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16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co.green2 sentences2026Code, § 19 [“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself”]; Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412, 437-438 [failure to inquire may constitute negligence]). 2. 1949(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 435; West v. Great Western Power Co., supra, 36 Cal.App.2d 403, 407 ; Adams v. Harrison, 34 Cal.App.2d 288, 299 [ 93 P.2d 237 ].) It is argued by defendants that inquiry made of some of the defendants would have developed the facts constituting the conspiracy, and that if plaintiff had taken depositions in the action of Sunday against B. | 2 | 2 |
First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Ass'n v. ALLIANCE BK.green2 sentences2026“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact.” (§ 19; First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1443 (First Fidelity) [“A person generally has ‘notice’ of a particular fact if that person has knowledge of circumstances which, upon reasonable inquiry, would lead to that particular fact.”].) Whether a buyer is a bona fide purchaser is a question of 2026“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact.” (§ 19; First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1443 (First Fidelity) [“A person generally has ‘notice’ of a particular fact if that person has knowledge of circumstances which, upon reasonable inquiry, would lead to that particular fact.”].) Whether a buyer is a bona fide purchaser is a question of | 2 | 2 |
Rabbit v. Atkinsongreen2 sentences2022If the sum which the vendor is willing to take is grossly disproportionate to the value of the thing which is the subject of the negotiation, it is strong proof of a defective title, and sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry, and if the purchaser neglects to prosecute such inquiry diligently, he may not be awarded the standing of a bona fide purchaser.” (Rabbit v. Atkinson (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 752, 757-758 .) Vertical disputes Wardwell’s allegation with evidence that the home was not in good condition. 1962In Rabbit v. Atkinson, 44 Cal.App.2d 752 [ 113 P.2d 14 ], the court had this to say about a purchaser being put on notice when obtaining property for a grossly inadequate consideration, at pages 757-758: “If the sum which the vendor is willing to take is grossly disproportionate to the value of the thing which is the subject of the negotiation, it is strong proof of a defective title, and sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry, and if the purchaser neglects to prosecute such inquiry diligently, he may not be awarded the standing of a bona fide purchaser. ’ ’ (See also Asisten v. Under | 1 | 3 |
Witty v. Clinchgreen2 sentences1949More is required, actual knowledge unless ‘the circumstances or suspicions are so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to bad faith’. (8 Cor.Jur. 501.) ” (See, also, Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779, 783 [ 279 P. 797 ]; Allenberg v. Rapken & Co., Ltd., 108 Cal.App. 99, 103 [ 291 P. 281 ]; Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal.App.2d 36, 40 [ 144 P.2d 95 ].) Conceding that the record contains no direct evidence of actual knowledge on the part of appellant as to any infirmity or defect in the checks, the question remains as to whether, under the evidence, the court was justified in concluding 1949More is required, actual knowledge unless ‘the circumstances or suspicions are so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to bad faith’. (8 Cor.Jur. 501.) ” (See, also, Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779, 783 [ 279 P. 797 ]; Allenberg v. Rapken & Co., Ltd., 108 Cal.App. 99, 103 [ 291 P. 281 ]; Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal.App.2d 36, 40 [ 144 P.2d 95 ].) Conceding that the record contains no direct evidence of actual knowledge on the part of appellant as to any infirmity or defect in the checks, the question remains as to whether, under the evidence, the court was justified in concluding | 1 | 2 |
Melendrez v. D & I INVESTMENT, INC.green2 sentences2026“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact.” (§ 19; First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1443 (First Fidelity) [“A person generally has ‘notice’ of a particular fact if that person has knowledge of circumstances which, upon reasonable inquiry, would lead to that particular fact.”].) Whether a buyer is a bona fide purchaser is a question of 2026“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact.” (§ 19; First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1443 (First Fidelity) [“A person generally has ‘notice’ of a particular fact if that person has knowledge of circumstances which, upon reasonable inquiry, would lead to that particular fact.”].) Whether a buyer is a bona fide purchaser is a question of | 1 | 1 |
ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc.green2 sentences2026“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact.” (§ 19; First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1443 (First Fidelity) [“A person generally has ‘notice’ of a particular fact if that person has knowledge of circumstances which, upon reasonable inquiry, would lead to that particular fact.”].) Whether a buyer is a bona fide purchaser is a question of 2026“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact.” (§ 19; First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1443 (First Fidelity) [“A person generally has ‘notice’ of a particular fact if that person has knowledge of circumstances which, upon reasonable inquiry, would lead to that particular fact.”].) Whether a buyer is a bona fide purchaser is a question of | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Shannongreen2 sentences2018In the absence of other facts or circumstances, Able, the owner of Whiteacre, and Able's family, tenants, and invitees, are entitled to use the road 24 hours a day by any form of transportation that does not inflict unreasonable damage or unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of Blackacre." ( Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, § 4.10, com. c, illus. 1; see Woods v. Shannon (2015) 378 Mont. 365 , 344 P.3d 413 , 417, quoting com. c, illus. 1 with approval; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Real Property, § 421, p. 487 ["a grant of a right-of-way without limitations or restrictions pe 2018In the absence of other facts or circumstances, Able, the owner of Whiteacre, and Able's family, tenants, and invitees, are entitled to use the road 24 hours a day by any form of transportation that does not inflict unreasonable damage or unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of Blackacre." ( Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, § 4.10, com. c, illus. 1; see Woods v. Shannon (2015) 378 Mont. 365 , 344 P.3d 413 , 417, quoting com. c, illus. 1 with approval; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Real Property, § 421, p. 487 ["a grant of a right-of-way without limitations or restrictions pe | 1 | 1 |
Appel v. Morfordgreen2 sentences1949More is required, actual knowledge unless ‘the circumstances or suspicions are so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to bad faith’. (8 Cor.Jur. 501.) ” (See, also, Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779, 783 [ 279 P. 797 ]; Allenberg v. Rapken & Co., Ltd., 108 Cal.App. 99, 103 [ 291 P. 281 ]; Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal.App.2d 36, 40 [ 144 P.2d 95 ].) Conceding that the record contains no direct evidence of actual knowledge on the part of appellant as to any infirmity or defect in the checks, the question remains as to whether, under the evidence, the court was justified in concluding 1949More is required, actual knowledge unless ‘the circumstances or suspicions are so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to bad faith’. (8 Cor.Jur. 501.) ” (See, also, Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779, 783 [ 279 P. 797 ]; Allenberg v. Rapken & Co., Ltd., 108 Cal.App. 99, 103 [ 291 P. 281 ]; Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal.App.2d 36, 40 [ 144 P.2d 95 ].) Conceding that the record contains no direct evidence of actual knowledge on the part of appellant as to any infirmity or defect in the checks, the question remains as to whether, under the evidence, the court was justified in concluding | 1 | 1 |
Allenberg v. Rapken Co., Ltd.green2 sentences1949More is required, actual knowledge unless ‘the circumstances or suspicions are so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to bad faith’. (8 Cor.Jur. 501.) ” (See, also, Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779, 783 [ 279 P. 797 ]; Allenberg v. Rapken & Co., Ltd., 108 Cal.App. 99, 103 [ 291 P. 281 ]; Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal.App.2d 36, 40 [ 144 P.2d 95 ].) Conceding that the record contains no direct evidence of actual knowledge on the part of appellant as to any infirmity or defect in the checks, the question remains as to whether, under the evidence, the court was justified in concluding 1949More is required, actual knowledge unless ‘the circumstances or suspicions are so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to bad faith’. (8 Cor.Jur. 501.) ” (See, also, Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779, 783 [ 279 P. 797 ]; Allenberg v. Rapken & Co., Ltd., 108 Cal.App. 99, 103 [ 291 P. 281 ]; Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal.App.2d 36, 40 [ 144 P.2d 95 ].) Conceding that the record contains no direct evidence of actual knowledge on the part of appellant as to any infirmity or defect