witnesses hearing in Texas

2004Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 277 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S.Ct. 3042 , 120 L.Ed.2d 910 (1992).

2001Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 277 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S.Ct. 3042 , 120 L.Ed.2d 910 (1992).

2004Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 277 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S.Ct. 3042 , 120 L.Ed.2d 910 (1992).

2001Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 277 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S.Ct. 3042 , 120 L.Ed.2d 910 (1992).

2019As we noted in Buxton [S]ection 2(b) contains numerous procedural safeguards that protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, including requirements that the trial court determine at a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the evidence will be adequate to support a finding that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defense counsel has the right to cross-examine the witnesses at the hearing, and that the State provide notice of its intent to use such evidence in its case in chief at least thirty days before trial. 526 S.W.3d at 688 (citing Har

2019As we noted in Buxton: [S]ection 2(b) contains numerous procedural safeguards that protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, including requirements that the trial court determine at a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the evidence will be adequate to support a finding that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defense counsel has the right to cross-examine the witnesses at the hearing, and that the State provide notice of its intent to use such evidence in its case in chief at least thirty days before trial. 526 S.W.3d at 688 (citing Ha

2006We agree with the conclusion in Compton that it would be unreasonable to conclude that any variation in administering the tests, no matter how slight, could automatically undermine the admissibility of an individual = s performance of the tests. 120 S.W.3d at 738 . 7 Presuming, without deciding, that Officer Walden qualified as an expert in this case, we hold that the trial court was free to believe any or all evidence presented and to make a determination of the facts supported by the record after evaluating the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing and that the trial court

2006We agree with the conclusion in Compton that it would be unreasonable to conclude that any variation in administering the tests, no matter how slight, could automatically undermine the admissibility of an individual’s performance of the tests. 120 S.W.3d at 738 . 7 Presuming, without deciding, that Officer Walden qualified as an expert in this *222 case, we hold that the trial court was free to believe any or all evidence presented and to make a determination of the facts supported by the record after evaluating the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing and that the trial co

2019As we noted in Buxton [S]ection 2(b) contains numerous procedural safeguards that protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, including requirements that the trial court determine at a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the evidence will be adequate to support a finding that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defense counsel has the right to cross-examine the witnesses at the hearing, and that the State provide notice of its intent to use such evidence in its case in chief at least thirty days before trial. 526 S.W.3d at 688 (citing Har

2019As we noted in Buxton: [S]ection 2(b) contains numerous procedural safeguards that protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, including requirements that the trial court determine at a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the evidence will be adequate to support a finding that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defense counsel has the right to cross-examine the witnesses at the hearing, and that the State provide notice of its intent to use such evidence in its case in chief at least thirty days before trial. 526 S.W.3d at 688 (citing Ha

2014It was free to reject appellant’s testimony that, despite his doubts regarding the car’s legitimacy, he believed Hafley had legally acquired it from his brother “for a cheap price.” See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865 .

2014It was free to reject appellant’s testimony that, despite his doubts regarding the car’s legitimacy, he believed Hafley had legally acquired it from his brother “for a cheap price.” See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865 .

1983Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Aranda v. State, 506 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).

1979Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Aranda v. State, 506 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

1983Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Aranda v. State, 506 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).

1979Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Aranda v. State, 506 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).

1958This is substantially the holding of this court in Langford v. State, 123 Texas Cr.

1958This is substantially the holding of this Court in Langford v. State, 123 Tex.Cr.R. 171 , 58 S.W.2d 115 , and Sherwood v. State, 111 Tex.Cr.R. 453 , 14 S.W.2d 1029 . 4.

2020To uphold an award of mental anguish damages on a legal sufficiency review, the record must contain “direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of [the plaintiff’s] mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiff’s daily routine,” or “evidence of a high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.” Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605 , 618–19 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995)) (emphasis added).

2018Id. art. 36.05.