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16 California opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Districtgreen2 sentences2024As a general rule, “[t]he violation of a statute gives to any person within the statute’s protection a right of action to recover damages caused by its violation.” (Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit District (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 (Yellow Cab).) Where the right is created by statute, “the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided.” (Id., citing County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541, 543 .) But where a statute does not specify a particular remedy, “any appropriate common[-]law remedy may be resorted t 2024As a general rule, “[t]he violation of a statute gives to any person within the statute’s protection a right of action to recover damages caused by its violation.” (Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit District (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 (Yellow Cab).) Where the right is created by statute, “the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided.” (Id., citing County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541, 543 .) But where a statute does not specify a particular remedy, “any appropriate common[-]law remedy may be resorted t | 5 | 8 |
Skaggs v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2020The remedy of the party aggrieved by the error lies only in a petition [for rehearing] to a reviewing court.” (Puritan Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1977) 76 6 Cal.App.3d 140, 147 ; see also Skaggs v. Los Angeles (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 269 , 272–273.) Applying the principles expressed above, the trial court did not err when it affirmed Manila’s prior sentence because this court’s directions in the disposition of Manila I did not expressly call for a new sentencing hearing. 1977(Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 269, 272-273 [ 291 P.2d 572 , 292 P.2d 572 ].) Case at Bench The power of the trial court here thus depends upon the nature of the Supreme Court’s order which remands the cause “for proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.” If that order is treated as a general reversal, the trial court has jurisdiction to consider all issues raised limited only by the applicable law of the case as enunciated by the Supreme Court to the extent that an exception to the application of that principle does not exist. | 2 | 2 |
County of San Diego v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2017(See § 5326.9.) When legislation provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme for its enforcement, courts generally conclude the Legislature intended that remedy to be exclusive, unless the statutory language or legislative history “ ‘ “clearly indicates an intent to create a private right of action.” ’ ” (Noe, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; see Thurman, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 ; see also County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580 , *382 610-611 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 ] [“[generally, when a new right is created by statute, a party aggrieved by violation of 2017(See § 5326.9.) When legislation provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme for its enforcement, courts generally conclude the Legislature intended that remedy to be exclusive, unless the statutory language or legislative history “ ‘ “clearly indicates an intent to create a private right of action.” ’ ” (Noe, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; see Thurman, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 ; see also County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580 , *382 610-611 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 ] [“[generally, when a new right is created by statute, a party aggrieved by violation of | 2 | 2 |
Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.green2 sentences2017(See § 5326.9.) When legislation provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme for its enforcement, courts generally conclude the Legislature intended that remedy to be exclusive, unless the statutory language or legislative history “ ‘ “clearly indicates an intent to create a private right of action.” ’ ” (Noe, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; see Thurman, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 ; see also County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580 , *382 610-611 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 ] [“[generally, when a new right is created by statute, a party aggrieved by violation of 2017(See § 5326.9.) When legislation provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme for its enforcement, courts generally conclude the Legislature intended that remedy to be exclusive, unless the statutory language or legislative history “clearly indicates an intent to create a private right of action.” (Noe, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; see Thurman, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 ; see also County of San Diego v. State (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 610-611 [“[g]enerally, when a new right is created by statute, a party aggrieved by violation of the statute is limited to the statutory 24 remedy | 2 | 2 |
County of Monterey v. Abbottgreen2 sentences2024As a general rule, “[t]he violation of a statute gives to any person within the statute’s protection a right of action to recover damages caused by its violation.” (Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit District (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 (Yellow Cab).) Where the right is created by statute, “the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided.” (Id., citing County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541, 543 .) But where a statute does not specify a particular remedy, “any appropriate common[-]law remedy may be resorted t 1983“Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided. ...” (Palo Alto-Menlo *519 Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 192 ]; County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541 [ 18 P. 113 , 20 P. 73 ]; see 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) p. 885.) Our courts have allowed exceptions to this rule only when the statutory remedy has been found inadequate. | 1 | 3 |
Williams v. City of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2024“We think it plain that the Legislature, in lieu of attempting to specify particular remedies for particular violations, determined that the task was best left to the courts on a case-by-case basis.” (Williams v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 47 Cal.3d 195, 203 (Williams).) In such circumstances, a trial court’s decision will be reversed only if there has been a prejudicial abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Paxton v. Paxtongreen1 sentence2024As a general rule, “[t]he violation of a statute gives to any person within the statute’s protection a right of action to recover damages caused by its violation.” (Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit District (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 (Yellow Cab).) Where the right is created by statute, “the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided.” (Id., citing County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541, 543 .) But where a statute does not specify a particular remedy, “any appropriate common[-]law remedy may be resorted t | 1 | 1 |
Stevenson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009(See Henning, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1273.) Thus, an employee did not have a common law right to his or her gratuity. "`"`Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy....'"'" ( Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 900 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ].) Since Labor Code section 351 created a right and did not simply provide a new remedy for a preexisting right, Grodensky and the class cannot base their tort claim for conversion on a violation of Labor Code section 351. 2009(See Henning, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1273.) Thus, an employee did not have a common law right to his or her gratuity. "`"`Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy....'"'" ( Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 900 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ].) Since Labor Code section 351 created a right and did not simply provide a new remedy for a preexisting right, Grodensky and the class cannot base their tort claim for conversion on a violation of Labor Code section 351. | 1 | 1 |
