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17 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Duncangreen2 sentences2016See Duncan, 146 Wn.2d at 173-74 (declining to extend the Terry stop exception to the warrant requirement beyond traffic violations to other civil infractions because "[ t]raffic violations create a unique set of circumstances that may justify this extension of Terry, but which may not be appropriate for other civil infractions"; noting "the diminishment of privacy interests" in vehicles '"due to the law enforcement exigency created by the ready mobility of vehicles"' (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 454 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996))). 6 State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1 (Gordon McCloud 2010State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 174-75 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002). | 1 | 5 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2014State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509,514 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 2005Id. at 4 . ¶12 The problem with applying the Terry stop standard here is that the misdemeanor of failure to transfer title is not one of the offenses an officer can investigate. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Mechamgreen2 sentences2019State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 135 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 348-50 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 26 Mecham, 186 Wn.2d at 137-38 ("As set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is a seizure for the purposes of constitutional analysis—it is analogous to a brief investigative detention."); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198 , 275 P.3d 289 (2012)("Terry's rationale applies to traffic infractions."); State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93 , 290 P.3d 983 (2012)("Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article 1, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at 2019State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 135 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 348-50 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 26 Mecham, 186 Wn.2d at 137-38 ("As set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is a seizure for the purposes of constitutional analysis—it is analogous to a brief investigative detention."); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198 , 275 P.3d 289 (2012)("Terry's rationale applies to traffic infractions."); State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93 , 290 P.3d 983 (2012)("Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article 1, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at | 1 | 1 |
State v. Snappgreen2 sentences2019State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 135 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 348-50 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 26 Mecham, 186 Wn.2d at 137-38 ("As set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is a seizure for the purposes of constitutional analysis—it is analogous to a brief investigative detention."); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198 , 275 P.3d 289 (2012)("Terry's rationale applies to traffic infractions."); State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93 , 290 P.3d 983 (2012)("Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article 1, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at 2019State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 135 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 348-50 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 26 Mecham, 186 Wn.2d at 137-38 ("As set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is a seizure for the purposes of constitutional analysis—it is analogous to a brief investigative detention."); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198 , 275 P.3d 289 (2012)("Terry's rationale applies to traffic infractions."); State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93 , 290 P.3d 983 (2012)("Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article 1, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Arreolagreen2 sentences2019State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 135 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 348-50 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 26 Mecham, 186 Wn.2d at 137-38 ("As set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is a seizure for the purposes of constitutional analysis—it is analogous to a brief investigative detention."); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198 , 275 P.3d 289 (2012)("Terry's rationale applies to traffic infractions."); State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93 , 290 P.3d 983 (2012)("Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article 1, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at 2019State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 135 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 348-50 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 26 Mecham, 186 Wn.2d at 137-38 ("As set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is a seizure for the purposes of constitutional analysis—it is analogous to a brief investigative detention."); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198 , 275 P.3d 289 (2012)("Terry's rationale applies to traffic infractions."); State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93 , 290 P.3d 983 (2012)("Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article 1, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Glover
green
2 sentences2010State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991). ¶45 Our courts have applied the Terry stop exception under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution to stops incident to traffic infractions. 2010State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991). ¶45 Our courts have applied the Terry stop exception under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution to stops incident to traffic infractions. | 3 | 2010–2014 |
State v. Duncan
green
2 sentences2010State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 174-75 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002). 2010State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 174-75 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002). | 3 | 2005–2010 |
State v. Acrey
green
2 sentences2023Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 746 . 2017State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 746 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003). | 2 | 2017–2023 |
United States v. Kareem Brown
green
1 sentence2026What constitutes reasonable, articulable suspicion Though it is not binding, Godwin cites United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006), as support for his argument that Wolff did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain him. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Garvin
green
1 sentence2020State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250 , 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Garvin
green
1 sentence2020State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250 , 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Ladson
green
1 sentence2019State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 135 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 348-50 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 26 Mecham, 186 Wn.2d at 137-38 ("As set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is a seizure for the purposes of constitutional analysis—it is analogous to a brief investigative detention."); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198 , 275 P.3d 289 (2012)("Terry's rationale applies to traffic infractions."); State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93 , 290 P.3d 983 (2012)("Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article 1, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Ladson
green
1 sentence2019State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 135 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 348-50 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 26 Mecham, 186 Wn.2d at 137-38 ("As set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is a seizure for the purposes of constitutional analysis—it is analogous to a brief investigative detention."); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198 , 275 P.3d 289 (2012)("Terry's rationale applies to traffic infractions."); State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93 , 290 P.3d 983 (2012)("Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article 1, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Acrey
green
1 sentence2017State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 746 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Setterstrom
green
1 sentence2016State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wn.2d 621,626 , 183 P.3d 1075 (2008). 5 The Court of Appeals also rejected Mecham's argument that the "to convict" instruction given at his felony DUI trial violated his constitutional right to a jury trial and that the certification of mailing on the license revocation order constitutes testimonial hearsay, the admission of which violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2016See Duncan, 146 Wn.2d at 173-74 (declining to extend the Terry stop exception to the warrant requirement beyond traffic violations to other civil infractions because "[ t]raffic violations create a unique set of circumstances that may justify this extension of Terry, but which may not be appropriate for other civil infractions"; noting "the diminishment of privacy interests" in vehicles '"due to the law enforcement exigency created by the ready mobility of vehicles"' (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 454 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996))). 6 State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1 (Gordon McCloud | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Setterstrom
neutral
1 sentence2016State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wn.2d 621,626 , 183 P.3d 1075 (2008). 5 The Court of Appeals also rejected Mecham's argument that the "to convict" instruction given at his felony DUI trial violated his constitutional right to a jury trial and that the certification of mailing on the license revocation order constitutes testimonial hearsay, the admission of which violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2016See Duncan, 146 Wn.2d at 173-74 (declining to extend the Terry stop exception to the warrant requirement beyond traffic violations to other civil infractions because "[ t]raffic violations create a unique set of circumstances that may justify this extension of Terry, but which may not be appropriate for other civil infractions"; noting "the diminishment of privacy interests" in vehicles '"due to the law enforcement exigency created by the ready mobility of vehicles"' (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 454 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996))). 6 State v. Flores (Cody Ray), No. 91986-1 (Gordon McCloud | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ybarra v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2016In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-94 , 100 S. Ct. 338 , 62 L. 2016In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-94 , 100 S. Ct. 338 , 62 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Hendrickson
green
1 sentence2013State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 71 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Hendrickson
green
1 sentence2013State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 71 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Florida v. Royer
green
2 sentences1984First, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 75 L. 1984First, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 75 L. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.