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16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B.green2 sentences2009Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 235 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 ]; Croskey, supra, ¶¶ 7:629-7:630.1, p. 7B-41 (rev. # 1, 2009).) This duty to defend an entire action continues “until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; see also id. at p. 1084.) The defending insurer may have a right to be reimbursed for defense costs allocable solely to cl 2009Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 235 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 ]; Croskey, supra, ¶¶ 7:629-7:630.1, p. 7B-41 (rev. # 1, 2009).) This duty to defend an entire action continues “until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; see also id. at p. 1084.) The defending insurer may have a right to be reimbursed for defense costs allocable solely to cl | 5 | 7 |
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 235 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 ]; Croskey, supra, ¶¶ 7:629-7:630.1, p. 7B-41 (rev. # 1, 2009).) This duty to defend an entire action continues “until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; see also id. at p. 1084.) The defending insurer may have a right to be reimbursed for defense costs allocable solely to cl 1998(Buss v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 46; Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ].) Conversely, in an action filed against the insured in which there is no potential that the insurer will have to provide indemnification, then, as a general rule, there is no duty to defend. | 1 | 2 |
City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2010Section 1063.2, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part: “[CIGA] shall be a party in interest in all proceedings involving a covered claim, and shall have the same rights as the insolvent insurer would have had if not in liquidation, including, but not limited to, the right to: (1) . . . , (2) receive notice of, investigate, adjust, compromise, settle, and pay a covered claim, and (3) investigate, handle, and deny a noncovered claim.” (Italics added.) “When construing statutes, our goal is ‘ “to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that 2010Section 1063.2, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part: “[CIGA] shall be a party in interest in all proceedings involving a covered claim, and shall have the same rights as the insolvent insurer would have had if not in liquidation, including, but not limited to, the right to: (1) . . . , (2) receive notice of, investigate, adjust, compromise, settle, and pay a covered claim, and (3) investigate, handle, and deny a noncovered claim.” (Italics added.) “When construing statutes, our goal is ‘ “to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that | 1 | 1 |
Cassady v. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLPgreen2 sentences2009Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 235 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 ]; Croskey, supra, ¶¶ 7:629-7:630.1, p. 7B-41 (rev. # 1, 2009).) This duty to defend an entire action continues “until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; see also id. at p. 1084.) The defending insurer may have a right to be reimbursed for defense costs allocable solely to cl 2009Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 235 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 ]; Croskey, supra, ¶¶ 7:629-7:630.1, p. 7B-41 (rev. # 1, 2009).) This duty to defend an entire action continues “until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; see also id. at p. 1084.) The defending insurer may have a right to be reimbursed for defense costs allocable solely to cl | 1 | 1 |
Vann v. Travelers Companiesgreen2 sentences2009Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 235 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 ]; Croskey, supra, ¶¶ 7:629-7:630.1, p. 7B-41 (rev. # 1, 2009).) This duty to defend an entire action continues “until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; see also id. at p. 1084.) The defending insurer may have a right to be reimbursed for defense costs allocable solely to cl 2009Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 235 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 ]; Croskey, supra, ¶¶ 7:629-7:630.1, p. 7B-41 (rev. # 1, 2009).) This duty to defend an entire action continues “until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; see also id. at p. 1084.) The defending insurer may have a right to be reimbursed for defense costs allocable solely to cl | 1 | 1 |
Brizuela v. Calfarm Insurancegreen2 sentences2006Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 578, 594 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 ], the Court of Appeal noted, again in dictum, an insurer might be liable for an implied covenant breach if, instead of investigating a noncovered claim, the insurance company embarked on a campaign to intimidate its insured into settling. 2006Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 578, 594 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 ], the Court of Appeal noted, again in dictum, an insurer might be liable for an implied covenant breach if, instead of investigating a noncovered claim, the insurance company embarked on a campaign to intimidate its insured into settling. | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.green2 sentences2004(Ashley, Bad Faith Actions Liability and Damages (2d ed. 1997), § 5A:02, p. 5A-10 [insurer might be liable for bad faith if, instead of investigating a non-covered claim, insurer embarked on campaign to intimidate insured into settling]; see, e.g., Murray v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 58, 65-66 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 33 ] [insurance company might be liable if it unreasonably delayed investigating an noncovered claim].) No such circumstances are *595 present here. 2004(Ashley, Bad Faith Actions Liability and Damages (2d ed. 1997), § 5A:02, p. 5A-10 [insurer might be liable for bad faith if, instead of investigating a non-covered claim, insurer embarked on campaign to intimidate insured into settling]; see, e.g., Murray v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 58, 65-66 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 33 ] [insurance company might be liable if it unreasonably delayed investigating an noncovered claim].) No such circumstances are *595 present here. | 1 | 1 |