Henning v. Industrial Welfare Commissiongreen1 sentence2009(See Henning, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1273.) Thus, an employee did not have a common law right to his or her gratuity. "`"`Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy....'"'" ( Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 900 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ].) Since Labor Code section 351 created a right and did not simply provide a new remedy for a preexisting right, Grodensky and the class cannot base their tort claim for conversion on a violation of Labor Code section 351. | 1 | 1 |
County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambragreen2 sentences1996Code, § 3523.) In accordance with that principle, “[t]he violation of a statute gives to any person within the statute’s protection a right of action to recover damages caused by its violation.” (Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 192 ]; accord, County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra (1980) 27 Cal.3d 184, 195 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 612 P.2d 24 ].) “Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided [citation]; otherwise any appro 1996Code, § 3523.) In accordance with that principle, “[t]he violation of a statute gives to any person within the statute’s protection a right of action to recover damages caused by its violation.” (Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 192 ]; accord, County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra (1980) 27 Cal.3d 184, 195 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 612 P.2d 24 ].) “Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided [citation]; otherwise any appro | 1 | 1 |
Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.red2 sentences1986Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 490 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 595 P.2d 592 ].) Section 1420 et seq. created a statutory remedy for the infringement of that right. ‘Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided [Citations.]” (Strauss v. A. L. 1986Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 490 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 595 P.2d 592 ].) Section 1420 et seq. created a statutory remedy for the infringement of that right. ‘Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided [Citations.]” (Strauss v. A. L. | 1 | 1 |
Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc.green2 sentences1983(See, e.g., Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1947) 30 Cal.2d 110, 113 [ 180 P.2d 321 , 171 A.L.R. 913 ].) We conclude that Strauss’ right to file a private civil action is demarcated by statute. 1983(See, e.g., Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1947) 30 Cal.2d 110, 113 [ 180 P.2d 321 , 171 A.L.R. 913 ].) We conclude that Strauss’ right to file a private civil action is demarcated by statute. | 1 | 1 |
River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1976(River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 986, 1001 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 498 ].) Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided (County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541, 543 [ 18 P. 113 , 20 P. 73 ]); otherwise any appropriate common law remedy may be resorted to. 1976(River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 986, 1001 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 498 ].) Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided (County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541, 543 [ 18 P. 113 , 20 P. 73 ]); otherwise any appropriate common law remedy may be resorted to. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Faria v. San Jacinto Unified School District
green
2 sentences1998Certainly nothing in chapter 5 expressly immunizes a personal representative from liability for fraudulently failing to give notice to the Department. (5) We recognize the rule, relied on by Fidelity, that "[w]here a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided [citation]; otherwise any appropriate common law remedy may be resorted to. [Citation.]" ( Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist., supra, 65 Cal. App.3d 121, 131 ; Faria v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist., supra, 50 Cal. App 1998We recognize the rule, relied on by Fidelity, that "[w]here a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided [citation]; otherwise any appropriate common law remedy may be resorted to. [Citation.]" ( Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 192 ; Faria v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 1939, 1947 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 .) As previously noted, the Department's right to recoup payments made under the Medi-Cal program from | 3 | 1998–1998 |
Roberts & Co. v. Landecker
neutral
2 sentences2024As a general rule, “[t]he violation of a statute gives to any person within the statute’s protection a right of action to recover damages caused by its violation.” (Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit District (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 (Yellow Cab).) Where the right is created by statute, “the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided.” (Id., citing County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541, 543 .) But where a statute does not specify a particular remedy, “any appropriate common[-]law remedy may be resorted t 1976(Roberts v. Landecker (1858) 9 Cal. 262, 267 ; Civ. | 2 | 1976–2024 |
Noe v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2017(See § 5326.9.) When legislation provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme for its enforcement, courts generally conclude the Legislature intended that remedy to be exclusive, unless the statutory language or legislative history “ ‘ “clearly indicates an intent to create a private right of action.” ’ ” (Noe, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; see Thurman, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 ; see also County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580 , *382 610-611 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 ] [“[generally, when a new right is created by statute, a party aggrieved by violation of 2017(See § 5326.9.) When legislation provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme for its enforcement, courts generally conclude the Legislature intended that remedy to be exclusive, unless the statutory language or legislative history “clearly indicates an intent to create a private right of action.” (Noe, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; see Thurman, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 ; see also County of San Diego v. State (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 610-611 [“[g]enerally, when a new right is created by statute, a party aggrieved by violation of the statute is limited to the statutory 24 remedy | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Mahoney
green
2 sentences1983“Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided. ...” (Palo Alto-Menlo *519 Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 131 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 192 ]; County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541 [ 18 P. 113 , 20 P. 73 ]; see 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) p. 885.) Our courts have allowed exceptions to this rule only when the statutory remedy has been found inadequate. 1976(River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 986, 1001 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 498 ].) Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided (County of Monterey v. Abbott (1888) 77 Cal. 541, 543 [ 18 P. 113 , 20 P. 73 ]); otherwise any appropriate common law remedy may be resorted to. | 2 | 1976–1983 |
Bauguess v. Paine
green
2 sentences2012The trial court imposed the requested $81,461.13 in sanctions pursuant to rule 2.30 against Farley and Menke. 5 The court concluded that rule 2.30(d) gave it the authority to impose reasonable monetary sanctions for failure to comply with the applicable rule of court, and rule 2.30(b) gave the court authority to order the person who had violated the rule of court to pay the party aggrieved by the violation its reasonable expenses, “ ‘including reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, incurred in connection with the motion for sanctions or the order to show cause.’ ” (Italics omitted.) Because rul 2012The trial court imposed the requested $81,461.13 in sanctions pursuant to rule 2.30 against Farley and Menke. 5 The court concluded that rule 2.30(d) gave it the authority to impose reasonable monetary sanctions for failure to comply with the applicable rule of court, and rule 2.30(b) gave the court authority to order the person who had violated the rule of court to pay the party aggrieved by the violation its reasonable expenses, “ ‘including reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, incurred in connection with the motion for sanctions or the order to show cause.’ ” (Italics omitted.) Because rul | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.