Theft Liability Act claim in Texas

2010Bank v. Couie, 642 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ) (finding, under predecessor statute to section 349.003 of the finance code, that “actual damages were not necessary items of proof to be made ... in order to recover under ... [article 5060, section 8.01(b) of the Consumer Credit] Code” because these penalties are not compensatory in nature and do not require a showing of actual damage); Stephens v. Friendly Chevrolet, Ltd., No. 05-04-00788-CV, 2005 WL 977834 , at *2, *4, 2005 Tex.App.

2010Bank v. Couie , 642 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ) (finding, under predecessor statute to section 349.003 of the finance code, that "actual damages were not necessary items of proof to be made . . . in order to recover under . . . [article 5060, section 8.01(b) of the Consumer Credit] Code" because these penalties are not compensatory in nature and do not require a showing of actual damage); Stephens v. Friendly Chevrolet, Ltd ., No. 05-04-00788-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 3170 , at *5, *11 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 28, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining that section 349

2010See Elias v. DeLeon, No. 12-04-00143-CV, 2005 WL 2404113 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Tyler Sept. 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that prison inmate’s petition asserting conversion claim had an arguable basis in law); Mi-nix, 162 S.W.3d at 639 (holding that prison inmate’s petition asserting Theft Liability Act claim against two correctional officers in their individual capacities had an arguable basis in law); Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 654 (holding that prison inmate’s petition for judicial review of prison disciplinary proceeding had arguable basis in law).

2010See Elias v. DeLeon, No. 12-04-00143-CV, 2005 WL 2404113 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Tyler Sept. 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that prison inmate's petition asserting conversion claim had an arguable basis in law); Minix, 162 S.W.3d at 639 (holding that prison inmate's petition asserting Theft Liability Act claim against two correctional officers in their individual capacities had an arguable basis in law); Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 654 (holding that prison inmate's petition for judicial review of prison disciplinary proceeding had arguable basis in law).

2010Ann. § 305.005); cf. Johns v. Ram-Forwarding, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 635, 637-38 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding, pursuant to section 134.005(b) of the civil practice and remedies code which provides “each person who prevails in a suit under this chapter shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees,” that the plaintiff who received zero damages on his Theft Liability Act claim was entitled to recover attorney’s fees because the jury found that the defendant committed civil theft); Nw.

2010Ann. § 305.005); cf. Johns v. Ram Forwarding, Inc ., 29 S.W.3d 635, 637-38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding, pursuant to section 134.005(b) of the civil practice and remedies code which provides "each person who prevails in a suit under this chapter shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees," that the plaintiff who received zero damages on his Theft Liability Act claim was entitled to recover attorney's fees because the jury found that the defendant committed civil theft); Nw.

2016Air Routing Int’l Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia Airways, Ltd., 150 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“The Theft Act is unusual in Texas law in that it requires the court to award attorney’s fees to a party who successfully defends a Theft Act claim, without any prerequisite that the claim is found to be groundless, frivolous, or brought in bad faith.”); see also Arrow Marble, LLC v. Estate of Killion, 441 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Equicap’s status defending against a TTLA claim does not prevent recovery of attorney’s fees.”).

2015See Arrow Marble, LLC v. Estate of Killion, 441 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (holding that party’s status defending against Texas Theft Liability Act claim “does not prevent recovery of attorney’s fees.”).

2010See Elias v. DeLeon, No. 12-04-00143-CV, 2005 WL 2404113 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Tyler Sept. 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that prison inmate’s petition asserting conversion claim had an arguable basis in law); Mi-nix, 162 S.W.3d at 639 (holding that prison inmate’s petition asserting Theft Liability Act claim against two correctional officers in their individual capacities had an arguable basis in law); Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 654 (holding that prison inmate’s petition for judicial review of prison disciplinary proceeding had arguable basis in law).

2010See Elias v. DeLeon, No. 12-04-00143-CV, 2005 WL 2404113 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Tyler Sept. 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that prison inmate's petition asserting conversion claim had an arguable basis in law); Minix, 162 S.W.3d at 639 (holding that prison inmate's petition asserting Theft Liability Act claim against two correctional officers in their individual capacities had an arguable basis in law); Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 654 (holding that prison inmate's petition for judicial review of prison disciplinary proceeding had arguable basis in law).

2023See Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 163 (Tex. 2004).

2023See Green Intern., Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997); Haden, 332 S.W.3d at 516 (holding that “a party waives any error arising from possibly awarding nonrecoverable fees when the complaining party does not object to failure to segregate between legal services for which fees are properly recoverable and those for which no recovery of fees is authorized[]”). 15 The billing records reflect three entries for work done by a person or persons with the initials “K.E.” and “K.S.E.” Based upon the nature of the tasks listed and the $75.00 hourly rate that the bills indicate was charged for

2023See Okorafor v. Uncle Sam & Assocs., Inc., 295 S.W.3d 27, 40 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (concluding movants’ request for attorney’s fees was one of several factors showing invocation of judicial process).

