Ruiz factors in Texas

2018See West, 765 F.2d at 531 (citing Alday, 750 F.2d at 376-78 ).

2018See West, 765 F.2d at 531 (citing Alday, 750 F.2d at 376-78 ).

2018See West, 765 F.2d at 531 (citing Alday, 750 F.2d at 376-78 ).

2018See West, 765 F.2d at 531 (citing Alday, 750 F.2d at 376-78 ).

2018We also review these factors in light of Lomeli, 363 S.W.3d at 694 , which affirmed a defense summary judgment after concluding that seven of the nine Ruiz factors supported borrowed employee status for the plaintiff. 2.

2018We also review these factors in light of Lomeli, 363 S.W.3d at 694 , which affirmed a defense summary judgment after concluding that seven of the nine Ruiz factors supported borrowed employee status for the plaintiff. 2.

2018Servs., L.P., 605 F. App’x 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

2018Servs., L.P., 605 F. App’x 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

2002See Rodriguez , 982 S.W.2d at 70-71 (construing Ruiz as applying a different standard of review than that articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Wilson , and applying the Ruiz standard where the defendant argues that venue is proper in another county and challenges the sufficiency of the proof to support the plaintiff's choice of venue).

2002See Rodriguez , 982 S.W.2d at 70-71 (construing Ruiz as applying a different standard of review than that articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Wilson , and applying the Ruiz standard where the defendant argues that venue is proper in another county and challenges the sufficiency of the proof to support the plaintiff's choice of venue).

2011If the remaining borrowed employee factors overwhelmingly point to borrowed employee status, a summary judgment or direct verdict is appropriate.”); Alexander v. Chevron, U.S.A, 806 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1986) (“[T]he terms of the contract between the borrowing employer and payroll employer does not ordinarily provide a sufficient basis to deny summary judgment when the remaining Ruiz factors point toward borrowed servant status.”); Gaudet, 562 F.2d at 358-59 (holding, despite contractual language, that “sufficient basic factual ingredients are undisputed to warrant the entry of summary judgm

2011If the remaining borrowed employee factors overwhelmingly point to borrowed employee status, a summary judgment or direct verdict is appropriate.”); Alexander v. Chevron, U.S.A, 806 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1986) (“[T]he terms of the contract between the borrowing employer and payroll employer does not ordinarily provide a sufficient basis to deny summary judgment when the remaining Ruiz factors point toward borrowed servant status.”); Gaudet, 562 F.2d at 358-59 (holding, despite contractual language, that “sufficient basic factual ingredients are undisputed to warrant the entry of summary judgm

2018Compare Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at 904 (“In this case, Deere has not provided legally sufficient evidence of any of the five TRPA factors to prove the existence of a partnership.”), with Lentz Eng’g, L.C. v. Brown, No. 14- 10-00610-CV, 2011 WL 4449655 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (legally sufficient evidence supported finding after bench trial that no partnership existed; intent evidence was controverted, and uncontroverted evidence of profit splitting and shared control did not conclusively establish existence of partnership under totality-of-the-circ

2018Compare Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at 904 (“In this case, Deere has not provided legally sufficient evidence of any of the five TRPA factors to prove the existence of a partnership.”), with Lentz Eng’g, L.C. v. Brown, No. 14- 10-00610-CV, 2011 WL 4449655 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (legally sufficient evidence supported finding after bench trial that no partnership existed; intent evidence was controverted, and uncontroverted evidence of profit splitting and shared control did not conclusively establish existence of partnership under totality-of-the-circ

2023See id.; see also Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at 783 (explaining that adjudication of a “substantial right” is a factor to consider when determining whether a probate order is appealable); cf. Cosentino v. Bank, No. 05-21-00829-CV, 2022 WL 472799 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 16, 2022, no pet.) (“‘phase of the proceeding for which the [proceeding] was brought’ refers to the basis for the proceeding — the claim(s) or cause(s) of action asserted — not -4- 04-22-00650-CV an issue within the claim(s) or action(s).”); Estate Land Co. v. Wiese, No. 14-16-00496-CV, 2017 WL 6543416 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston

2021Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142 (stating that appellant must establish both prongs to prove counsel’s representation was ineffective); see also Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 (stating that failure to satisfy one prong negates court’s need to consider other prong).

2021See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 .

2021Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142 (stating that appellant must establish both prongs to prove counsel’s representation was ineffective); see also Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 (stating that failure to satisfy one prong negates court’s need to consider other prong).

2020As explained above, we think multiple Ruiz factors are in genuine dispute, the dispute is material to the ultimate question, and the lack of fact-findings resolving these questions cannot be ignored. 17 (“The central question in borrowed servant cases is whether someone has the power to control and direct another person in performance of his work.”); Capps, 784 F.2d at 617 (“[T]he courts place the most emphasis on the first factor, control over the employee.”).

2020As explained above, we think multiple Ruiz factors are in genuine dispute, the dispute is material to the ultimate question, and the lack of fact-findings resolving these questions cannot be ignored. 17 (“The central question in borrowed servant cases is whether someone has the power to control and direct another person in performance of his work.”); Capps, 784 F.2d at 617 (“[T]he courts place the most emphasis on the first factor, control over the employee.”).

2020See, e.g., Brown v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 984 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1993).

2020See, e.g., Brown v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 984 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1993).

2020See, e.g., Brown, 984 F.2d at 677 . 8 We are provided with no convincing reason to depart from the Fifth Circuit’s approach, and Fredieu does not offer any reason to think the Fifth Circuit’s view is incorrect as a matter of statutory interpretation, although he would be free to try.1 We agree with the Fifth Circuit that, in LHWCA cases, “the question of borrowed-employee status is a question of law for the district court to determine.” Billizon, 993 F.2d at 105 .

2020See, e.g., White, 222 F.3d at 150 (Wilkinson, J.) (rejecting the Ruiz factors because “[a] nine- part probe provides insufficient guidance to prospective litigants about the application of a legal standard, as the Fifth Circuit itself has intimated”).

2020See, e.g., White, 222 F.3d at 150 (Wilkinson, J.) (rejecting the Ruiz factors because “[a] nine- part probe provides insufficient guidance to prospective litigants about the application of a legal standard, as the Fifth Circuit itself has intimated”).

2018See id.

2018Co., 834 F.2d 1238, 1243 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). 7 The inquiry into Fredieu’s LHWCA borrowed employee status focuses on the nine Ruiz factors incorporated in the instruction accompanying Question No. 4.

2018See id.; see also Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. Crim.

2017Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625, 628-29 , 122 S.Ct. 2450 .

2017Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625, 628-29 .

2015App. 2013). 305 Ruiz’s brief 29. 306 See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 137, 143 . 35 additional mitigation evidence.