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16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chatton v. National Union Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences2014Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 846, 854 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 ].) *522 The Upasanis nevertheless argue that Kulkami’s alleged emotional distress was a bodily injury under the terms of the various policies because it arose from a noneconomic loss. 2014Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 846, 854 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 ].) *522 The Upasanis nevertheless argue that Kulkami’s alleged emotional distress was a bodily injury under the terms of the various policies because it arose from a noneconomic loss. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2013(See People v. Newby, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347 [disfiguring injury must be permanent]; Thomas, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 512 [disabling injury must more than “slight and temporary”].) To add a serious bodily injury requirement to the specific injuries listed in section 203 is more confusing than elucidating. 2013(See People v. Newby, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347 [disfiguring injury must be permanent]; Thomas, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 512 [disabling injury must more than “slight and temporary”].) To add a serious bodily injury requirement to the specific injuries listed in section 203 is more confusing than elucidating. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Newbygreen2 sentences2013(See People v. Newby, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347 [disfiguring injury must be permanent]; Thomas, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 512 [disabling injury must more than “slight and temporary”].) To add a serious bodily injury requirement to the specific injuries listed in section 203 is more confusing than elucidating. 2013(See People v. Newby, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347 [disfiguring injury must be permanent]; Thomas, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 512 [disabling injury must more than “slight and temporary”].) To add a serious bodily injury requirement to the specific injuries listed in section 203 is more confusing than elucidating. | 2 | 2 |
Dudley v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1977Code, § 739; People v. Eitzen. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 253, 259-260 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 772 ]; Dudley v. Superior Court (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 977, 982-985 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 797 ]; cf. Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 664-667 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 289 , 483 P.2d 1241 ]; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 181, p. 171 and (1975 supp.) § 181, p. 151.) The court granted the motions to strike the bodily injury clause, and stated, “If it is surplusage, it is proper to strike it. [¶] If you are saying that it belongs there on a factual basis I say the factual basis had not been established accord 1977Code, § 739; People v. Eitzen. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 253, 259-260 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 772 ]; Dudley v. Superior Court (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 977, 982-985 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 797 ]; cf. Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 664-667 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 289 , 483 P.2d 1241 ]; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 181, p. 171 and (1975 supp.) § 181, p. 151.) The court granted the motions to strike the bodily injury clause, and stated, “If it is surplusage, it is proper to strike it. [¶] If you are saying that it belongs there on a factual basis I say the factual basis had not been established accord | 2 | 2 |
People v. Eitzengreen2 sentences1977Code, § 739; People v. Eitzen. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 253, 259-260 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 772 ]; Dudley v. Superior Court (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 977, 982-985 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 797 ]; cf. Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 664-667 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 289 , 483 P.2d 1241 ]; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 181, p. 171 and (1975 supp.) § 181, p. 151.) The court granted the motions to strike the bodily injury clause, and stated, “If it is surplusage, it is proper to strike it. [¶] If you are saying that it belongs there on a factual basis I say the factual basis had not been established accord 1977Code, § 739; People v. Eitzen. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 253, 259-260 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 772 ]; Dudley v. Superior Court (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 977, 982-985 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 797 ]; cf. Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 664-667 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 289 , 483 P.2d 1241 ]; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 181, p. 171 and (1975 supp.) § 181, p. 151.) The court granted the motions to strike the bodily injury clause, and stated, “If it is surplusage, it is proper to strike it. [¶] If you are saying that it belongs there on a factual basis I say the factual basis had not been established accord | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1977Code, § 739; People v. Eitzen. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 253, 259-260 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 772 ]; Dudley v. Superior Court (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 977, 982-985 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 797 ]; cf. Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 664-667 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 289 , 483 P.2d 1241 ]; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 181, p. 171 and (1975 supp.) § 181, p. 151.) The court granted the motions to strike the bodily injury clause, and stated, “If it is surplusage, it is proper to strike it. [¶] If you are saying that it belongs there on a factual basis I say the factual basis had not been established accord 1977Code, § 739; People v. Eitzen. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 253, 259-260 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 772 ]; Dudley v. Superior Court (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 977, 982-985 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 797 ]; cf. Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 664-667 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 289 , 483 P.2d 1241 ]; see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 181, p. 171 and (1975 supp.) § 181, p. 151.) The court granted the motions to strike the bodily injury clause, and stated, “If it is surplusage, it is proper to strike it. [¶] If you are saying that it belongs there on a factual basis I say the factual basis had not been established accord | 2 | 2 |
