administrative fair hearing in California

2016When a community-based placement is identified and selected, all necessary services and supports must be in place before transferring a nondangerous, developmentally disabled person from a developmental center to the community-based living arrangement. (§ 4418.3, subd. (a).) “[T]he Lanterman Act guarantees an applicant for or recipient of services or his or her representative ‘who is dissatisfied with any decision or action of [a regional center]’ the right to an administrative fair hearing. (§ 4710.5, subd. (a).) The statute also provides detailed provisions for claimants who wish to attempt

2016When a community-based placement is identified and selected, all necessary services and supports must be in place before transferring a nondangerous, developmentally disabled person from a developmental center to the community-based living arrangement. (§ 4418.3, subd. (a).) “[T]he Lanterman Act guarantees an applicant for or recipient of services or his or her representative ‘who is dissatisfied with any decision or action of [a regional center]’ the right to an administrative fair hearing. (§ 4710.5, subd. (a).) The statute also provides detailed provisions for claimants who wish to attempt

2016(Whitley, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460; see Michelle K., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 .) Absent a showing of good cause, the regional center presents its witnesses and all other evidence first followed by the claimant’s presentation of his or her case. (§ 4712, subd. (j); Whitley, at p. 1460.) A recording of the proceedings must be made at public expense. (§ 4712, subd. (k); Whitley, at p. 1460.) “Within 10 working days of the fair hearing, the hearing officer must ‘render a written decision’ containing ‘a summary of the facts, a statement of the evidence from the proceedings that was

2016(Whitley, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460; see Michelle K., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 .) Absent a showing of good cause, the regional center presents its witnesses and all other evidence first followed by the claimant’s presentation of his or her case. (§ 4712, subd. (j); Whitley, at p. 1460.) A recording of the proceedings must be made at public expense. (§ 4712, subd. (k); Whitley, at p. 1460.) “Within 10 working days of the fair hearing, the hearing officer must ‘render a written decision’ containing ‘a summary of the facts, a statement of the evidence from the proceedings that was

2016Appellants appealed from the order dismissing the Hop petition and related proceedings.3 II DISCUSSION A. The Lanterman Act and State Developmental Center Placements The Lanterman Act “‘grants persons with developmental disabilities the right to receive treatment and services to meet their needs, regardless of age or degree of handicap, at each stage of life.’” (In re Michael K. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1117 (Michael K.).) “The Legislature enacted the Lanterman Act to ‘establish certain rights of the so-called developmentally disabled persons, primarily their entitlement to the maximum deg

2013(See Michael K., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126 .) In Whitley, the Court of Appeal held the fair hearing procedures provide the exclusive remedy for a developmentally disabled person’s legal representative to object to a community placement decision. 11 (Whitley; supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1463, 1465.) The Whitley court reached that conclusion based on the exhaustion of the administrative remedies doctrine.

1984A threshold contention is that primary jurisdiction resides in the administrative agency (see Tank Car Corp. v. El Terminal Co. (1940) 308 U.S. 422, 433 [ 84 L.Ed. 361 , 370 60 S.Ct. 325 ]) and prevents the trial court from exercising criminal jurisdiction unless and until there is an administrative ruling that defendant was ineligible for welfare aid.

1984A threshold contention is that primary jurisdiction resides in the administrative agency (see Tank Car Corp. v. El Terminal Co. (1940) 308 U.S. 422, 433 [ 84 L.Ed. 361 , 370 60 S.Ct. 325 ]) and prevents the trial court from exercising criminal jurisdiction unless and until there is an administrative ruling that defendant was ineligible for welfare aid.

1986Arguing that this is a proper use of the fair hearing procedure, plaintiff quotes certain language from the opinion of our Supreme Court in People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468 , which held that the state may be barred by collateral estoppel from prosecuting a person for welfare fraud when he or she has been exonerated of that charge in an administrative fair hearing.

1984In People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 651 P.2d 321 ], the Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel bars the state from criminally prosecuting for welfare fraud a defendant who was exonerated of that charge in an administrative fair hearing before the state Department of Social Services (at p. 489).