Johansen v. California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureaugreen2 sentences2003Bureau (1975) 15 Cal.3d 9, 16, 19 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 538 P.2d 744 ].) However, where the kind of claim asserted is not covered by the insurance contract (and not simply the amount of the claim), an insurer has no obligation to pay money in settlement of a noncovered claim, because “The insurer does not ... insure the entire range of an insured’s well-being, outside the scope of and unrelated to the *959 insurance policy, with respect to paying third party claims. 2003Bureau (1975) 15 Cal.3d 9, 16, 19 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 538 P.2d 744 ].) However, where the kind of claim asserted is not covered by the insurance contract (and not simply the amount of the claim), an insurer has no obligation to pay money in settlement of a noncovered claim, because “The insurer does not ... insure the entire range of an insured’s well-being, outside the scope of and unrelated to the *959 insurance policy, with respect to paying third party claims. | 1 | 1 |
David Kleis, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1997(Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; David Kleis, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1045 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 ].) “Once the defense duty attaches, the insurer is obligated to defend against all of the claims involved in the action, both covered and noncovered, until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim. [Citations.] Any doubt as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured’s favor.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) In this case, the de 1997(Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081; David Kleis, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1045 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 ].) “Once the defense duty attaches, the insurer is obligated to defend against all of the claims involved in the action, both covered and noncovered, until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim. [Citations.] Any doubt as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured’s favor.” (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) In this case, the de | 1 | 1 |
Dyer v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences1996Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1540, 1547 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 298 ].) Of course, once a potential for coverage is established as to at least one of the claims asserted against the insured, “. . . the insurer is obligated to defend against all of the claims involved in the action, both covered and noncovered, until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim. [Citations.]” (Horace Mann Ins. 1996Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1540, 1547 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 298 ].) Of course, once a potential for coverage is established as to at least one of the claims asserted against the insured, “. . . the insurer is obligated to defend against all of the claims involved in the action, both covered and noncovered, until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim. [Citations.]” (Horace Mann Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Republic Indemnity Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1993Co. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 553, 564 [ 91 Cal. Rptr. 153 , 476 P.2d 825 ]; Republic Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 492, 498 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 331 ]; California Union Ins. 1993Co. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 553, 564 [ 91 Cal. Rptr. 153 , 476 P.2d 825 ]; Republic Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 492, 498 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 331 ]; California Union Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Hogan v. Midland National Insurancegreen2 sentences1993Co. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 553, 564 [ 91 Cal. Rptr. 153 , 476 P.2d 825 ]; Republic Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 492, 498 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 331 ]; California Union Ins. 1993Co. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 553, 564 [ 91 Cal. Rptr. 153 , 476 P.2d 825 ]; Republic Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 492, 498 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 331 ]; California Union Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Venoco, Inc. v. Gulf Underwriters Insurance
green
1 sentence2024Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 750, 765 .) “In other words, this clause does not require the insurer to defend a noncovered claim merely because it is groundless.” (Croskey, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group, 2023) ¶ 7:523.3, p. 13, citing North American Building Maint., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
North American Building Maintenance Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
green
2 sentences2024Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 627 , 639–640 [“While 23 an insurer must defend any claim that would be covered if true, even though the claim is in fact false . . . , an insurer has no duty to defend a noncovered claim even if the claim is false.” (Citations omitted.)].) Castaneda’s complaint alleged that both Hernandez and Dorian “were the owners, keepers, and harborers” of the dog that injured her. 2024Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 627 , 639–640 [“While 23 an insurer must defend any claim that would be covered if true, even though the claim is in fact false . . . , an insurer has no duty to defend a noncovered claim even if the claim is false.” (Citations omitted.)].) Castaneda’s complaint alleged that both Hernandez and Dorian “were the owners, keepers, and harborers” of the dog that injured her. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Industrial Indemnity Co. v. WKRS.'COMP. APP. BD.
