Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
17 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hartland Dean West v. Kerr-Mcgee Corporationgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 (“In the instant case, factual findings concerning the first and third factors should have been made prior to the district court’s determination of borrowed employee status.”); see also West, 765 F.2d at 531 ; Alday, 750 F.2d at 378 . 2018See, e.g., Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 (“In the instant case, factual findings concerning the first and third factors should have been made prior to the district court’s determination of borrowed employee status.”); see also West, 765 F.2d at 531 ; Alday, 750 F.2d at 378 . | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Union Oil Company Of Californiagreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 (“In the instant case, factual findings concerning the first and third factors should have been made prior to the district court’s determination of borrowed employee status.”); see also West, 765 F.2d at 531 ; Alday, 750 F.2d at 378 . 2018See, e.g., Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 (“In the instant case, factual findings concerning the first and third factors should have been made prior to the district court’s determination of borrowed employee status.”); see also West, 765 F.2d at 531 ; Alday, 750 F.2d at 378 . | 2 | 2 |
Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See id. at 489–91; Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 , 935– 96 (Tex. 1998). 2015See id. at 489–91; Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 , 935– 96 (Tex. 1998). | 2 | 2 |
Ingram v. Deeregreen2 sentences2019Id. at 896 ; Shafipour v. Rischon Dev. 2018Id. at 896 ; Shafipour v. Rischon Dev. | 1 | 3 |
R.K. v. Ramirezgreen1 sentence2024But Richardson challenges whether the emotional impact on 8 E.B. from contemporaneously observing her brother’s death rose to the level of “shock.” In Richardson’s view, “shock” is a mental or emotional condition that courts in other states have characterized as exceeding mental anguish, and that condition is part of E.B.’s claim because “the jury must make a factual determination concerning the condition itself.” R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 843 (Tex. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Hawkins v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Hawkins v. State 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) Clearly the first and third factors tell in favor of a finding of prejudicial harm. | 1 | 1 |
Francis A. Cash v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, J. B. Hutton, Jr., Amicus Curiaegreen2 sentences1992Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 564 (9th Cir.1984) (prospective application allowed because "the strength of the considerations relating to the first and third factors outweigh[ed] that relating to the second factor ...’’); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir.1983) (court allowed prospective holding despite concluding that the second prong favored a retroactive holding); Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation, 681 F.2d 81 , 85 (1st Cir.1982); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980) ("The application of [the Chevron ] factors is not accomplished through a 1992Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 564 (9th Cir.1984) (prospective application allowed because "the strength of the considerations relating to the first and third factors outweigh[ed] that relating to the second factor ..."); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir.1983) (court allowed prospective holding despite concluding that the second prong favored a retroactive holding); Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 681 F.2d 81 , 85 (1st Cir.1982); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980) (`The application of [the Chevron ] factors is not accomplished through a | 1 | 1 |
Donald J. Simpson v. Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programsgreen2 sentences1992Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 564 (9th Cir.1984) (prospective application allowed because "the strength of the considerations relating to the first and third factors outweigh[ed] that relating to the second factor ...’’); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir.1983) (court allowed prospective holding despite concluding that the second prong favored a retroactive holding); Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation, 681 F.2d 81 , 85 (1st Cir.1982); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980) ("The application of [the Chevron ] factors is not accomplished through a 1992Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 564 (9th Cir.1984) (prospective application allowed because "the strength of the considerations relating to the first and third factors outweigh[ed] that relating to the second factor ..."); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir.1983) (court allowed prospective holding despite concluding that the second prong favored a retroactive holding); Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 681 F.2d 81 , 85 (1st Cir.1982); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980) (`The application of [the Chevron ] factors is not accomplished through a | 1 | 1 |
Aline Edwards Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Company, Beatrice C. Shirley v. Penrod Drilling Company, Glenda Lees Nealy v. Fluor Drilling Services, Inc.green2 sentences1992Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 564 (9th Cir.1984) (prospective application allowed because "the strength of the considerations relating to the first and third factors outweigh[ed] that relating to the second factor ...’’); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir.1983) (court allowed prospective holding despite concluding that the second prong favored a retroactive holding); Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation, 681 F.2d 81 , 85 (1st Cir.1982); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980) ("The application of [the Chevron ] factors is not accomplished through a 1992Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 564 (9th Cir.1984) (prospective application allowed because "the strength of the considerations relating to the first and third factors outweigh[ed] that relating to the second factor ..."); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir.1983) (court allowed prospective holding despite concluding that the second prong favored a retroactive holding); Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 681 F.2d 81 , 85 (1st Cir.1982); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980) (`The application of [the Chevron ] factors is not accomplished through a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Austin v. State