2016(Whitley, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460; see Michelle K., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 .) Absent a showing of good cause, the regional center presents its witnesses and all other evidence first followed by the claimant’s presentation of his or her case. (§ 4712, subd. (j); Whitley, at p. 1460.) A recording of the proceedings must be made at public expense. (§ 4712, subd. (k); Whitley, at p. 1460.) “Within 10 working days of the fair hearing, the hearing officer must ‘render a written decision’ containing ‘a summary of the facts, a statement of the evidence from the proceedings that was

2013(See Hop, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 94 [“‘A precipitous release of these [adults] to families and community facilities unprepared to care for them could be both disruptive to 16 Because neither the Harbor Regional Center nor Fairview made any decision that would have allowed John or Petitioners to invoke the administrative fair hearing procedures, we need not decide whether these administrative procedures would satisfy Hop if there was an administrative hearing before an independent hearing officer. 34 the treatment program and potentially harmful to the [patient] and the community’”]; see also S

2013(See Hop, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 94 [“‘A precipitous release of these [adults] to families and community facilities unprepared to care for them could be both disruptive to 16 Because neither the Harbor Regional Center nor Fairview made any decision that would have allowed John or Petitioners to invoke the administrative fair hearing procedures, we need not decide whether these administrative procedures would satisfy Hop if there was an administrative hearing before an independent hearing officer. 34 the treatment program and potentially harmful to the [patient] and the community’”]; see also S

2007We have “ ‘no power to rewrite the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention which is not *1467 expressed.’ [Citations.]” (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 633 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 , 927 P.2d 1175 ].) IV.

2007We have “ ‘no power to rewrite the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention which is not *1467 expressed.’ [Citations.]” (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 633 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 , 927 P.2d 1175 ].) IV.

2007(See Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Horeros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1095 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 ] [application of statutory provisions to undisputed facts presents a question of law].) The Supreme Court has justified consideration of a new issue on appeal for the first time “when the issue posed is purely a question of law based on undisputed facts, and involves important questions of public policy. [Citations.]” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 654-655, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 ].) Both of these factors are present here.

2007(See Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Horeros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1095 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 ] [application of statutory provisions to undisputed facts presents a question of law].) The Supreme Court has justified consideration of a new issue on appeal for the first time “when the issue posed is purely a question of law based on undisputed facts, and involves important questions of public policy. [Citations.]” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 654-655, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 ].) Both of these factors are present here.

2007(See Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Horeros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1095 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 ] [application of statutory provisions to undisputed facts presents a question of law].) The Supreme Court has justified consideration of a new issue on appeal for the first time “when the issue posed is purely a question of law based on undisputed facts, and involves important questions of public policy. [Citations.]” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 654-655, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 ].) Both of these factors are present here.

2007(See Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Horeros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1095 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 ] [application of statutory provisions to undisputed facts presents a question of law].) The Supreme Court has justified consideration of a new issue on appeal for the first time “when the issue posed is purely a question of law based on undisputed facts, and involves important questions of public policy. [Citations.]” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 654-655, fn. 3 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 ].) Both of these factors are present here.

2007(See Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 79 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ] [“As a general rule, where a statute creates a right that did not exist at common law and provides a comprehensive and detailed remedial scheme for its enforcement, the statutory remedy is exclusive.”].) This determination of exclusivity is not only supported by the comprehensive statutory scheme but by language found in the Lanterman Act itself, expressly making fair hearings the exclusive remedy for issues relating to the provision of services.

2007(See Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 79 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ] [“As a general rule, where a statute creates a right that did not exist at common law and provides a comprehensive and detailed remedial scheme for its enforcement, the statutory remedy is exclusive.”].) This determination of exclusivity is not only supported by the comprehensive statutory scheme but by language found in the Lanterman Act itself, expressly making fair hearings the exclusive remedy for issues relating to the provision of services.

2006(Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 402 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 111 P.2d 83 ].) No punishment results from an administrative fair hearing.