in the checks, the question remains as to whether, under the evidence, the court was justified in concluding | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Harrisongreen2 sentences1949(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 435; West v. Great Western Power Co., supra, 36 Cal.App.2d 403, 407 ; Adams v. Harrison, 34 Cal.App.2d 288, 299 [ 93 P.2d 237 ].) It is argued by defendants that inquiry made of some of the defendants would have developed the facts constituting the conspiracy, and that if plaintiff had taken depositions in the action of Sunday against B. 1949(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 435; West v. Great Western Power Co., supra, 36 Cal.App.2d 403, 407 ; Adams v. Harrison, 34 Cal.App.2d 288, 299 [ 93 P.2d 237 ].) It is argued by defendants that inquiry made of some of the defendants would have developed the facts constituting the conspiracy, and that if plaintiff had taken depositions in the action of Sunday against B. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Berríos
neutral
2 sentences1937(Boyd v. Bearce, 48 Cal. App. 46 [ 191 Pac. 560 ]; Jordan v. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 [ 33 Pac. 889 ].) Certainly this is a circumstance which should put a prudent person upon inquiry both as to the liability of the maker and the title of prior holders. 1936(Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779 [ 279 Pac. 797 ] ; Flippen v. Abbey, 135 Cal. App. 666 [ 27 Pac. (2d) 792 ]; Jordan v. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 [ 33 Pac. 889 ].) Appellants attempt to establish that the note was obtained from the Bishops not through fraud but upon an unexecuted oral agreement, and cite 19 Cal. Jur. 867, Splivalo v. Patten, 38 Cal. 138 [ 99 Am. | 2 | 1936–1937 |
Jordan v. Grover
green
2 sentences1937(Boyd v. Bearce, 48 Cal. App. 46 [ 191 Pac. 560 ]; Jordan v. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 [ 33 Pac. 889 ].) Certainly this is a circumstance which should put a prudent person upon inquiry both as to the liability of the maker and the title of prior holders. 1936(Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779 [ 279 Pac. 797 ] ; Flippen v. Abbey, 135 Cal. App. 666 [ 27 Pac. (2d) 792 ]; Jordan v. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 [ 33 Pac. 889 ].) Appellants attempt to establish that the note was obtained from the Bishops not through fraud but upon an unexecuted oral agreement, and cite 19 Cal. Jur. 867, Splivalo v. Patten, 38 Cal. 138 [ 99 Am. | 2 | 1936–1937 |
Noronha v. Stewart
green
1 sentence2025Gamerberg and Noronha In the trial court, Krajian argued that Gamerberg is “applicable and informative” and “controlling.” He now claims that Gamerberg was wrongly decided and asks this court to instead follow Noronha v. Stewart (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 485 (Noronha), in which the court concluded that an irrevocable license is binding on successors to the licensor regardless of the successors’ knowledge of the license. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Berendsen v. McIver
green
1 sentence2025Code, §§ 1213 [“Every 6 conveyance of real property ... recorded as prescribed by law from the time it is filed with the recorder for record is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees”], 19 [“Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact.”].) Berendsen v. McIver (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 347 (Berendsen) considered and rejected similar arguments i | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Zissler v. Saville
green
1 sentence2024Code, § 19 [‘Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, 16 by prosecuting such inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact’].)” (Zissler v. Saville (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 630, 642 .) The Starrs argue that as bona fide purchasers they were entitled to rely on the language of the recorded deed that gave them unrestricted use of the driveway, including for vehicular ingress and egress. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2022Code, § 19 [defining “constructive notice” as “actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact”].) What is more, a “reasonable person” standard is synonymous with a negligence standard because “‘ordinary negligence’ . . . consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ . . . .” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 753 , italics added; Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 576, 589 ; Anderson v. Fitnes | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Bellman v. San Francisco High School District
green