green
2 sentences2015A detailed analysis of how curative measures may counter a limine violation in Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 801 (Tex.App.–Houston[14th Dist.] 2007, pet.ref’d). 2015This court offered a detailed analysis of how curative measures may counter a limine violation in Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 801 (Tex.App.–Houston[14th Dist.] 2007, pet.ref’d). | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Phillip Andrew Alday v. Patterson Truck Line, Inc., Individually and D/B/A and Atchafalaya Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g., Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 (“In the instant case, factual findings concerning the first and third factors should have been made prior to the district court’s determination of borrowed employee status.”); see also West, 765 F.2d at 531 ; Alday, 750 F.2d at 378 . 2018See, e.g., Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 (“In the instant case, factual findings concerning the first and third factors should have been made prior to the district court’s determination of borrowed employee status.”); see also West, 765 F.2d at 531 ; Alday, 750 F.2d at 378 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale
green
2 sentences2015See id. at 489–91; Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 , 935– 96 (Tex. 1998). 2015See id. at 489–91; Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 , 935– 96 (Tex. 1998). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Elbaor v. Smith
green
2 sentences2012The first factor is: whether the decision establishes a new principle of law by either overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed[.] Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d at 250 . 2012The first factor is: whether the decision establishes a new principle of law by either overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed[.] Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d at 250 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen
green
1 sentence2022The first factor The first factor concerns whether “the terms of the contract were negotiated, rather than boilerplate, and during negotiations, the parties specifically discussed the issue which has become the topic of the subsequent dispute.” Forest Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 60 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kentucky v. King
green
2 sentences2012NOTES [2] We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the first and third factors no longer apply after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kentucky v. King, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). 2012NOTES [2] We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the first and third factors no longer apply after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kentucky v. King, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
red
2 sentences1996We conclude, as we did in Elbaor, id. at 251 , that today’s holding applies in this case, in pending cases in which complaint of an assignment has been preserved, and to every such assignment executed after today. 1996We conclude, as we did in Elbaor, id. at 251 , that today's holding applies in this case, in pending cases in which complaint of an assignment has been preserved, and to every such assignment executed after today. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Carmelo Reyes Barina v. Gulf Trading And Transportation Company
green
2 sentences1992Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 564 (9th Cir.1984) (prospective application allowed because "the strength of the considerations relating to the first and third factors outweigh[ed] that relating to the second factor ...’’); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir.1983) (court allowed prospective holding despite concluding that the second prong favored a retroactive holding); Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation, 681 F.2d 81 , 85 (1st Cir.1982); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980) ("The application of [the Chevron ] factors is not accomplished through a 1992Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 564 (9th Cir.1984) (prospective application allowed because "the strength of the considerations relating to the first and third factors outweigh[ed] that relating to the second factor ..."); Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441, 445-46 (5th Cir.1983) (court allowed prospective holding despite concluding that the second prong favored a retroactive holding); Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 681 F.2d 81 , 85 (1st Cir.1982); Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980) (`The application of [the Chevron ] factors is not accomplished through a | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Robert I. Silverman v. Marion Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia
green
2 sentences1992Op. at 519. 51 It actually should be irrelevant how, for instance, a federal district court in Washington, D.C. chooses among the three requirements of Chevron Oil, Op. at n. 36 (citing Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072 (D.C.Cir.1988)), when Texas has consistently required that all three be met. 1992Op. at 519. [51] It actually should be irrelevant how, for instance, a federal district court in Washington, D.C. chooses among the three requirements of Chevron Oil, Op. at n. 36 (citing Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072 (D.C.Cir.1988)), when Texas has consistently required that all three be met. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.