Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
16 California opinions name it 3 courts 1934–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissionersgreen2 sentences1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam 1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam | 2 | 5 |
People v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2018(See People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 ; People v. Smith (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 283 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 .) In Brooks , the trial court initially granted a defendant's motion to suppress based on one ground and did not consider an alternate ground. ( Brooks , at p. 474, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 .) When that ruling was later reversed, the trial court considered the alternate ground in a renewed suppression hearing and granted the motion again. ( Id . at pp. 474-475, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 .) The Supreme Court held that the trial court 2018(See People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 ; People v. Smith (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 283 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 .) In Brooks , the trial court initially granted a defendant's motion to suppress based on one ground and did not consider an alternate ground. ( Brooks , at p. 474, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 .) When that ruling was later reversed, the trial court considered the alternate ground in a renewed suppression hearing and granted the motion again. ( Id . at pp. 474-475, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 .) The Supreme Court held that the trial court | 2 | 2 |
Ratliff v. Lamptongreen2 sentences1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam 1950Considering the merits of Mrs. Keenan’s position, since the decision in Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ], it has repeatedly been held “. . . that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P | 2 | 2 |
Wellborn v. Wellborngreen2 sentences1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam 1950Considering the merits of Mrs. Keenan’s position, since the decision in Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ], it has repeatedly been held “. . . that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P | 2 | 2 |
People v. Arebalos-Cabreragreen1 sentence2025(See People v. Arebalos-Cabrera, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 192 [noting the defendant was not entitled to a second suppression hearing since the trial court did not deprive him of the opportunity for a full hearing on the motion].) On this record, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider defendant’s reconsideration motion. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2018(See People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 ; People v. Smith (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 283 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 .) In Brooks , the trial court initially granted a defendant's motion to suppress based on one ground and did not consider an alternate ground. ( Brooks , at p. 474, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 .) When that ruling was later reversed, the trial court considered the alternate ground in a renewed suppression hearing and granted the motion again. ( Id . at pp. 474-475, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 .) The Supreme Court held that the trial court 2018(See People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 ; People v. Smith (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 283 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 .) In Brooks , the trial court initially granted a defendant's motion to suppress based on one ground and did not consider an alternate ground. ( Brooks , at p. 474, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 .) When that ruling was later reversed, the trial court considered the alternate ground in a renewed suppression hearing and granted the motion again. ( Id . at pp. 474-475, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 605 P.2d 1306 .) The Supreme Court held that the trial court | 1 | 1 |
Gitmed v. General Motors Corp.green1 sentence2015(Cf. Sadler v. Turner (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 245, 250 (Sadler) [request for dismissal after failure to amend need not be made by way of noticed motion]; Wilburn v. Oakland Hospital (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1110 (Wilburn) [citing Sadler for the proposition that “no notice was required on an ex parte application to dismiss after failure of the other party to amend after sustaining of a demurrer”]; Oppenheimer v. Deutchman (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 879 (Oppenheimer) [no notice required because the party whose pleading was challenged by demurrer had already had the opportunity for a full | 1 | 1 |
Datig v. Dove Books, Inc.green1 sentence2015(Cf. Sadler v. Turner (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 245, 250 (Sadler) [request for dismissal after failure to amend need not be made by way of noticed motion]; Wilburn v. Oakland Hospital (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1110 (Wilburn) [citing Sadler for the proposition that “no notice was required on an ex parte application to dismiss after failure of the other party to amend after sustaining of a demurrer”]; Oppenheimer v. Deutchman (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 879 (Oppenheimer) [no notice required because the party whose pleading was challenged by demurrer had already had the opportunity for a full | 1 | 1 |
Wilburn v. Oakland Hospitalgreen1 sentence2015(Cf. Sadler v. Turner (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 245, 250 (Sadler) [request for dismissal after failure to amend need not be made by way of noticed motion]; Wilburn v. Oakland Hospital (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1110 (Wilburn) [citing Sadler for the proposition that “no notice was required on an ex parte application to dismiss after failure of the other party to amend after sustaining of a demurrer”]; Oppenheimer v. Deutchman (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 879 (Oppenheimer) [no notice required because the party whose pleading was challenged by demurrer had already had the opportunity for a full | 1 | 1 |
