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17 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1926–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Interest of E.R.green2 sentences2024However, I write separately because, in the collateral attack analysis, my opinion would begin where the majority opinion could have ended—in concluding Bell failed to exercise reasonable diligence so as to justify substituted service.1 See In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 564 (Tex. 2012) (“[i]f personal service can be effected by the exercise of reasonable diligence, substitute service is not to be resorted to” (quoting Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 241 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex. 1951))). 2023However, I write separately because, in the collateral attack analysis, my opinion would begin where the majority opinion could have ended—in concluding Bell failed to exercise reasonable diligence so as to justify substituted service. 1 That is, even assuming without deciding that: (1) Bell exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to personally serve JD Auto’s authorized agent so as to justify substituted service; and (2) Bell posted notice at the courthouse in compliance with the trial court’s substituted service order, JD Auto’s collateral 1 See In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 564 (Tex. 201 | 2 | 2 |
Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovichgreen2 sentences2024However, I write separately because, in the collateral attack analysis, my opinion would begin where the majority opinion could have ended—in concluding Bell failed to exercise reasonable diligence so as to justify substituted service.1 See In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 564 (Tex. 2012) (“[i]f personal service can be effected by the exercise of reasonable diligence, substitute service is not to be resorted to” (quoting Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 241 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex. 1951))). 2023However, I write separately because, in the collateral attack analysis, my opinion would begin where the majority opinion could have ended—in concluding Bell failed to exercise reasonable diligence so as to justify substituted service. 1 That is, even assuming without deciding that: (1) Bell exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to personally serve JD Auto’s authorized agent so as to justify substituted service; and (2) Bell posted notice at the courthouse in compliance with the trial court’s substituted service order, JD Auto’s collateral 1 See In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 564 (Tex. 201 | 2 | 2 |
Narvaez v. Maldonadogreen2 sentences2009Narvaez v. Maldonado, 127 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.).3 Because both Park and Western Union characterize Western Union’s jurisdictional challenge as a collateral attack on the underlying default judgment, we will proceed under a collateral-attack analysis. 2009Narvaez v. Maldonado , 127 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.). (3) Because both Park and Western Union characterize Western Union's jurisdictional challenge as a collateral attack on the underlying default judgment, we will proceed under a collateral-attack analysis. | 2 | 2 |
Cook v. Camerongreen1 sentence2003See Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1987). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Whitegreen1 sentence1992See also White v. White , 179 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1944) (holding as impermissible a collateral attack to challenge the jurisdiction of a court issuing a binding judgment which is regular on its face and on the record). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re AGG
green
2 sentences2009In re A.G.G., 267 S.W.3d at 169 . 2009In re A.G.G., 267 S.W.3d at 169 . | 4 | 2009–2009 |
Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
green
1 sentence2016Doe cannot collaterally attack the hearing officer’s determination through a declaratory action, because UDJA claims generally cannot provide “relief against agency orders from which the legislature has not granted a right of judicial review and thereby waived sovereign immunity.” Creedmoor-Maha, 307 S.W.3d at 515 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
cluster 610597
green
1 sentence2015United Sta s v. Ga rc ia -Jasso, 4/ 2 F. 3d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Vaquero, 997 F.2d 78 , 79 -(5th Cir. 1993). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Holder v. Scott
green
1 sentence2004Appellants cite three cases as authority for their unique application of the collateral attack rule: Starnes v. Holloway, 779 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Dews v. Floyd, 418 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1967, no writ); and Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1965, writ refd n.r.e.). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Starnes v. Holloway
green
1 sentence2004Appellants cite three cases as authority for their unique application of the collateral attack rule: Starnes v. Holloway, 779 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Dews v. Floyd, 418 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1967, no writ); and Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1965, writ refd n.r.e.). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Wood v. Downing
neutral
1 sentence2004Appellants cite three cases as authority for their unique application of the collateral attack rule: Starnes v. Holloway, 779 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Dews v. Floyd, 418 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1967, no writ); and Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1965, writ refd n.r.e.). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences1965We have now concluded that even though petitioner was in the appellate process at the time the Supreme Court handed down Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , he may not avail himself in this collateral attack of the rule therein announced because of his failure to object to the introduction of the fruits of the search at the time of trial. 1965We have now concluded that even though petitioner was in the appellate process at the time the Supreme Court handed down Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , he may not avail himself in this collateral attack of the rule therein announced because of his failure to object to the introduction of the fruits of the search at the time of trial. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Tuck v. Patterson
green
1 sentence1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud | 1 | 1941–1941 |
McCampbell v. Durst
neutral
2 sentences1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud 1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Fisher v. Wood
neutral
1 sentence1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Kreis v. Kreis
neutral
1 sentence1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Miller v. Carlton
green
2 sentences1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud 1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Nuckols v. Stanger
neutral
1 sentence1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Johnston v. Stephens
green
2 sentences1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud 1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Storer v. Lane.
neutral
2 sentences1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud 1941This court concludes that the trial court erred in so determining that removal of such pre-existing judgment by direct attack thereon was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of this action; hence, that plaintiffs'in error’s quoted first assignment should be sustained; in other words, our authorities hold that, in such an instance as this, where a purchaser at a judicial sale is alleged to have acquired the property in fraud both of the court through which the proceedings were had and of the plaintiff himself, that it passed by constructive trust for the benefit of the *922 defraud | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Boggess v. Howard
green
1 sentence1927Dec. 657 ; Boggess v. Howard, 40 Tex. 153 ), or invoke the doctrine of collateral attack (Freeman on Judgments [5th Ed.] p. 788). | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Crawford v. McDonald
green
1 sentence1926As said by the Supreme Court in Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626 , 33 S. W. 325 : “It is well settled that, where a personal judgment has been rendered against a defendant by a domestic court of general jurisdiction, and under the “judgment” property has been seized and sold, he will not, in a contest over the title to the property, be allowed to show by evidence dehors the record that the judgment was rendered without any service * * * upon him.” This was said in a case of collateral attack, where the judgment recited legal service upon the defendant, and the rule is definitely settled in Te | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.