collection claim in Iowa

1936“In Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa 151 , it was claimed, by counsel for plaintiff, that since the law gave him the right to sue the county only after he had presented his claim to the board of supervisors, and they had refused to allow it, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until such demand and refusal; but it was held, that the presentation of his claim to the board was a preliminary act, devolving upon him in the institution of the proceedings for the collection of his claim against the county, which he might do at any time after his claim matured, and hence the statute co

1872In Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa, 151 , it was claimed, by counsel for plaintiff, that since the law gave him the right to sue the county only after he had presented his claim to the board of supervisors, and they had refused to allow it, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until such demand and refusal; but it was held, that the presentation of his claim to the board was a preliminary act, devolving upon him in the institution of the proceedings for the collection of his claim against the county, which he might do at any time after his claim matured, and hence the statute co

1949If so, a finding that he was actuated by malice necessarily would have followed.” In Potter v. Sims, 135 Iowa 739, 743 , 111 N. W. 29, 30 , the court said: “If a criminal prosecution is not instituted for the purpose of enforcing the law alleged to have been violated, but for the *582 purpose of enforcing the collection of a claim or gaining some other private advantage or benefit, such fact is a direct impeachment of the good faith of the prosecution.” In Vorhes v. Buchwald, 137 Iowa 721, 725 , 112 N. W. 1105, 1107 , we said: "The law requires good faith on the part of'the person making compl

1949If so, a finding that he was actuated by malice necessarily would have followed.” In Potter v. Sims, 135 Iowa 739, 743 , 111 N. W. 29, 30 , the court said: “If a criminal prosecution is not instituted for the purpose of enforcing the law alleged to have been violated, but for the *582 purpose of enforcing the collection of a claim or gaining some other private advantage or benefit, such fact is a direct impeachment of the good faith of the prosecution.” In Vorhes v. Buchwald, 137 Iowa 721, 725 , 112 N. W. 1105, 1107 , we said: "The law requires good faith on the part of'the person making compl

1949If so, a finding that he was actuated by malice necessarily would have followed.” In Potter v. Sims, 135 Iowa 739, 743 , 111 N. W. 29, 30 , the court said: “If a criminal prosecution is not instituted for the purpose of enforcing the law alleged to have been violated, but for the *582 purpose of enforcing the collection of a claim or gaining some other private advantage or benefit, such fact is a direct impeachment of the good faith of the prosecution.” In Vorhes v. Buchwald, 137 Iowa 721, 725 , 112 N. W. 1105, 1107 , we said: "The law requires good faith on the part of'the person making compl

1949If so, a finding that he was actuated by malice necessarily would have followed.” In Potter v. Sims, 135 Iowa 739, 743 , 111 N. W. 29, 30 , the court said: “If a criminal prosecution is not instituted for the purpose of enforcing the law alleged to have been violated, but for the *582 purpose of enforcing the collection of a claim or gaining some other private advantage or benefit, such fact is a direct impeachment of the good faith of the prosecution.” In Vorhes v. Buchwald, 137 Iowa 721, 725 , 112 N. W. 1105, 1107 , we said: "The law requires good faith on the part of'the person making compl

1936“In Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa 151 , it was claimed, by counsel for plaintiff, that since the law gave him the right to sue the county only after he had presented his claim to the board of supervisors, and they had refused to allow it, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until such demand and refusal; but it was held, that the presentation of his claim to the board was a preliminary act, devolving upon him in the institution of the proceedings for the collection of his claim against the county, which he might do at any time after his claim matured, and hence the statute co

1936“In Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa 151 , it was claimed, by counsel for plaintiff, that since the law gave him the right to sue the county only after he had presented his claim to the board of supervisors, and they had refused to allow it, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until such demand and refusal; but it was held, that the presentation of his claim to the board was a preliminary act, devolving upon him in the institution of the proceedings for the collection of his claim against the county, which he might do at any time after his claim matured, and hence the statute co

1936In the case of Lenehan v. Drainage District, 219 Iowa 294, 297 , 258 N. W. 91, 92 , an action in mandamus brought by the holders of certain drainage warrants against the drainage district to compel them to levy an assessment for a deficiency, the defendants pleaded the statute of limitations and alleged that, “notwithstanding such deficiency, the appellants failed to exercise the right of demanding the additional assessment, and neglected, for a period of more than three years before the present suit was commenced, to follow such demand with the necessary action in mandamus, ’ ’ and we held th

1936In the case of Lenehan v. Drainage District, 219 Iowa 294, 297 , 258 N. W. 91, 92 , an action in mandamus brought by the holders of certain drainage warrants against the drainage district to compel them to levy an assessment for a deficiency, the defendants pleaded the statute of limitations and alleged that, “notwithstanding such deficiency, the appellants failed to exercise the right of demanding the additional assessment, and neglected, for a period of more than three years before the present suit was commenced, to follow such demand with the necessary action in mandamus, ’ ’ and we held th

1936“In Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa 151 , it was claimed, by counsel for plaintiff, that since the law gave him the right to sue the county only after he had presented his claim to the board of supervisors, and they had refused to allow it, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until such demand and refusal; but it was held, that the presentation of his claim to the board was a preliminary act, devolving upon him in the institution of the proceedings for the collection of his claim against the county, which he might do at any time after his claim matured, and hence the statute co

1936“In Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa 151 , it was claimed, by counsel for plaintiff, that since the law gave him the right to sue the county only after he had presented his claim to the board of supervisors, and they had refused to allow it, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until such demand and refusal; but it was held, that the presentation of his claim to the board was a preliminary act, devolving upon him in the institution of the proceedings for the collection of his claim against the county, which he might do at any time after his claim matured, and hence the statute co

1936“In Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa 151 , it was claimed, by counsel for plaintiff, that since the law gave him the right to sue the county only after he had presented his claim to the board of supervisors, and they had refused to allow it, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until such demand and refusal; but it was held, that the presentation of his claim to the board was a preliminary act, devolving upon him in the institution of the proceedings for the collection of his claim against the county, which he might do at any time after his claim matured, and hence the statute co

1913Gressly v. Hamilton County, 136 Iowa, 722 . 2.

1906Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 380 .

1873Id.

1864This distinction between claims in the form of mortgage liens and ordinary claims, is recognized, as we think, by §§ 2412, 2395, of the Rev. of 1860, and also in the case of Carns v. Crandell, 4 Iowa, 151 . ' Again, granting that plaintiff’s' claim should have been filed and proved within the time‘prescribed' for ordinary claims, the question remains, whether there are not some equitable considerations growing out of the plaintiff’s right under the law, to elect whether he will seek satisfaction of his claim out of the personalty in the hands of the administrator, or in equity by the enforceme

1859Farwell v. Tyler, 5 Iowa 535 ; Allen v. Newbury, 8 Ib. 65.