Oppenheimer v. Deutchmangreen1 sentence2015(Cf. Sadler v. Turner (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 245, 250 (Sadler) [request for dismissal after failure to amend need not be made by way of noticed motion]; Wilburn v. Oakland Hospital (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1110 (Wilburn) [citing Sadler for the proposition that “no notice was required on an ex parte application to dismiss after failure of the other party to amend after sustaining of a demurrer”]; Oppenheimer v. Deutchman (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 879 (Oppenheimer) [no notice required because the party whose pleading was challenged by demurrer had already had the opportunity for a full | 1 | 1 |
Sadler v. Turnergreen1 sentence2015(Cf. Sadler v. Turner (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 245, 250 (Sadler) [request for dismissal after failure to amend need not be made by way of noticed motion]; Wilburn v. Oakland Hospital (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1110 (Wilburn) [citing Sadler for the proposition that “no notice was required on an ex parte application to dismiss after failure of the other party to amend after sustaining of a demurrer”]; Oppenheimer v. Deutchman (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 879 (Oppenheimer) [no notice required because the party whose pleading was challenged by demurrer had already had the opportunity for a full | 1 | 1 |
Moul v. McVeygreen2 sentences1962Such opportunity does no more than fulfill the purpose of the statute whose “object ... is to so balance rights as between the survivor and the deceased that no advantage may be taken of a deceased person because of the fact that his lips are sealed by death, and that the personal representative may not take advantage of the survivor.” (Moul v. McVey (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 101, 105-106 [ 121 P.2d 83 ].) It would be a strange reversal of judicial history if we were now to ignore the trend of the cases and hold, that the waiver of the statute did not cover the defense which the estate itself has p 1962Such opportunity does no more than fulfill the purpose of the statute whose “object ... is to so balance rights as between the survivor and the deceased that no advantage may be taken of a deceased person because of the fact that his lips are sealed by death, and that the personal representative may not take advantage of the survivor.” (Moul v. McVey (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 101, 105-106 [ 121 P.2d 83 ].) It would be a strange reversal of judicial history if we were now to ignore the trend of the cases and hold, that the waiver of the statute did not cover the defense which the estate itself has p | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board
green
2 sentences1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam 1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam | 6 | 1945–1977 |
Welch v. Ware
green
2 sentences1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam 1950Considering the merits of Mrs. Keenan’s position, since the decision in Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ], it has repeatedly been held “. . . that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P | 4 | 1945–1977 |
Bannerman v. Boyle
green
2 sentences1952It then held (p. 714), quoting with approval from Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [116 P. *882 732]: “ .. . that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common . fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication. ’ ” Thus, the Keenan case determined that section 13583 is valid, and that the section, by necessary implication, 1950Considering the merits of Mrs. Keenan’s position, since the decision in Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ], it has repeatedly been held “. . . that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P | 4 | 1945–1974 |
Covert v. State Board of Equalization
green
2 sentences1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam 1977The California Supreme Court, in holding that she was entitled to a hearing, stated: “it has repeatedly been held \ .. that if by statute an officer or civil service employee may not be removed or discharged except for cause, the clear implication is that there be afforded an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish his removal; that unless the statute expressly negatives the necessity of a hearing, common fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such a requirement by implication.’ (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]); see, also, Ratliff v. Lam | 2 | 1950–1977 |
City & County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo
green
2 sentences1974(Peo ple v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; City & County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [ 112 P.2d 595 ]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [ 140 P.2d 657 , 147 A.L.R. 1028 ].) Thus, in the instant case the goal of civil service, assurance of continuity in the position, should not be thwarted by leaving the employee without remedy for a full consideration of the propriety of his discharge, unless the statute unquestionably requires such a result. [<|] The rule is firmly established that if 1974(Peo ple v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; City & County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [ 112 P.2d 595 ]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [ 140 P.2d 657 , 147 A.L.R. 1028 ].) Thus, in the instant case the goal of civil service, assurance of continuity in the position, should not be thwarted by leaving the employee without remedy for a full consideration of the propriety of his discharge, unless the statute unquestionably requires such a result. [<|] The rule is firmly established that if | 2 | 1945–1974 |
Cal. Drive-In Restaurant Assn. v. Clark
green
2 sentences1974(Peo ple v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; City & County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [ 112 P.2d 595 ]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [ 140 P.2d 657 , 147 A.L.R. 1028 ].) Thus, in the instant case the goal of civil service, assurance of continuity in the position, should not be thwarted by leaving the employee without remedy for a full consideration of the propriety of his discharge, unless the statute unquestionably requires such a result. [<|] The rule is firmly established that if 1974(Peo ple v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; City & County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [ 112 P.2d 595 ]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [ 140 P.2d 657 , 147 A.L.R. 1028 ].) Thus, in the instant case the goal of civil service, assurance of continuity in the position, should not be thwarted by leaving the employee without remedy for a full consideration of the propriety of his discharge, unless the statute unquestionably requires such a result. [<|] The rule is firmly established that if | 2 | 1945–1974 |
