collection requirement in California

2021(Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 685 .) Defendant asserts that Proposition 8 does not apply to his state search and seizure or informational privacy claims because King did not address the collection and analysis of DNA from an arrestee when the prosecutor later declines to file formal charges and it did not decide the Fourth Amendment issue “within the context of” his informational application of the Truth-in-Evidence provision in Proposition 8, which we discuss post, we need not separately analyze defendant’s privacy right contention under the Hill test. 57 privacy contention. 23 But we look to

2021(Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 685 .) Defendant asserts that Proposition 8 does not apply to his state search and seizure or informational privacy claims because King did not address the collection and analysis of DNA from an arrestee when the prosecutor later declines to file formal charges and it did not decide the Fourth Amendment issue “within the context of” his informational application of the Truth-in-Evidence provision in Proposition 8, which we discuss post, we need not separately analyze defendant’s privacy right contention under the Hill test. 57 privacy contention.23 But we look to

2018The high court granted review in King to resolve a conflict among federal and state courts "as to whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection and analysis of a DNA sample from persons arrested, but not yet convicted, on felony charges." ( Id . at p. 442, 133 S.Ct. 1958 .) The specific question before the court concerned the application of a Maryland law that authorized law enforcement authorities to collect DNA *671 samples from an individual charged with certain statutorily defined "crime[s] of violence," including murder, rape, first degree assault, kidnapping, arson, and sexual as

2018The high court granted review in King to resolve a conflict among federal and state courts "as to whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection and analysis of a DNA sample from persons arrested, but not yet convicted, on felony charges." ( Id . at p. 442, 133 S.Ct. 1958 .) The specific question before the court concerned the application of a Maryland law that authorized law enforcement authorities to collect DNA *671 samples from an individual charged with certain statutorily defined "crime[s] of violence," including murder, rape, first degree assault, kidnapping, arson, and sexual as

2019Los Angeles , supra , 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 940 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 519 .) *367 On the other side of the balance, the city's interest in enforcing the collection requirement is considerable.

2019Los Angeles , supra , 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 940 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 519 .) *367 On the other side of the balance, the city's interest in enforcing the collection requirement is considerable.

2018No judgment was entered in favor of Pasternack on the collection claim, however, because his cross-complaint against the contractor was still pending. ( Pasternack, supra , 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1352-1353, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 .) While his cross-complaint against the contractor in the underlying action was still pending, Pasternack sued the contractor and others for malicious prosecution, alleging that the underlying collection claim was filed maliciously, without probable cause, and for the sole purpose of extracting a general release. ( Pasternack, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353 , 186 Cal.

2018No judgment was entered in favor of Pasternack on the collection claim, however, because his cross-complaint against the contractor was still pending. ( Pasternack, supra , 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1352-1353, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 .) While his cross-complaint against the contractor in the underlying action was still pending, Pasternack sued the contractor and others for malicious prosecution, alleging that the underlying collection claim was filed maliciously, without probable cause, and for the sole purpose of extracting a general release. ( Pasternack, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353 , 186 Cal.

2023In such cases, the existence of one of these legal impediments to adoption is relevant because the legal impediment would preclude the very basis upon which the social worker formed the opinion that the minor is likely to be adopted.” (Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1650–1651, italics added.) But where, as here, “the social worker’s opinion that [the minor is] likely to be adopted was not based solely on the foster mother’s desire to adopt,” but on a collection of factors, no inquiry need be made into whether there is any legal impediment to adoption by that parent.

2019In Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes (1976) 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 ( Moe ), the court adjudicated a series of disputes between the asserted taxing power of the State of Montana and the immunity claimed by an Indian tribe.

2019In Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes (1976) 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 ( Moe ), the court adjudicated a series of disputes between the asserted taxing power of the State of Montana and the immunity claimed by an Indian tribe.

2019The court held, as an initial matter, that a collection requirement that affects a state agency in its *558 "proprietary" capacity does not impinge on state sovereignty. ( City of Modesto , supra , 34 Cal.App.3d at pp. 506-507, 110 Cal.Rptr. 111 .) 7 But the court then proceeded to "affirm the judgment for another reason." ( Id. at p. 508, 110 Cal.Rptr. 111 .) Recognizing that the city "has no practical nor economical means of collecting such a tax without the cooperation of the supplier of the utility service," the court concluded: "It is basic that the power to tax carries with it the coroll