2006(Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 402 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 111 P.2d 83 ].) No punishment results from an administrative fair hearing.

2006(See People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 989, fn. 3 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 286 ; People v. Faubus (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1, 5-6 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 167 .) The governing statutes confirm that the DSS was not required to prove defendant acted with fraudulent intent in order to obtain reimbursement. (ง 11004.) Indeed, under DSS regulations, the ALJ apparently lacked jurisdiction to determine whether defendant acted with fraudulent intent.

2006(See People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 989, fn. 3 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 286 ; People v. Faubus (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1, 5-6 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 167 .) The governing statutes confirm that the DSS was not required to prove defendant acted with fraudulent intent in order to obtain reimbursement. (ง 11004.) Indeed, under DSS regulations, the ALJ apparently lacked jurisdiction to determine whether defendant acted with fraudulent intent.

2006Under Vandenberg , "because [an administrative fair hearing] does not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation does not undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to decide the same issue." ( Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 982 P.2d 229 .) In any event, under Lucido, any concerns about judicial economy "pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes." ( Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d

2006Under Vandenberg , "because [an administrative fair hearing] does not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation does not undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to decide the same issue." ( Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 982 P.2d 229 .) In any event, under Lucido, any concerns about judicial economy "pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes." ( Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d

2006Under Vandenberg , "because [an administrative fair hearing] does not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation does not undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to decide the same issue." ( Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 982 P.2d 229 .) In any event, under Lucido, any concerns about judicial economy "pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes." ( Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d

2006Under Vandenberg , "because [an administrative fair hearing] does not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation does not undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to decide the same issue." ( Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 982 P.2d 229 .) In any event, under Lucido, any concerns about judicial economy "pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes." ( Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d

2006(See People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 989, fn. 3 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 286 ; People v. Faubus (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1, 5-6 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 167 .) The governing statutes confirm that the DSS was not required to prove defendant acted with fraudulent intent in order to obtain reimbursement. (ง 11004.) Indeed, under DSS regulations, the ALJ apparently lacked jurisdiction to determine whether defendant acted with fraudulent intent.

2006(See People v. Camillo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 981, 989, fn. 3 , 244 Cal.Rptr. 286 ; People v. Faubus (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1, 5-6 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 167 .) The governing statutes confirm that the DSS was not required to prove defendant acted with fraudulent intent in order to obtain reimbursement. (ง 11004.) Indeed, under DSS regulations, the ALJ apparently lacked jurisdiction to determine whether defendant acted with fraudulent intent.

2006To paraphrase Lucido, "because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS's] failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) For these reasons, the majority errs in asserting that "the purposes" of administrative fair hearings and welfare fraud prosecutions "do not differ greatly." (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p.

2006To paraphrase Lucido, "because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS's] failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) For these reasons, the majority errs in asserting that "the purposes" of administrative fair hearings and welfare fraud prosecutions "do not differ greatly." (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p.

2006Under Vandenberg , "because [an administrative fair hearing] does not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation does not undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to decide the same issue." ( Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 982 P.2d 229 .) In any event, under Lucido, any concerns about judicial economy "pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes." ( Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d

2006Under Vandenberg , "because [an administrative fair hearing] does not involve the use of a judge and a courtroom, later relitigation does not undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to decide the same issue." ( Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 833, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 982 P.2d 229 .) In any event, under Lucido, any concerns about judicial economy "pale before the importance of preserving the criminal trial process as the exclusive forum for determining guilt or innocence as to new crimes." ( Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 351 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d

1986(People v. Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690, 696 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 153 , 548 P.2d 353 , 80 A.L.R.3d 1269 ].) The Legislature could not have intended that every event occurring during the processing of an application and the delivery of benefits—no matter how trivial or inconsequential—could be the subject of a demand for an administrative fair hearing.

1986(People v. Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690, 696 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 153 , 548 P.2d 353 , 80 A.L.R.3d 1269 ].) The Legislature could not have intended that every event occurring during the processing of an application and the delivery of benefits—no matter how trivial or inconsequential—could be the subject of a demand for an administrative fair hearing.