People v. Santanagreen2 sentences2023Indeed, Santana’s refusal to “conclude that the offense of mayhem includes a serious bodily injury requirement simply based on cases holding that mayhem includes a great bodily injury component” (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1009 ) confirms that great bodily injury does not establish serious bodily injury and says nothing about whether serious bodily injury establishes great bodily injury. 2016(See Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1009 [“[W]e cannot conclude that the offense of mayhem includes a serious bodily injury requirement simply based on cases holding that mayhem includes a great bodily injury component.”].) Poisson offers no compelling argument that we should disregard this portion of Santana . | 1 | 2 |
People v. Wadegreen1 sentence2015In short, we are not precluded from applying the usual rule, recognized by the California Supreme Court, that serious bodily injury and great bodily injury " 'are essentially equivalent elements.' " (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 , overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 ; see also People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143, fn. 2 ; People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149-1150 [citing cases]; People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1613 [citing cases].) In this case, the jury's finding that Smith inflicted serious 7 Additional | 1 | 1 |
People v. Arnettgreen1 sentence2015In short, we are not precluded from applying the usual rule, recognized by the California Supreme Court, that serious bodily injury and great bodily injury " 'are essentially equivalent elements.' " (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 , overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 ; see also People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143, fn. 2 ; People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149-1150 [citing cases]; People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1613 [citing cases].) In this case, the jury's finding that Smith inflicted serious 7 Additional | 1 | 1 |
People v. Knollergreen1 sentence2015In short, we are not precluded from applying the usual rule, recognized by the California Supreme Court, that serious bodily injury and great bodily injury " 'are essentially equivalent elements.' " (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 , overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 ; see also People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143, fn. 2 ; People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149-1150 [citing cases]; People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1613 [citing cases].) In this case, the jury's finding that Smith inflicted serious 7 Additional | 1 | 1 |
Spinello v. Amblin Entertainmentgreen2 sentences2006(See Spinello v. Amblin Entertainment (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1398-1399 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ].) “The bodily injury clause in [a comprehensive general liability insurance] policy has been interpreted on numerous occasions. 2006(See Spinello v. Amblin Entertainment (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1398-1399 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ].) “The bodily injury clause in [a comprehensive general liability insurance] policy has been interpreted on numerous occasions. | 1 | 1 |
Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciottagreen2 sentences1992(Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 807 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 640 P.2d 764 ].) *854 The bodily injury clause in the CGL policy has been interpreted on numerous occasions, The cases overwhelmingly hold that the phrase “bodily injury, sickness or disease” is plain and unambiguous and that coverage under the bodily injury clause is limited to physical injury to the body and does not include nonphysical, emotional or mental harm. 1992(Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 807 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 640 P.2d 764 ].) *854 The bodily injury clause in the CGL policy has been interpreted on numerous occasions, The cases overwhelmingly hold that the phrase “bodily injury, sickness or disease” is plain and unambiguous and that coverage under the bodily injury clause is limited to physical injury to the body and does not include nonphysical, emotional or mental harm. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Holmesgreen2 sentences1982Code, particularly subd. (e), p. 2837.) The court concluded, “During this time it could have taken whatever steps were necessary to protect the bodily injury claim.” (Id., at p. 549; see also Kidd v. Hillman (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 507, 510 [ 58 P.2d 62 ]; Mitchell v. Holmes (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 461, 463 [ 50 P.2d 473 ].) In Liberty Mut. 1982Code, particularly subd. (e), p. 2837.) The court concluded, “During this time it could have taken whatever steps were necessary to protect the bodily injury claim.” (Id., at p. 549; see also Kidd v. Hillman (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 507, 510 [ 58 P.2d 62 ]; Mitchell v. Holmes (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 461, 463 [ 50 P.2d 473 ].) In Liberty Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Kidd v. Hillmangreen1 sentence1982Code, particularly subd. (e), p. 2837.) The court concluded, “During this time it could have taken whatever steps were necessary to protect the bodily injury claim.” (Id., at p. 549; see also Kidd v. Hillman (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 507, 510 [ 58 P.2d 62 ]; Mitchell v. Holmes (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 461, 463 [ 50 P.2d 473 ].) In Liberty Mut. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. AUSBIE
green
2 sentences2013We also conclude that Ausbie, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 855 , on which defendant relies, does not support instructing the jury on a separate “serious bodily injury” requirement for mayhem. 2013We also conclude that Ausbie, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 855 , on which defendant relies, does not support instructing the jury on a separate “serious bodily injury” requirement for mayhem. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Blakeley
green
1 sentence2015In short, we are not precluded from applying the usual rule, recognized by the California Supreme Court, that serious bodily injury and great bodily injury " 'are essentially equivalent elements.' " (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 , overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 ; see also People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143, fn. 2 ; People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149-1150 [citing cases]; People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1613 [citing cases].) In this case, the jury's finding that Smith inflicted serious 7 Additional | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Burroughs