2019The court held, as an initial matter, that a collection requirement that affects a state agency in its *558 "proprietary" capacity does not impinge on state sovereignty. ( City of Modesto , supra , 34 Cal.App.3d at pp. 506-507, 110 Cal.Rptr. 111 .) 7 But the court then proceeded to "affirm the judgment for another reason." ( Id. at p. 508, 110 Cal.Rptr. 111 .) Recognizing that the city "has no practical nor economical means of collecting such a tax without the cooperation of the supplier of the utility service," the court concluded: "It is basic that the power to tax carries with it the coroll

2018(See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder (2010) 560 U.S. 563 , 574, 130 S.Ct. 2577 , 177 L.Ed.2d 68 ["A 'felony,' we have come to understand, is a 'serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by *693 death.' "].) Though the court also occasionally referred to "violent" and "dangerous" crimes, King did not purport to limit its *675 holding to those felonies that happen to be classified as "violent" or "dangerous" as a matter of state law, nor did it purport to create a new classification of violent offenses as a matter of federal constitutional law. 2 But in any

2018(See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder (2010) 560 U.S. 563 , 574, 130 S.Ct. 2577 , 177 L.Ed.2d 68 ["A 'felony,' we have come to understand, is a 'serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by *693 death.' "].) Though the court also occasionally referred to "violent" and "dangerous" crimes, King did not purport to limit its *675 holding to those felonies that happen to be classified as "violent" or "dangerous" as a matter of state law, nor did it purport to create a new classification of violent offenses as a matter of federal constitutional law. 2 But in any

2018(See Hill , supra , 7 Cal.4th at pp. 40-41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 [finding that the collection of a urine sample "impacts legally protected privacy interests"].) And the use of that sample to create and store a DNA profile gives the government long-term access to the subject's genetic code-some of the most personal information imaginable. ( Id. at p. 41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 [" 'A person's medical profile [as revealed by the collection and analysis of urine] is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judi

2018(See Hill , supra , 7 Cal.4th at pp. 40-41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 [finding that the collection of a urine sample "impacts legally protected privacy interests"].) And the use of that sample to create and store a DNA profile gives the government long-term access to the subject's genetic code-some of the most personal information imaginable. ( Id. at p. 41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 [" 'A person's medical profile [as revealed by the collection and analysis of urine] is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judi

2018The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides, in essentially identical language: "The right of the people to be secure in their *670 persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated." As the constitutional language itself makes plain, the "touchstone for all *689 issues" under both provisions i

2018The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides, in essentially identical language: "The right of the people to be secure in their *670 persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated." As the constitutional language itself makes plain, the "touchstone for all *689 issues" under both provisions i

2018(See Hill , supra , 7 Cal.4th at pp. 40-41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 [finding that the collection of a urine sample "impacts legally protected privacy interests"].) And the use of that sample to create and store a DNA profile gives the government long-term access to the subject's genetic code-some of the most personal information imaginable. ( Id. at p. 41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 [" 'A person's medical profile [as revealed by the collection and analysis of urine] is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judi

2018(See Hill , supra , 7 Cal.4th at pp. 40-41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 [finding that the collection of a urine sample "impacts legally protected privacy interests"].) And the use of that sample to create and store a DNA profile gives the government long-term access to the subject's genetic code-some of the most personal information imaginable. ( Id. at p. 41, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 [" 'A person's medical profile [as revealed by the collection and analysis of urine] is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judi

2017As those two decisions explained, what matters is not the source of a local agency’s authority, but instead whether, under Hall’s analytical framework, the state entity is engaged in a governmental activity and whether consent to local regulation has been conferred by a statute or constitutional provision. ( Bame, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1355-1356; Laidlaw, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 638-639.) City of Modesto’s alternative rationale exacerbated the error of focusing on the source of the city’s authority, i.e., the home-rule provision, by then weighing that authority against the state en

2017As those two decisions explained, what matters is not the source of a local agency’s authority, but instead whether, under Hall’s analytical framework, the state entity is engaged in a governmental activity and whether consent to local regulation has been conferred by a statute or constitutional provision. ( Bame, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1355-1356; Laidlaw, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 638-639.) City of Modesto’s alternative rationale exacerbated the error of focusing on the source of the city’s authority, i.e., the home-rule provision, by then weighing that authority against the state en

2009Appeals Bd., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 790 .) The court held, however, that “ ‘[t]he failure to give notice under section 5400, or any defect or inaccuracy in a notice is not a bar to recovery under this division if it is found as a fact in the proceedings for the collection of the claim that the employer was not in fact misled or prejudiced by such failure.’ (§ 5403.)” (Beckstead v. Workers’ Comp.

