Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
16 California opinions name it 1 courts 2007–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Flatley v. Maurogreen2 sentences2026(See Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325 [the anti-SLAPP statute does not bar the evidentiary use of statements made in judicial proceedings]; Miller, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 257 [“ ‘[t]here is a “distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the claim” ’ ”].) D. 2013The Conduct at Issue Was Not “Illegal as a Matter of Law” Rubtsov contends Neiman and Estep willfully violated the visitation orders, so their conduct was illegal and cannot be protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute under the rule from Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley). | 3 | 5 |
Baral v. Schnittgreen2 sentences2025(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) Instead, it provides a procedure for weeding out meritless claims at an early stage of the litigation. 2020Farming Co. v. Couch Distributing Co., Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 180 , 194–195, disapproved on other grounds by Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 [submission of sitemaps to the city in connection with permitting process, an official proceeding, satisfies first prong].) B Because the cause of action arises from protected activity, we next consider the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute analysis and decline Pancho Villa’s request to remand the matter to the trial court to consider this 6 Although we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion with respect to whether the fraudulent misre | 2 | 3 |
Navellier v. Slettengreen2 sentences2007(Ibid.) Navellier also makes clear, however, that the anti-SLAPP statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action for breach of contract or fraud that arises from the defendant's free speech or petitioning. ( Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 93, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 .) Where a complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if plaintiffs evidence is credited, it is not subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute. 2007(Ibid.) Navellier also makes clear, however, that the anti-SLAPP statute does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action for breach of contract or fraud that arises from the defendant's free speech or petitioning. ( Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 93, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 .) Where a complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if plaintiffs evidence is credited, it is not subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute. | 2 | 2 |
Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carsongreen1 sentence2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the | 1 | 1 |
Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co.green1 sentence2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the | 1 | 1 |
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunitygreen2 sentences2010(Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1116 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) *543 C. 2010(Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1116 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) *543 C. | 1 | 1 |
Navellier v. Slettengreen2 sentences2007(Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 770 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 201 ].) So, as Navellier observes, acts falling within the anti-SLAPP statute because of their connection with judicial proceedings do not “inevitably” fall within the litigation privilege; however, the privilege plainly “informs interpretation of the ‘arising from’ prong of the anti-SLAPP statute ....’’ {Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 770 .) 15 Kimmel v. Goland held the litigation privilege did not apply to noncommunicative acts (the illegal recording of confidential telephone conversations) for the pu 2007(Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 770 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 201 ].) So, as Navellier observes, acts falling within the anti-SLAPP statute because of their connection with judicial proceedings do not “inevitably” fall within the litigation privilege; however, the privilege plainly “informs interpretation of the ‘arising from’ prong of the anti-SLAPP statute ....’’ {Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 770 .) 15 Kimmel v. Goland held the litigation privilege did not apply to noncommunicative acts (the illegal recording of confidential telephone conversations) for the pu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hong Liu v. Moore
green
2 sentences2023(Liu, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 752 .) In the Liu court’s view, a determination of whether a defendant would have prevailed on its special motion to strike using the ordinary anti-SLAPP statute analysis is an essential predicate to an award of fees and costs under subdivision (c)(1). 2023(Liu, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 752 .) In the Liu court’s view, a determination of whether a defendant would have prevailed on its special motion to strike using the ordinary anti-SLAPP statute analysis is an essential predicate to an award of fees and costs under subdivision (c)(1). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals
green
1 sentence2021(Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 665 & fn. 3.) The anti-SLAPP statute is designed to weed out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
M.F. Farming Co. v. Couch Distributing Co.
green
1 sentence2020Farming Co. v. Couch Distributing Co., Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 180 , 194–195, disapproved on other grounds by Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 [submission of sitemaps to the city in connection with permitting process, an official proceeding, satisfies first prong].) B Because the cause of action arises from protected activity, we next consider the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute analysis and decline Pancho Villa’s request to remand the matter to the trial court to consider this 6 Although we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion with respect to whether the fraudulent misre | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the 2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Park v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ.
green
1 sentence2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Century 21 Chamberlain & Associates v. Haberman
green
1 sentence2010(Century 21, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 9 .) 5 Mallard also contends Morrell was without standing to file an antiSLAPP motion on his own behalf because “he was only a helper to the party which actually had the right to petition.” Mallard’s argument is without merit because an attorney representing a client in litigation may invoke the anti-SLAPP statute to challenge claims alleged against him or her. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Rusheen v. Cohen
green
1 sentence2007(Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058 .) Acts deemed noncommunicative and unprivileged include prelitigation illegal recording of confidential telephone conversations; eavesdropping on a telephone conversation; and a physician’s negligent examination of a patient causing physical injury. {Ibid.) 14 Another court has pointed out that the protections afforded by the anti-SLAPP statute and the privilege “are not entirely coextensive,” in that malicious prosecution actions are not barred by the litigation privilege, but are subject to a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.