Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
16 California opinions name it 3 courts 1937–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliottgreen2 sentences2025IV, § 31].) “However, ‘expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning . . . of the Constitution if those funds are expended for a public purpose . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization (2001) 25 Cal.4th 197, 225 .) The public purpose doctrine requires that “a direct and substantial public purpose is served and nonstate entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose. [Citations.]” (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 (California Housing Finance Agency).) 2025IV, § 31].) “However, ‘expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning . . . of the Constitution if those funds are expended for a public purpose . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization (2001) 25 Cal.4th 197, 225 .) The public purpose doctrine requires that “a direct and substantial public purpose is served and nonstate entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose. [Citations.]” (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 (California Housing Finance Agency).) | 3 | 3 |
County of Alameda v. Carlesongreen2 sentences2025IV, § 31].) “However, ‘expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning . . . of the Constitution if those funds are expended for a public purpose . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization (2001) 25 Cal.4th 197, 225 .) The public purpose doctrine requires that “a direct and substantial public purpose is served and nonstate entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose. [Citations.]” (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 (California Housing Finance Agency).) 2025IV, § 31].) “However, ‘expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning . . . of the Constitution if those funds are expended for a public purpose . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization (2001) 25 Cal.4th 197, 225 .) The public purpose doctrine requires that “a direct and substantial public purpose is served and nonstate entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose. [Citations.]” (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 (California Housing Finance Agency).) | 2 | 2 |
County of Alameda v. Janssengreen2 sentences1997Under the public purpose doctrine, public credit may be extended and public funds disbursed if a direct and substantial public purpose is served and non state entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose. [Citations.] `. . . [T]he benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.' [Citation.]" In County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276 , 281 , the court analyzed the "gift clause," then contained in article IV, as follow 1997Under the public purpose doctrine, public credit may be extended and public funds disbursed if a direct and substantial public purpose is served and non state entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose. [Citations.] `. . . [T]he benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.' [Citation.]" In County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 281 , the court analyzed the "gift clause," then contained in article IV, as follows | 1 | 5 |
Winkelman v. City of Tiburongreen2 sentences1995(See, e.g., California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliot (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 ["Under the public purpose doctrine, public credit may be extended and public funds disbursed if a direct and substantial public purpose is served and nonstate entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose"]; Winkelman v. City of Tiburon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 834, 845-846 ; 77 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen 170, 173 (1994).) Here the county's master plan for a recreational trail system serves a public purpose by promoting "the laudable goal of inducing owners to make their properties available for recreation. 1994(See, e.g., California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliot (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 ["Under the public purpose doctrine, public credit may be extended and public funds disbursed if a direct and substantial public purpose is served and nonstate entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose"]; Winkelman v. City of Tiburon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 834, 845-846 ; 74 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 159 , 162 (1991).) 3. 94-310 In our view, the stated reasons for the home loan in question constitute legitimate "public purposes" for making the loan. | 1 | 3 |
Schettler v. County of Santa Claragreen2 sentences1996It has been consistently held that expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition if those funds are expended for a public purpose.” (Schettler v. County of Santa Clara (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 990, 1003 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 731 ].) The assessor acknowledges the public purpose exception but argues a public purpose cannot be presumed in the absence of a legislative statement of purpose and without evidence to support the presumption. 1996It has been consistently held that expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition if those funds are expended for a public purpose.” (Schettler v. County of Santa Clara (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 990, 1003 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 731 ].) The assessor acknowledges the public purpose exception but argues a public purpose cannot be presumed in the absence of a legislative statement of purpose and without evidence to support the presumption. | 1 | 2 |
Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmoregreen2 sentences2007(Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 796 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 904 , 700 P.2d 794 ].) This means that “ ‘the owner is constitutionally entitled [to] the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken.’ ” (Id. at pp. 796-797.) Two provisions in the Eminent Domain Law (§ 1230.010 et seq.) set out the basic method for determining the date on which taken property is to be valued for the purpose of fixing compensation. 2007(Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 796 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 904 , 700 P.2d 794 ].) This means that “ ‘the owner is constitutionally entitled [to] the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken.’ ” (Id. at pp. 796-797.) Two provisions in the Eminent Domain Law (§ 1230.010 et seq.) set out the basic method for determining the date on which taken property is to be valued for the purpose of fixing compensation. | 1 | 1 |
City of Los Angeles v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1999(See City of Los Angeles v. Lewis (1917) 175 Cal. 777, 779-780 [ 167 P. 390 ].) 11 The Superintendent can likewise prompt inquiry. (§ 47604.3.) 12 Article XVI, section 8 gives priority funding status to support of the public school system and public institutions of higher education and also sets minimum amounts of funding. 1999(See City of Los Angeles v. Lewis (1917) 175 Cal. 777, 779-780 [ 167 P. 390 ].) 11 The Superintendent can likewise prompt inquiry. (§ 47604.3.) 12 Article XVI, section 8 gives priority funding status to support of the public school system and public institutions of higher education and also sets minimum amounts of funding. | 1 | 1 |
Wall v. Municipal Courtgreen1 sentence1994(Cf. Ector v. City of Torrance (1973) 10 Cal.3d 129, 135 [possible legitimate objectives of a city residency requirement include "enhancement of the quality of employee performance by greater personal knowledge of the city's conditions and by a feeling of greater personal stake in the city's progress; diminution of absenteeism and tardiness among municipal personnel; ready availability of trained manpower in emergency situations"]; Wall v. Municipal Court (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 247, 250 [reasonable to require a traffic referee to reside within the city so that he would be acquainted with the ci | 1 | 1 |
Ector v. City of Torrancegreen1 sentence1994(Cf. Ector v. City of Torrance (1973) 10 Cal.3d 129, 135 [possible legitimate objectives of a city residency requirement include "enhancement of the quality of employee performance by greater personal knowledge of the city's conditions and by a feeling of greater personal stake in the city's progress; diminution of absenteeism and tardiness among municipal personnel; ready availability of trained manpower in emergency situations"]; Wall v. Municipal Court (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 247, 250 [reasonable to require a traffic referee to reside within the city so that he would be acquainted with the ci | 1 | 1 |
