plan defendant in California

2015(See, e.g., Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 278, 290 .) Here, Shelby merely asserts, without any meaningful discussion of the specific evidence he challenges or of the plaintiffs’ allegations, that the “‘prior bad acts’ evidence does not share sufficient features with the allegations to fall under the common plan exception.” Shelby’s bald assertions of error are wholly inadequate to allow any meaningful analysis of the issue.

2015(See, e.g., Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 278, 290 .) Here, Shelby merely asserts, without any meaningful discussion of the specific evidence he challenges or of the plaintiffs’ allegations, that the “‘prior bad acts’ evidence does not share sufficient features with the allegations to fall under the common plan exception.” Shelby’s bald assertions of error are wholly inadequate to allow any meaningful analysis of the issue.

2017As explained in Rabuck , the standardized assessment protocol itself-the most recent version of which the department adopted in 2009-explains that " '[i]n the context of clinical evaluation, a protocol is a plan or framework that serves as a guide for evaluators in performing evaluations.' " ( Rabuck , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 , 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 354 .) Thus, the 2009 assessment protocol "provides a 'plan or framework' by which the evaluator makes the ultimate determination whether the person being evaluated is a sexually violent predator." ( Ibid. ) That is to say, the standardized as

2017As explained in Rabuck , the standardized assessment protocol itself-the most recent version of which the department adopted in 2009-explains that " '[i]n the context of clinical evaluation, a protocol is a plan or framework that serves as a guide for evaluators in performing evaluations.' " ( Rabuck , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 , 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 354 .) Thus, the 2009 assessment protocol "provides a 'plan or framework' by which the evaluator makes the ultimate determination whether the person being evaluated is a sexually violent predator." ( Ibid. ) That is to say, the standardized as

2022(See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402 [“in establishing a common design or plan, evidence of uncharged misconduct must demonstrate ‘not merely a similarity in the 26 results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations’”]; People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1147 .) Bracken argues the requisite similarity existed, contending “Mallard had a distinct practice of grooming his clients and method of assault.” It would have been within the trial court’s discretion to

2013(In re Lucas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) The 2009 SAP provides a “plan or framework” by which the evaluator makes the ultimate determination whether the person being evaluated is a sexually violent predator. (2009 SAP, supra, at p. 1.) The 2009 SAP has six sections preceded by an introduction and statement of purpose.

2000Co. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 858 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 511 ] would be favorable to the defense of the Plan defendants and the statements of Wilner that his firm could not prepare an adequate defense or offer any opinion as to the Plan defendants’ exposure because of Berger Kahn’s failure to conduct any discovery.

2000Co. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 858 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 511 ] would be favorable to the defense of the Plan defendants and the statements of Wilner that his firm could not prepare an adequate defense or offer any opinion as to the Plan defendants’ exposure because of Berger Kahn’s failure to conduct any discovery.

2000The best interest of both insurer and insured converge in expectations of competent representation.’ ” ( Unigard, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236 .) The Unigard court continued: “We conclude that where the insurer hires counsel to defend its insured and does not raise or reserve any coverage dispute, and where there is otherwise no actual or apparent conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured that would preclude an attorney from representing both, the attorney has a dual attorney-client relationship with both insurer and insured.” (Id. at pp. 1236-1237, some original italics omi

2000Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358, 364 , footnote 3 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 50 A.L.R.4th 913 ], 5 in discussing the conflict faced by counsel in the triangular representation afforded the insured by the insurer’s lawyers, “ ‘[a]s a practical matter, however, there has been recognition that, in reality, the insurer’s attorneys may have closer ties with the insurer and a more compelling interest in protecting the insurer’s position, whether or not it coincides with what is best for the insured.’ ” This concern is mitigated here, where the Plan defendants for several years had had an independ