green
1 sentence2007CIGA Pays “Covered Claims’’ “CIGA ‘is authorized by statute to pay only “covered claims” of an insolvent insurer, those determined by the Legislature to be in keeping with the goal of providing protection for the insured public. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] CIGA has the statutory authority to ‘deny a noncovered claim.’ (.. . § 1063.2, subd. (b).)” (Industrial Indemnity, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 548, 557 .) Thus, CIGA’s first duty is to determine whether a claim placed before it is a “covered claim.” Moreover, the scope of CIGA’s rights and duties turns on the definition of “covered claim.” (Id. at p, | 1 | 2007–2007 |
California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
1 sentence2004Appeals Bd., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 364 .) Specifically excluded from the definition of “covered claims” is among others, “any obligations to any state or to the federal government.” (Ins. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
JEFFREY E. v. Central Baptist Church
green
2 sentences1997Sexual Misconduct Outside Scope of Employment In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ], the court held that a school district could not be vicariously liable to the victim of a teacher’s alleged acts of molestation because such misconduct was outside the course and scope of the teacher’s employment. 5 (48 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 447; cf. Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [church not liable *658 for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) 1997Sexual Misconduct Outside Scope of Employment In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ], the court held that a school district could not be vicariously liable to the victim of a teacher’s alleged acts of molestation because such misconduct was outside the course and scope of the teacher’s employment. 5 (48 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 447; cf. Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [church not liable *658 for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School District
green
2 sentences1997Sexual Misconduct Outside Scope of Employment In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ], the court held that a school district could not be vicariously liable to the victim of a teacher’s alleged acts of molestation because such misconduct was outside the course and scope of the teacher’s employment. 5 (48 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 447; cf. Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [church not liable *658 for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) 1997Sexual Misconduct Outside Scope of Employment In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ], the court held that a school district could not be vicariously liable to the victim of a teacher’s alleged acts of molestation because such misconduct was outside the course and scope of the teacher’s employment. 5 (48 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 447; cf. Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [church not liable *658 for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
green
2 sentences1997Sexual Misconduct Outside Scope of Employment In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ], the court held that a school district could not be vicariously liable to the victim of a teacher’s alleged acts of molestation because such misconduct was outside the course and scope of the teacher’s employment. 5 (48 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 447; cf. Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [church not liable *658 for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) 1997Sexual Misconduct Outside Scope of Employment In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ], the court held that a school district could not be vicariously liable to the victim of a teacher’s alleged acts of molestation because such misconduct was outside the course and scope of the teacher’s employment. 5 (48 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 447; cf. Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [church not liable *658 for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) | 1 | 1997–1997 |
John R. v. Oakland Unified School District
green
2 sentences1997Sexual Misconduct Outside Scope of Employment In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ], the court held that a school district could not be vicariously liable to the victim of a teacher’s alleged acts of molestation because such misconduct was outside the course and scope of the teacher’s employment. 5 (48 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 447; cf. Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [church not liable *658 for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) 1997Sexual Misconduct Outside Scope of Employment In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ], the court held that a school district could not be vicariously liable to the victim of a teacher’s alleged acts of molestation because such misconduct was outside the course and scope of the teacher’s employment. 5 (48 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 447; cf. Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 128 ] [church not liable *658 for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1993(Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276 .) Once the defense duty attaches, the insurer is obligated to defend against all of the claims involved in the action, both covered and noncovered, until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim. 1993Facts extrinsic to the complaint also give rise to a duty to defend when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276 .) (1c) Once the defense duty attaches, the insurer is obligated to defend against all of the claims involved in the action, both covered and noncovered, until the insurer produces undeniable evidence supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered claim. ( Hogan v. Midland National Ins. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.