’s failure to seek court permission for a ‘missing witness’ argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross’s absence but ‘did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant’ ” (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d a 1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) ("If in this brief reference to appellant's inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure"); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 ("The prosecutor's failure to seek court permission for a `missing witness' argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross's absence but `did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant'" (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d at | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Harvey v. United States
green
2 sentences1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) (“If in this brief reference to appellant’s inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure”); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 (“The prosecutor’s failure to seek court permission for a ‘missing witness’ argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross’s absence but ‘did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant’ ” (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d a 1986Compare Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220 (D.C.1973) ("If in this brief reference to appellant's inability to produce the witnesses error was committed, it was procedural error in failing to follow the Gass procedure"); Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 614 ("The prosecutor's failure to seek court permission for a `missing witness' argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross's absence but `did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant'" (citation omitted)); and Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d at | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.