17 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1880–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcikgreen2 sentences2022Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230 , 242–43 (Tex. 2010) (“Probable error is . . . a matter of judgment drawn from an evaluation of ‘the whole case from voir dire to closing argument, considering the state of the evidence, the strength and weakness of the case, and the verdict.’” (quoting Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. 2008))). 2010Probable error is not subject to precise measurement, but it is something less than certitude; it is a matter of judgment drawn from an evaluation of “the whole case from voir dire to closing argument, considering the ‘state of the evidence, the strength and weakness of the ease, and the verdict.’ ” Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex.2008) (quoting Standard Fire Ins. | 4 | 4 |
TXI Transportation Co. v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2022Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230 , 242–43 (Tex. 2010) (“Probable error is . . . a matter of judgment drawn from an evaluation of ‘the whole case from voir dire to closing argument, considering the state of the evidence, the strength and weakness of the case, and the verdict.’” (quoting Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. 2008))). 2019See TXI Transportation Company v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230 , 242–43 (Tex. 2010)(“[Probable error] is a matter of judgment drawn from an evaluation of the whole case from voir dire to closing argument, considering the state of the evidence, the strength and weakness of the case, and the verdict.”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]. | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Montoya De Hernandezgreen2 sentences2005But this level of reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and it requires less than the probable standard, which calls for facts suggesting “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); and referencing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)). 2005But this level of reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and it requires less than the probable standard, which calls for facts suggesting “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); and referencing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)). | 3 | 3 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2005But this level of reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and it requires less than the probable standard, which calls for facts suggesting “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); and referencing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)). 2005But this level of reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and it requires less than the probable standard, which calls for facts suggesting “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); and referencing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)). | 2 | 3 |
Jones v. Jefferson Countygreen1 sentence2026For similar reasons, Galderma has not established a probable right to 17 Jones v. Jefferson Cnty., 15 S.W.3d 206, 213 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied); Hyde v. Aero Valley Prop. | 1 | 1 |
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reesegreen2 sentences2010Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex.1979)). 2010Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co.green2 sentences1949See .the following decisions, already cited, regarding judgments: Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex.. 414, 55 S.W. 559 ; Poitevent v. Scarborough, 103 Tex. 111 , 124 S.W. 87 ; Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, p. 678 , 180 S.W.2d 909, 679 (Headnote 6) ; Miller v. Lemm, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 211 ; Robertson v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 862 ; Pearson v. Lloyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 759 . 1949See .the following decisions, already cited, regarding judgments: Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex.. 414, 55 S.W. 559 ; Poitevent v. Scarborough, 103 Tex. 111 , 124 S.W. 87 ; Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, p. 678 , 180 S.W.2d 909, 679 (Headnote 6) ; Miller v. Lemm, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 211 ; Robertson v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 862 ; Pearson v. Lloyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 759 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Sokolow
green
2 sentences2005But this level of reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and it requires less than the probable standard, which calls for facts suggesting “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); and referencing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)). 2005But this level of reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and it requires less than the probable standard, which calls for facts suggesting “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); and referencing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)). | 3 | 2004–2005 |
Munson v. Milton
green
1 sentence2016Thus, this Court concluded that because the restrictive covenant prohibited the homeowner from leasing the home for such transient purposes, the other owners had “established a probable violation of the restrictive covenant.” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump
green
1 sentence2012Transcontinental Insurance, 330 S.W.3d at 225 ; see TXI Transportation Company v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 242-43 (Tex. 2010) (“Probable error is not subject to precise measurement, but it is something less than certitude; it is a matter of judg *812 ment drawn from an evaluation of the whole case from voir dire to closing argument, considering the state of the evidence, the strength and weakness of the case, and the Verdict”). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Christy v. Stauffer Publications, Inc.