1 sentence2022Code, § 19 [defining “constructive notice” as “actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact”].) What is more, a “reasonable person” standard is synonymous with a negligence standard because “‘ordinary negligence’ . . . consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ . . . .” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 753 , italics added; Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 576, 589 ; Anderson v. Fitnes | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Anderson v. Fitness International, LLC
green
1 sentence2022Code, § 19 [defining “constructive notice” as “actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact”].) What is more, a “reasonable person” standard is synonymous with a negligence standard because “‘ordinary negligence’ . . . consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ . . . .” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 753 , italics added; Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 576, 589 ; Anderson v. Fitnes | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Northrup v. Hayward
neutral
2 sentences1970It has been held that where the judgment debtor “has notice of facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry, it is sufficient to protect the rights of the attorney.” (Northrup v. Hayward, 102 Minn. 307 [ 113 N.W. 701, 703 ], cited in 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 288, p. 207.) This would clearly apply to Richman and inferentially to Granz through Richman. 12. 1970It has been held that where the judgment debtor “has notice of facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry, it is sufficient to protect the rights of the attorney.” (Northrup v. Hayward, 102 Minn. 307 [ 113 N.W. 701, 703 ], cited in 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 288, p. 207.) This would clearly apply to Richman and inferentially to Granz through Richman. 12. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Beresford v. Horn
neutral
2 sentences1960The following excerpt from our opinion in Beresford v. Horn, 127 Cal.App.2d 89 [ 273 P.2d 302 ] is sufficient to state both the facts and our conclusions in that case (p. 91) : “Plaintiffs recognize the familiar rule that actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry is deemed to be notice of facts discoverable in the exercise of reasonable diligence in making an investigation. 1960The following excerpt from our opinion in Beresford v. Horn, 127 Cal.App.2d 89 [ 273 P.2d 302 ] is sufficient to state both the facts and our conclusions in that case (p. 91) : “Plaintiffs recognize the familiar rule that actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry is deemed to be notice of facts discoverable in the exercise of reasonable diligence in making an investigation. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
West v. Great Western Power Co.
green
1 sentence1949(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 435; West v. Great Western Power Co., supra, 36 Cal.App.2d 403, 407 ; Adams v. Harrison, 34 Cal.App.2d 288, 299 [ 93 P.2d 237 ].) It is argued by defendants that inquiry made of some of the defendants would have developed the facts constituting the conspiracy, and that if plaintiff had taken depositions in the action of Sunday against B. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Boyd v. Bearce
green
1 sentence1937(Boyd v. Bearce, 48 Cal. App. 46 [ 191 Pac. 560 ]; Jordan v. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 [ 33 Pac. 889 ].) Certainly this is a circumstance which should put a prudent person upon inquiry both as to the liability of the maker and the title of prior holders. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Splivallo v. Patten
green
1 sentence1936(Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779 [ 279 Pac. 797 ] ; Flippen v. Abbey, 135 Cal. App. 666 [ 27 Pac. (2d) 792 ]; Jordan v. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 [ 33 Pac. 889 ].) Appellants attempt to establish that the note was obtained from the Bishops not through fraud but upon an unexecuted oral agreement, and cite 19 Cal. Jur. 867, Splivalo v. Patten, 38 Cal. 138 [ 99 Am. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Flippen v. Abbey
green
2 sentences1936(Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779 [ 279 Pac. 797 ] ; Flippen v. Abbey, 135 Cal. App. 666 [ 27 Pac. (2d) 792 ]; Jordan v. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 [ 33 Pac. 889 ].) Appellants attempt to establish that the note was obtained from the Bishops not through fraud but upon an unexecuted oral agreement, and cite 19 Cal. Jur. 867, Splivalo v. Patten, 38 Cal. 138 [ 99 Am. 1936(Witty v. Clinch, 207 Cal. 779 [ 279 Pac. 797 ] ; Flippen v. Abbey, 135 Cal. App. 666 [ 27 Pac. (2d) 792 ]; Jordan v. Grover, 99 Cal. 194 [ 33 Pac. 889 ].) Appellants attempt to establish that the note was obtained from the Bishops not through fraud but upon an unexecuted oral agreement, and cite 19 Cal. Jur. 867, Splivalo v. Patten, 38 Cal. 138 [ 99 Am. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.