Gage v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1974(Peo ple v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; City & County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [ 112 P.2d 595 ]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [ 140 P.2d 657 , 147 A.L.R. 1028 ].) Thus, in the instant case the goal of civil service, assurance of continuity in the position, should not be thwarted by leaving the employee without remedy for a full consideration of the propriety of his discharge, unless the statute unquestionably requires such a result. [<|] The rule is firmly established that if 1974(Peo ple v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; City & County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [ 112 P.2d 595 ]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [ 140 P.2d 657 , 147 A.L.R. 1028 ].) Thus, in the instant case the goal of civil service, assurance of continuity in the position, should not be thwarted by leaving the employee without remedy for a full consideration of the propriety of his discharge, unless the statute unquestionably requires such a result. [<|] The rule is firmly established that if | 2 | 1945–1974 |
People v. Moroney
green
2 sentences1974(Peo ple v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; City & County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [ 112 P.2d 595 ]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [ 140 P.2d 657 , 147 A.L.R. 1028 ].) Thus, in the instant case the goal of civil service, assurance of continuity in the position, should not be thwarted by leaving the employee without remedy for a full consideration of the propriety of his discharge, unless the statute unquestionably requires such a result. [<|] The rule is firmly established that if 1974(Peo ple v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; City & County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [ 112 P.2d 595 ]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [ 140 P.2d 657 , 147 A.L.R. 1028 ].) Thus, in the instant case the goal of civil service, assurance of continuity in the position, should not be thwarted by leaving the employee without remedy for a full consideration of the propriety of his discharge, unless the statute unquestionably requires such a result. [<|] The rule is firmly established that if | 2 | 1945–1974 |
Boyd v. Pendegast
green
2 sentences1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit 1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit | 2 | 1945–1974 |
Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc. v. Francis
green
2 sentences1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit 1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit | 2 | 1945–1974 |
Abrams v. Daugherty
green
2 sentences1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit 1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit | 2 | 1945–1974 |
People v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit 1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit | 2 | 1945–1974 |
Scott v. Donahue
green
2 sentences1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit 1974(See Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 P. 732 ]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ]; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 Cal.App. 383 [ 249 P. 539 ]; People v. Bailey, 30 Cal.App. 581 [ 158 P. 1036 ]; Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126 [ 269 P. 455 ]; Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal.App. 297 [ 212 P. 942 ]; Boyd v. Pendegast, 57 Cal.App. 504 [ 207 P. 713 ]; 99 A.L.R. 336 .) Thus it is clear that the charter, by prohibiting removal except for cause, impliedly requires a hearing.” Hence permanent employment wit | 2 | 1945–1974 |
La Prade v. Department of Water & Power
green
2 sentences1952(La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal.2d 47 [ 162 P.2d 13 ]; Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]; cf. Carroll v. California Horse Racing Bd., 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ].) This does not mean, of course, that the ‘discretion’ given to the board is absolute, since it must be exercised in accordance with the law. 1952(La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal.2d 47 [ 162 P.2d 13 ]; Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [ 160 P.2d 816 ]; cf. Carroll v. California Horse Racing Bd., 16 Cal.2d 164 [ 105 P.2d 110 ].) This does not mean, of course, that the ‘discretion’ given to the board is absolute, since it must be exercised in accordance with the law. | 2 | 1946–1952 |
Fuentes v. Shevin
green
2 sentences1977Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 556 , . 92 S.Ct. 1983 ], and related cases which require a hearing before a person is deprived of any significant property interest, are not in point. 1977Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 556 , . 92 S.Ct. 1983 ], and related cases which require a hearing before a person is deprived of any significant property interest, are not in point. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City
green
2 sentences1958City, 350 U.S. 551 [ 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.Ed. 692 ], and Board of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ]. 1958City, 350 U.S. 551 [ 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.Ed. 692 ], and Board of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ]. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Board of Education v. Mass
green
2 sentences1958City, 350 U.S. 551 [ 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.Ed. 692 ], and Board of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ]. 1958City, 350 U.S. 551 [ 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.Ed. 692 ], and Board of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ]. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
People v. Prewett
green
2 sentences1934While the constitutional right of the defendant to be heard in his defense includes a right of complete discussion of all 'the matters of law and evidence embraced by the case, there is nothing to prevent the court from limiting the time for argument, providing it does not thereby deprive the defendant of the opportunity for a full defense. (8 Cal. Jur. 261; People v. Prewett, 40 Cal. App. 416 [ 180 Pac. 844 ].) We find no abuse of discretion under the circumstances here present. 1934While the constitutional right of the defendant to be heard in his defense includes a right of complete discussion of all 'the matters of law and evidence embraced by the case, there is nothing to prevent the court from limiting the time for argument, providing it does not thereby deprive the defendant of the opportunity for a full defense. (8 Cal. Jur. 261; People v. Prewett, 40 Cal. App. 416 [ 180 Pac. 844 ].) We find no abuse of discretion under the circumstances here present. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.