mandatory procedural requirement in Virginia

2020See Davis v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 339, 339 (2011) (Rule of Court that prescribes dismissing appeal establishes “a mandatory procedural requirement and that the failure to comply with this requirement deprives the Court of its active jurisdiction to consider the appeal”).

2019In doing so, we relied upon - 15 - both Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(i), which provides that if a “petition for appeal does not contain assignments of error, the petition shall be dismissed[,]” and the decision of the Supreme Court in Davis v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 339, 339 (2011), in which the Supreme Court held that its equivalent rule regarding assignments of error created “a mandatory procedural requirement and that the failure to comply with this requirement deprives th[e Supreme] Court of its active jurisdiction to consider the appeal.” Square, No. 2526-11-2, at *3.

2013As the Supreme Court explained, “[b]y prescribing dismissal of the appeal, [Rule 5:17(c)(l)(iii) ] established] that the inclusion of sufficient assignments of error is a mandatory procedural requirement and that the failure to comply with this requirement deprives [the Supreme] Court of its active jurisdiction 8 to consider the appeal.” Id. at 339, 717 S.E.2d at 796-97 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 464, 467-68 , 706 S.E.2d 889, 891-92 (2011); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 518-19 , 659 S.E.2d 311, 315-16 (2008)).

2013As the Supreme Court explained, “[b]y prescribing dismissal of the appeal, [Rule 5:17(c)(l)(iii) ] established] that the inclusion of sufficient assignments of error is a mandatory procedural requirement and that the failure to comply with this requirement deprives [the Supreme] Court of its active jurisdiction 8 to consider the appeal.” Id. at 339, 717 S.E.2d at 796-97 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 464, 467-68 , 706 S.E.2d 889, 891-92 (2011); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 518-19 , 659 S.E.2d 311, 315-16 (2008)).

2013As the Supreme Court explained, “[b]y prescribing dismissal of the appeal, [Rule 5:17(c)(l)(iii) ] established] that the inclusion of sufficient assignments of error is a mandatory procedural requirement and that the failure to comply with this requirement deprives [the Supreme] Court of its active jurisdiction 8 to consider the appeal.” Id. at 339, 717 S.E.2d at 796-97 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 464, 467-68 , 706 S.E.2d 889, 891-92 (2011); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 518-19 , 659 S.E.2d 311, 315-16 (2008)).

2013As the Supreme Court explained, “[b]y prescribing dismissal of the appeal, [Rule 5:17(c)(l)(iii) ] established] that the inclusion of sufficient assignments of error is a mandatory procedural requirement and that the failure to comply with this requirement deprives [the Supreme] Court of its active jurisdiction 8 to consider the appeal.” Id. at 339, 717 S.E.2d at 796-97 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 464, 467-68 , 706 S.E.2d 889, 891-92 (2011); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 518-19 , 659 S.E.2d 311, 315-16 (2008)).

2014Trigg Co., 106 Va. 327, 342 , 56 S.E. 158, 163 (1907)), and not to invite an appellate court “to delve into the record and winnow the chaff from the wheat.” Loughran v. Kincheloe, 160 Va. 292, 298 , 168 S.E. 362, 364 (1933).

2014Trigg Co., 106 Va. 327, 342 , 56 S.E. 158, 163 (1907)), and not to invite an appellate court “to delve into the record and winnow the chaff from the wheat.” Loughran v. Kincheloe, 160 Va. 292, 298 , 168 S.E. 362, 364 (1933).

2014Trigg Co., 106 Va. 327, 342 , 56 S.E. 158, 163 (1907)), and not to invite an appellate court “to delve into the record and winnow the chaff from the wheat.” Loughran v. Kincheloe, 160 Va. 292, 298 , 168 S.E. 362, 364 (1933).

2014Trigg Co., 106 Va. 327, 342 , 56 S.E. 158, 163 (1907)), and not to invite an appellate court “to delve into the record and winnow the chaff from the wheat.” Loughran v. Kincheloe, 160 Va. 292, 298 , 168 S.E. 362, 364 (1933).

2012Simply alleging, as Whitt does in his original assignment of error, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of law fails to point out any particular error “ ‘with reasonable certainty,’ ” Yeatts, 249 Va. at 290, 455 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269, 271 , 77 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1953)).

2012Simply alleging, as Whitt does in his original assignment of error, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of law fails to point out any particular error “ ‘with reasonable certainty,’ ” Yeatts, 249 Va. at 290, 455 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269, 271 , 77 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1953)).

2012Thus, Rule 1:1 defeats the trial court’s ability to exercise its “active” jurisdiction over a case and enter a valid decree or disposition beyond the time limit unless an exception applies or the trial court specifically retains jurisdiction over the case. -9- modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer.” “[T]he provisions of Rule 1:1 are mandatory in order to assure the certainty and stability that the finality of judgments brings.” Super Fresh Foods Mkts. of Va., Inc. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 563 , 561 S.E.2d 734, 738 (2002).

2012Thus, Rule 1:1 defeats the trial court’s ability to exercise its “active” jurisdiction over a case and enter a valid decree or disposition beyond the time limit unless an exception applies or the trial court specifically retains jurisdiction over the case. -9- modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer.” “[T]he provisions of Rule 1:1 are mandatory in order to assure the certainty and stability that the finality of judgments brings.” Super Fresh Foods Mkts. of Va., Inc. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 563 , 561 S.E.2d 734, 738 (2002).

1994In Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124 (1992), the Court, in determining whether a health care provider was covered by the original Act, or by a subsequent amendment, said: Even though former Code § 8.01-581.1 was amended by the General Assembly in 1989 to include professional corporations and certain other legal entities within the definition of “health care provider,” we must construe this statute as it existed when Turner’s cause of action arose. 244 Va. at p. 126 (emphasis added).

1994In Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124 (1992), the Court, in determining whether a health care provider was covered by the original Act, or by a subsequent amendment, said: Even though former Code § 8.01-581.1 was amended by the General Assembly in 1989 to include professional corporations and certain other legal entities within the definition of “health care provider,” we must construe this statute as it existed when Turner’s cause of action arose. 244 Va. at p. 126 (emphasis added).