2023See Green Intern., Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997); Haden, 332 S.W.3d at 516 (holding that “a party waives any error arising from possibly awarding nonrecoverable fees when the complaining party does not object to failure to segregate between legal services for which fees are properly recoverable and those for which no recovery of fees is authorized[]”). 15 The billing records reflect three entries for work done by a person or persons with the initials “K.E.” and “K.S.E.” Based upon the nature of the tasks listed and the $75.00 hourly rate that the bills indicate was charged for

2022In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that “Kanyezi was not entitled to a full credit or full offset for the reasonable amounts of its attorneys’ fees incurred defending against [Appellees’] Theft Liability Act claim and the claims inextricably intertwined therewith.” See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502 (“[T]he base lodestar figure can be adjusted down when it is established, based on considerations not already accounted for in the first step, to be an unreasonably high or excessive fee award, creating a windfall for the prevailing party or its attorney.”); Land

2022In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that “Kanyezi was not entitled to a full credit or full offset for the reasonable amounts of its attorneys’ fees incurred defending against [Appellees’] Theft Liability Act claim and the claims inextricably intertwined therewith.” See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502 (“[T]he base lodestar figure can be adjusted down when it is established, based on considerations not already accounted for in the first step, to be an unreasonably high or excessive fee award, creating a windfall for the prevailing party or its attorney.”); Land

2022See Jarvis, 298 S.W.3d at 313 .

2022See Jarvis, 298 S.W.3d at 313 .

2022In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that “Kanyezi was not entitled to a full credit or full offset for the reasonable amounts of its attorneys’ fees incurred defending against [Appellees’] Theft Liability Act claim and the claims inextricably intertwined therewith.” See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502 (“[T]he base lodestar figure can be adjusted down when it is established, based on considerations not already accounted for in the first step, to be an unreasonably high or excessive fee award, creating a windfall for the prevailing party or its attorney.”); Land

2022In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that “Kanyezi was not entitled to a full credit or full offset for the reasonable amounts of its attorneys’ fees incurred defending against [Appellees’] Theft Liability Act claim and the claims inextricably intertwined therewith.” See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502 (“[T]he base lodestar figure can be adjusted down when it is established, based on considerations not already accounted for in the first step, to be an unreasonably high or excessive fee award, creating a windfall for the prevailing party or its attorney.”); Land

2021See, e.g., Lopez v. Serna, 414 S.W.3d 890 , 893–95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citing Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex. 2011)). 7 against individual government actors, necessarily “could have been brought” against the relevant governmental unit, regardless of whether the governmental unit’s own immunities might ultimately bar the claim.

2021See, e.g., Lopez v. Serna, 414 S.W.3d 890 , 893–95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citing Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex. 2011)). 7 against individual government actors, necessarily “could have been brought” against the relevant governmental unit, regardless of whether the governmental unit’s own immunities might ultimately bar the claim.

2021See, e.g., Lopez v. Serna, 414 S.W.3d 890 , 893–95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citing Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex. 2011)). 7 against individual government actors, necessarily “could have been brought” against the relevant governmental unit, regardless of whether the governmental unit’s own immunities might ultimately bar the claim.

2021See, e.g., Lopez v. Serna, 414 S.W.3d 890 , 893–95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citing Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex. 2011)). 7 against individual government actors, necessarily “could have been brought” against the relevant governmental unit, regardless of whether the governmental unit’s own immunities might ultimately bar the claim.

2016Air Routing Int’l Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia Airways, Ltd., 150 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“The Theft Act is unusual in Texas law in that it requires the court to award attorney’s fees to a party who successfully defends a Theft Act claim, without any prerequisite that the claim is found to be groundless, frivolous, or brought in bad faith.”); see also Arrow Marble, LLC v. Estate of Killion, 441 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Equicap’s status defending against a TTLA claim does not prevent recovery of attorney’s fees.”).

2015CODE ANN. § 134.005(b) (West Supp. 2014) (“Each person who prevails in a suit under this chapter shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.”); see also Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998) (“Statutes providing that a party ‘may recover,’ ‘shall be awarded,’ or ‘is entitled to’ attorney fees are not discretionary.”) Prevailing parties can include defendants defending against a Texas Theft Liability Act claim.

2012Pace Concerts, Ltd. v. Resendez , 72 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that plaintiff had right to nonsuit claims after defendant filed motion for summary judgment but before decision was rendered); Taliaferro v. Smith , 804 S.W.2d 548 , 549 – 50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (plaintiff may nonsuit after failing to timely respond to motion for summary judgment); Morriss v. Enron Oil & Gas Co ., 948 S.W.2d 858 , 871 n.12 (Tex, App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (recognizing that it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment on contract

2008Carr v. Brasher , 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). [8] As discussed above, in response to O = Kane = s first issue, we have concluded that appellees = summary judgment motion was not sufficiently broad to encompass the Texas Theft Liability Act claim raised in O = Kane = s second amended petition.