2001The rules set detailed standards for the licensing and operation of forensic alcohol laboratories, the training of personnel, the collection and analysis of samples in general, and the manner of expressing results. ([Tit. 17,] §§ 1215-1220.4.) Article 7 of the rules ( [id.] §§ 1221-1221.5) comprises the requirements for breath alcohol analysis, including standards for procedures ( [id.] §§ 1221.1, 1221.4), standards for instrument performance ( [id.] § 1221.2), and approved instruments ( [id.] § 1221.3). [¶] The foregoing regulations establish a standard for the competency of the results of bl

2001(Ibid.)" ( Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 141-142 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 , fn. omitted.) The trial court acknowledged defendant's PAS test was not administered in compliance with the Title 17 regulations in numerous respects, but determined the prosecution had nonetheless established a sufficient foundation to admit the evidence: "[The prosecution] made no showing of any compliance with Title 17, and I'm convinced that there will be— there is a reason to believe that there is a lot of noncompliance with Title 17. [¶] And that I'm not even sure there was substa

2001(Ibid.)" ( Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 141-142 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 , fn. omitted.) The trial court acknowledged defendant's PAS test was not administered in compliance with the Title 17 regulations in numerous respects, but determined the prosecution had nonetheless established a sufficient foundation to admit the evidence: "[The prosecution] made no showing of any compliance with Title 17, and I'm convinced that there will be— there is a reason to believe that there is a lot of noncompliance with Title 17. [¶] And that I'm not even sure there was substa

1974One hundred years ago in Harp v. Calahan, supra, 46 Cal. 222, 231 , this court declared: “The policy which dictated the provisions requiring claims against the estate to be presented within a fixed period is perfectly apparent.

1974One hundred years ago in Harp v. Calahan, supra, 46 Cal. 222, 231 , this court declared: “The policy which dictated the provisions requiring claims against the estate to be presented within a fixed period is perfectly apparent.

1973(Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 111 [ 302 P.2d 574 ]; In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254 [ 93 P.2d 105 ]; Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575 [ 292 S.W.2d 777 ]; City of Charleston v. Southeastern Const. Co., 134 W.Va. 666 [ 64 S.E.2d 676 ].) Appellants’ contention runs counter to the doctrine of stare decisis.

1973(Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 111 [ 302 P.2d 574 ]; In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254 [ 93 P.2d 105 ]; Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575 [ 292 S.W.2d 777 ]; City of Charleston v. Southeastern Const. Co., 134 W.Va. 666 [ 64 S.E.2d 676 ].) Appellants’ contention runs counter to the doctrine of stare decisis.

1973(Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 111 [ 302 P.2d 574 ]; In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254 [ 93 P.2d 105 ]; Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575 [ 292 S.W.2d 777 ]; City of Charleston v. Southeastern Const. Co., 134 W.Va. 666 [ 64 S.E.2d 676 ].) Appellants’ contention runs counter to the doctrine of stare decisis.

1973(Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 111 [ 302 P.2d 574 ]; In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254 [ 93 P.2d 105 ]; Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575 [ 292 S.W.2d 777 ]; City of Charleston v. Southeastern Const. Co., 134 W.Va. 666 [ 64 S.E.2d 676 ].) Appellants’ contention runs counter to the doctrine of stare decisis.

1973(Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 111 [ 302 P.2d 574 ]; In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254 [ 93 P.2d 105 ]; Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575 [ 292 S.W.2d 777 ]; City of Charleston v. Southeastern Const. Co., 134 W.Va. 666 [ 64 S.E.2d 676 ].) Appellants’ contention runs counter to the doctrine of stare decisis.

1973(Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 111 [ 302 P.2d 574 ]; In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254 [ 93 P.2d 105 ]; Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575 [ 292 S.W.2d 777 ]; City of Charleston v. Southeastern Const. Co., 134 W.Va. 666 [ 64 S.E.2d 676 ].) Appellants’ contention runs counter to the doctrine of stare decisis.

1973(Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 111 [ 302 P.2d 574 ]; In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254 [ 93 P.2d 105 ]; Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575 [ 292 S.W.2d 777 ]; City of Charleston v. Southeastern Const. Co., 134 W.Va. 666 [ 64 S.E.2d 676 ].) Appellants’ contention runs counter to the doctrine of stare decisis.

1911As said by the district court of appeal, it is not clear from the opinion in Davis v. Smith, 48 Vt. 52 , that the court held that where there was a single retainer of an attorney in two suits, the mere fact that one of such suits was still pending would prevent the running of the statute of limitations as to services rendered in the other, which had been terminated.