green
1 sentence1973Christy v. Stauffer Publications, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.1969). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Miller v. Lemm
neutral
1 sentence1949See .the following decisions, already cited, regarding judgments: Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex.. 414, 55 S.W. 559 ; Poitevent v. Scarborough, 103 Tex. 111 , 124 S.W. 87 ; Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, p. 678 , 180 S.W.2d 909, 679 (Headnote 6) ; Miller v. Lemm, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 211 ; Robertson v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 862 ; Pearson v. Lloyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 759 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Mansel v. Castles
green
1 sentence1949See .the following decisions, already cited, regarding judgments: Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex.. 414, 55 S.W. 559 ; Poitevent v. Scarborough, 103 Tex. 111 , 124 S.W. 87 ; Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, p. 678 , 180 S.W.2d 909, 679 (Headnote 6) ; Miller v. Lemm, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 211 ; Robertson v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 862 ; Pearson v. Lloyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 759 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Pearson v. Lloyd
green
1 sentence1949See .the following decisions, already cited, regarding judgments: Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex.. 414, 55 S.W. 559 ; Poitevent v. Scarborough, 103 Tex. 111 , 124 S.W. 87 ; Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, p. 678 , 180 S.W.2d 909, 679 (Headnote 6) ; Miller v. Lemm, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 211 ; Robertson v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 862 ; Pearson v. Lloyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 759 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Robertson v. Lee
neutral
1 sentence1949See .the following decisions, already cited, regarding judgments: Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex.. 414, 55 S.W. 559 ; Poitevent v. Scarborough, 103 Tex. 111 , 124 S.W. 87 ; Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, p. 678 , 180 S.W.2d 909, 679 (Headnote 6) ; Miller v. Lemm, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 211 ; Robertson v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 862 ; Pearson v. Lloyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 759 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Poitevent v. Scarborough
green
2 sentences1949See .the following decisions, already cited, regarding judgments: Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex.. 414, 55 S.W. 559 ; Poitevent v. Scarborough, 103 Tex. 111 , 124 S.W. 87 ; Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, p. 678 , 180 S.W.2d 909, 679 (Headnote 6) ; Miller v. Lemm, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 211 ; Robertson v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 862 ; Pearson v. Lloyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 759 . 1949See .the following decisions, already cited, regarding judgments: Mansel v. Castles, 93 Tex.. 414, 55 S.W. 559 ; Poitevent v. Scarborough, 103 Tex. 111 , 124 S.W. 87 ; Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, p. 678 , 180 S.W.2d 909, 679 (Headnote 6) ; Miller v. Lemm, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 211 ; Robertson v. Lee, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 862 ; Pearson v. Lloyd, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 759 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Kent v. the People
green
1 sentence1916United States v. Searcey (D.C.) 26 F. 435 ; Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563 , 9 P. 852 ; Sears v. Vaughan, 230 Ill. 572 , 82 N.E. 881 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Sears v. Vaughan
green
2 sentences1916United States v. Searcey (D.C.) 26 F. 435 ; Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563 , 9 P. 852 ; Sears v. Vaughan, 230 Ill. 572 , 82 N.E. 881 . 1916United States v. Searcey (D.C.) 26 F. 435 ; Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563 , 9 P. 852 ; Sears v. Vaughan, 230 Ill. 572 , 82 N.E. 881 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
United States v. Searcey
neutral
1 sentence1916United States v. Searcey (D.C.) 26 F. 435 ; Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563 , 9 P. 852 ; Sears v. Vaughan, 230 Ill. 572 , 82 N.E. 881 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Mayes v. Jones
neutral
1 sentence1899We believe a careful examination of all the decisions of this court in which it has been held that the creditor had a right to a personal judgment against the heir will show that they wore governed by the acts above referred to as being in force prior to the first day of September, 1879, when the Revised Statutes took effect, and are therefore not in conflict with the conclusion we have reached in this case, with the probable exception of the case of Mayes v. Jones, 62 Tex. 365 . | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Powers v. Caldwell
neutral
1 sentence1880Powers v. Caldwell, 25 Tex., 352 ; Williams v. Bailes, 9 Tex., 62 . | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.