Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
17 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopezgreen2 sentences2015Although at least one court has held such error to be “structural,” Mondragon, supra, at 942–43, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has yet declared whether the due process violation of trying an incompetent defendant constitutes the type of constitutional error, such as those enumerated most recently in United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 , 148–49, 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), that is not susceptible to a harm analysis. 2015Although at least one court has held such error to be “structural,” Mondragon, supra, at 942–43, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has yet declared whether the due process violation of trying an incompetent defendant constitutes the type of constitutional error, such as those enumerated most recently in United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 , 148–49, 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), that is not susceptible to a harm analysis. | 2 | 3 |
Cain v. Stategreen2 sentences2003The next question is whether the constitutional right protected by art. 26.13(a)(1) is "structural" and therefore immune from a harmless error analysis, or whether it is the type of constitutional error governed by Rule 44.2(a), pursuant to Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264 , which relied upon Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), in holding that "except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as `structural,' no error is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis." Cain , at 264. 2003The next question is whether the constitutional right protected by art. 26.13(a)(1) is "structural" and therefore immune from a harmless error analysis, or whether it is the type of constitutional error governed by Rule 44.2(a), pursuant to Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264 , which relied upon Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), in holding that "except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as `structural,' no error is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis." Cain , at 264. | 2 | 2 |
Lake v. Stategreen1 sentence2025Defense counsel then moved for a 4 Appellant first argues “that this type of constitutional error is of such an egregious nature that reversal is warranted without the necessity of a harm analysis.” However, Texas law is clear that only “certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as ‘structural,’” are “categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.” Lake v. State, 532 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Weisegreen1 sentence2024Id. at 711. 6 the court simply reiterated its long-standing view that an “applicant may not use a pretrial writ to assert his or her constitutional rights to a speedy trial[.]” Ex parte Sheffield, 685 S.W.3d at 95 (citing Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Boykin v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2015Finally, should this Court do so, (4) Click respectfully requests it to then remand this case to the court of appeals to analyze whether the trial court’s infringement of Click’s constitution- 2 Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (reversible error where record did not disclose that de- fendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty). 19 al rights was “structural,” and therefore immune from a harmless error analysis, or whether it is the type of constitutional error governed by Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a). | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. Kallamgreen1 sentence2013See generally Boyd, 152 S.W.3d at 680 (recognizing uniform application of two-pronged, open-courts inquiry to as-applied and facial chal lenges to statute). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stone v. Powell
green
2 sentences2017In sum, counsel for the State urges that this type of constitutional claim should be [***LEdHR20A] Application of the deemed to fall within the limit on federal habeas corpus Thompson standard to assess the validity of a jurisdiction identified in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , criminal conviction after Winship could lead to with respect to Fourth Amendment claims. 2015In sum, counsel for the State urges that this type of constitutional claim should be deemed to fall within the limit on federal habeas corpus jurisdiction identified in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , with respect to Fourth Amendment claims. | 3 | 2015–2017 |
People v. Mondragon
green
2 sentences2015Although at least one court has held such error to be “structural,” Mondragon, supra, at 942–43, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has yet declared whether the due process violation of trying an incompetent defendant constitutes the type of constitutional error, such as those enumerated most recently in United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 , 148–49, 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), that is not susceptible to a harm analysis. 2013Although at least one court has held such error to be “structural,” Mondragon, supra, at 942-43 , neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has yet declared whether the due process violation of trying an incompetent defendant constitutes the type of constitutional error, such as those enumerated most recently in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-49 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), that is not susceptible to a harm analysis. | 3 | 2013–2015 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences2014Jones, 223 S.W.3d at 383 . 2014Jones, 223 S.W.3d at 383 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2010If the first or “representation” right has been violated, then prejudice is presumed, and the defendant is entitled to have the judgment set aside. “[S]uch circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent.” Id. at 692 , 104 5.Ct. at 2067. 2010If the first or "representation" right has been violated, then prejudice is presumed, and the defendant is entitled to have the judgment set aside. "[S]uch circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent." Id. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. at 2067 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1998The Court held further that a constitutionally deficient instruction as to reasonable doubt is the type of constitutional error that cannot be subject to a harm analysis under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 1998The Court held further that a constitutionally deficient instruction as to reasonable doubt is the type of constitutional error that cannot be subject to a harm analysis under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). | 2 | 1998–2003 |
Perry, Ex Parte James Richard \Rick\""
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 711. 7 trial.” Id. at 96 (citing Perry, 483 S.W.3d at 895–96). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2003The next question is whether the constitutional right protected by art. 26.13(a)(1) is "structural" and therefore immune from a harmless error analysis, or whether it is the type of constitutional error governed by Rule 44.2(a), pursuant to Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264 , which relied upon Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), in holding that "except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as `structural,' no error is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis." Cain , at 264. 2003The next question is whether the constitutional right protected by art. 26.13(a)(1) is "structural" and therefore immune from a harmless error analysis, or whether it is the type of constitutional error governed by Rule 44.2(a), pursuant to Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264 , which relied upon Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), in holding that "except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as `structural,' no error is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis." Cain , at 264. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1998Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 278-281 , 113 S.Ct. at 2081-2082 . 1998Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 278-281 , 113 S.Ct. at 2081-2082 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.