green
1 sentence2015In short, we are not precluded from applying the usual rule, recognized by the California Supreme Court, that serious bodily injury and great bodily injury " 'are essentially equivalent elements.' " (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 , overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 ; see also People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143, fn. 2 ; People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149-1150 [citing cases]; People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1613 [citing cases].) In this case, the jury's finding that Smith inflicted serious 7 Additional | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
green
2 sentences2004"Although loss of consortium may have physical consequences, it is principally a form of mental suffering." ( Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 401 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 525 P.2d 669 .) In contrast, Warner's reasoning on this point is good common sense and good legal sense. 2004“Although loss of consortium may have physical consequences, it is principally a form of mental suffering.” (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 401 .) In contrast, Warner’s reasoning on this point is good common sense and good legal sense. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Schwalbe v. Jones
green
2 sentences1995Co. v. Jacober, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 207 .) Thus, decisional law, statutory law and the commonsense view of the layperson support the reasonableness of De May’s interpretation of the term “the insured” as referring to one person, namely the insured “named in Item 1 of the declarations” against whom the bodily injury claim is made. *1140 Auto Club argues Jacober was limited to its facts in Schwalbe v. Jones (1976) 16 Cal.3d 514 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 546 P.2d 1033 ], in which the Supreme Court held enforceable policy exclusions for bodily injury of a named insured caused by an additional-insur 1995Co. v. Jacober, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 207 .) Thus, decisional law, statutory law and the commonsense view of the layperson support the reasonableness of De May’s interpretation of the term “the insured” as referring to one person, namely the insured “named in Item 1 of the declarations” against whom the bodily injury claim is made. *1140 Auto Club argues Jacober was limited to its facts in Schwalbe v. Jones (1976) 16 Cal.3d 514 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 546 P.2d 1033 ], in which the Supreme Court held enforceable policy exclusions for bodily injury of a named insured caused by an additional-insur | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Jacober
green
1 sentence1995Co. v. Jacober, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 207 .) Thus, decisional law, statutory law and the commonsense view of the layperson support the reasonableness of De May’s interpretation of the term “the insured” as referring to one person, namely the insured “named in Item 1 of the declarations” against whom the bodily injury claim is made. *1140 Auto Club argues Jacober was limited to its facts in Schwalbe v. Jones (1976) 16 Cal.3d 514 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 546 P.2d 1033 ], in which the Supreme Court held enforceable policy exclusions for bodily injury of a named insured caused by an additional-insur | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Holcomb v. Kincaid
green
1 sentence1992Co. of Hartford (1981) 50 Md.App. 112 [ 436 A.2d 493, 499 ]; Holcomb v. Kincaid (La.Ct.App. 1981) 406 So.2d 646 , etc.) do not compel a different result either because: (1) they represent the minority view on the issue, (2) are for the most part decided without analysis, (3) were disapproved in Culcasi , and (4) any precedential value has been further eroded by the recent United States Supreme Court case holding that the bodily injury clause in an insurance policy has a limited meaning which excludes coverage for purely mental injuries. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd
green
1 sentence1992(See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, supra, 499 U.S. _ [ 113 L.Ed.2d 569 ].) (2) The “Bodily Injury” Clause of the CGL Policy Does Not Provide Coverage for Emotional Distress for Investment Losses Caused by Negligent Misrepresentation Appellant next contends that respondents’ emotional distress claim is not cognizable under the “bodily injury” clause of the policy because emotional distress damages for investment losses caused by negligent misrepresentation are not recoverable. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Loewenthal v. Security Insurance
green
2 sentences1992Co. of Hartford (1981) 50 Md.App. 112 [ 436 A.2d 493, 499 ]; Holcomb v. Kincaid (La.Ct.App. 1981) 406 So.2d 646 , etc.) do not compel a different result either because: (1) they represent the minority view on the issue, (2) are for the most part decided without analysis, (3) were disapproved in Culcasi , and (4) any precedential value has been further eroded by the recent United States Supreme Court case holding that the bodily injury clause in an insurance policy has a limited meaning which excludes coverage for purely mental injuries. 1992Co. of Hartford (1981) 50 Md.App. 112 [ 436 A.2d 493, 499 ]; Holcomb v. Kincaid (La.Ct.App. 1981) 406 So.2d 646 , etc.) do not compel a different result either because: (1) they represent the minority view on the issue, (2) are for the most part decided without analysis, (3) were disapproved in Culcasi , and (4) any precedential value has been further eroded by the recent United States Supreme Court case holding that the bodily injury clause in an insurance policy has a limited meaning which excludes coverage for purely mental injuries. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
In Re Shull
green
2 sentences1975(See People v. Floyd, 71 Cal.2d 879 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 22 , 457 P.2d 862 ]; In re Shull, 23 Cal.2d 745 [ 146 P.2d 417 ].) The bodily injury clause of section 213 is formulated in terms of a single offender and a single victim. 1975(See People v. Floyd, 71 Cal.2d 879 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 22 , 457 P.2d 862 ]; In re Shull, 23 Cal.2d 745 [ 146 P.2d 417 ].) The bodily injury clause of section 213 is formulated in terms of a single offender and a single victim. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Floyd
green
2 sentences1975(See People v. Floyd, 71 Cal.2d 879 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 22 , 457 P.2d 862 ]; In re Shull, 23 Cal.2d 745 [ 146 P.2d 417 ].) The bodily injury clause of section 213 is formulated in terms of a single offender and a single victim. 1975(See People v. Floyd, 71 Cal.2d 879 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 22 , 457 P.2d 862 ]; In re Shull, 23 Cal.2d 745 [ 146 P.2d 417 ].) The bodily injury clause of section 213 is formulated in terms of a single offender and a single victim. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.