2000Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358, 364 , footnote 3 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 50 A.L.R.4th 913 ], 5 in discussing the conflict faced by counsel in the triangular representation afforded the insured by the insurer’s lawyers, “ ‘[a]s a practical matter, however, there has been recognition that, in reality, the insurer’s attorneys may have closer ties with the insurer and a more compelling interest in protecting the insurer’s position, whether or not it coincides with what is best for the insured.’ ” This concern is mitigated here, where the Plan defendants for several years had had an independ

2000Having established an attorney-client relationship between Gulf and the Berger Kahn defendants, it must be determined whether under applicable law Gulf can sue them for alleged malpractice committed in representing the Plan defendants. *128 In Fifield Manor v. Finston (1960) 54 Cal.2d 632 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 354 P.2d 1073 , 78 A.L.R.2d 813 ], because of the highly personal nature of malpractice actions, the Supreme Court held that legal malpractice claims are not assignable.

2000Having established an attorney-client relationship between Gulf and the Berger Kahn defendants, it must be determined whether under applicable law Gulf can sue them for alleged malpractice committed in representing the Plan defendants. *128 In Fifield Manor v. Finston (1960) 54 Cal.2d 632 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 354 P.2d 1073 , 78 A.L.R.2d 813 ], because of the highly personal nature of malpractice actions, the Supreme Court held that legal malpractice claims are not assignable.

1995The Fifth Circuit held that while claims against the insurer were preempted, “we are not persuaded that this logic should extend to immunize agents from personal liability for their solicitation of potential participants in an ERISA plan prior to its formation.” (Perkins, supra, 898 F.2d at p. 473 ; Kurtz, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260 .) “The [Perkins] court found that the claim ‘relates to’ the plan only indirectly: ‘[a] state law claim . . . which does not affect the relations among the principal ERISA entities (the employer, the plan fiduciaries, the plan, and the beneficiaries) as such

1995The Fifth Circuit held that while claims against the insurer were preempted, “we are not persuaded that this logic should extend to immunize agents from personal liability for their solicitation of potential participants in an ERISA plan prior to its formation.” (Perkins, supra, 898 F.2d at p. 473 ; Kurtz, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260 .) “The [Perkins] court found that the claim ‘relates to’ the plan only indirectly: ‘[a] state law claim . . . which does not affect the relations among the principal ERISA entities (the employer, the plan fiduciaries, the plan, and the beneficiaries) as such

1995Co. (5th Cir. 1990) 898 F.2d 470 , which found no ERISA preemption of a state law action by an employer against an independent insurance agent who allegedly solicited the plaintiffs’ participation in an ERISA plan and allegedly misrepresented plan coverage in order to induce plaintiffs to give up existing coverage and join the plan in violation of a state statute.

1995The Fifth Circuit held that while claims against the insurer were preempted, “we are not persuaded that this logic should extend to immunize agents from personal liability for their solicitation of potential participants in an ERISA plan prior to its formation.” (Perkins, supra, 898 F.2d at p. 473 ; Kurtz, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260 .) “The [Perkins] court found that the claim ‘relates to’ the plan only indirectly: ‘[a] state law claim . . . which does not affect the relations among the principal ERISA entities (the employer, the plan fiduciaries, the plan, and the beneficiaries) as such

1988(Cf. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 229, 236 .) Examination of the administrative record persuades us there was no basis for invalidating the 5 Plan approval on cumulative-impact grounds: In the course of processing the 5 Plan the term itself was mentioned only once and in passing, and although there was some mention of previous incidents of flooding and erosion in the relevant area there was no suggestion that anyone perceived any significant cumulative environmental effect relevant to the 5 Plan.

1967(People v. Anthony, supra, 185 Cal. 152 .) Tke holding in People v. Baskett, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at page 717 , that the common plan exception in sex cases is limited to proof of identity, is too restrictive and is disapproved.

1967The holding in People v. Baskett, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at page 717 , that the common plan exception in sex cases is limited to proof of identity, is too restrictive and is disapproved. [fn. 6] 6.

1967(People v. Anthony, supra, 185 Cal. 152 .) Tke holding in People v. Baskett, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at page 717 , that the common plan exception in sex cases is limited to proof of identity, is too restrictive and is disapproved.