Ketcham v. Modesto Irrigation Districtgreen2 sentences1937Dist., 135 Cal. App. 180, 188 [ 26 Pac. (2d) 876 ].) This reasoning is likewise applicable and constitutes sufficient answer to appellant’s claim that an action based on negligence may not be maintained against it for the reason that it is a public agency created for a public purpose and the doctrine of respondeat superior is therefore not applicable to fasten upon it liability for torts of its officers and agents. 1937Dist., 135 Cal. App. 180, 188 [ 26 Pac. (2d) 876 ].) This reasoning is likewise applicable and constitutes sufficient answer to appellant’s claim that an action based on negligence may not be maintained against it for the reason that it is a public agency created for a public purpose and the doctrine of respondeat superior is therefore not applicable to fasten upon it liability for torts of its officers and agents. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
California Employment Stabilization Commission v. Payne
green
2 sentences1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678 , 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com . v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210 , 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870 , 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276 , 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681 , 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist . v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371 , 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist . (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366 , 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for 1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681, 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist. v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366, 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for less than | 3 | 1958–1997 |
Mannheim v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678 , 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com . v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210 , 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870 , 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276 , 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681 , 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist . v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371 , 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist . (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366 , 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for 1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681, 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist. v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366, 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for less than | 3 | 1982–1997 |
Mitchell v. County Sanitation District Number One
green
2 sentences1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678 , 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com . v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210 , 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870 , 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276 , 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681 , 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist . v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371 , 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist . (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366 , 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for 1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681, 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist. v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366, 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for less than | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Paramount Unified School District v. Teachers Ass'n of Paramount, CTA/NEA
green
2 sentences1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678 , 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com . v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210 , 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870 , 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276 , 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681 , 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist . v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371 , 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist . (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366 , 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for 1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681, 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist. v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366, 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for less than | 2 | 1997–1997 |
County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente
green
2 sentences1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678 , 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com . v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210 , 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870 , 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276 , 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681 , 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist . v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371 , 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist . (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366 , 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for 1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681, 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist. v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366, 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for less than | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Bickerdike v. State
green
2 sentences1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678 , 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com . v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210 , 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870 , 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276 , 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681 , 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist . v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371 , 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist . (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366 , 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for 1997(See, e.g., Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 690-691 ; California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 216-217 ; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-878 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 280-284 ; Bickerdike v. State (1904) 144 Cal. 681, 692 ; Paramount Unified School Dist. v. Teachers Assn. of Paramount (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1388-1389 ); Mitchell v. County Sanitation Dist. (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 366, 372 .) We believe that a district attorney may reasonably conclude that the release of a real property lien for less than | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Preston v. State Board of Equalization
green
1 sentence2025IV, § 31].) “However, ‘expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning . . . of the Constitution if those funds are expended for a public purpose . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization (2001) 25 Cal.4th 197, 225 .) The public purpose doctrine requires that “a direct and substantial public purpose is served and nonstate entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose. [Citations.]” (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 (California Housing Finance Agency).) | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kowis v. Howard
green
1 sentence2025Moreover, the order has no precedential value (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894 ), and his discussion regarding fiscal impact and the ability of public entities to defend against old claims raises largely legislative considerations. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC
red
2 sentences2014(Id. at p. 380.) The Iskanian court held these characteristics make an employee’s waiver of the right to bring a representative PAGA action unenforceable as against public policy because a predispute waiver of that right would allow an employer to exculpate itself for its own wrongdoing in violation of Civil Code section 1668, and also would allow a private agreement to contravene a law established for a public purpose in violation of Civil Code section 3513.5 ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 382-383.) Unlike Gentry’s 4 “Case law has clarified the distinction ‘between a request for statuto 2014An example of the former is [Labor Code] section 203, which obligates an employer that willfully fails to pay wages due an employee who is discharged or quits to pay the employee, in addition to the unpaid wages, a penalty equal to the employee’s daily wages for each day, not exceeding 30 days, that the wages are unpaid. [Citation.] Examples of the latter are [Labor Code] section 225.5, which provides, in addition to any other penalty that may be assessed, an employer that unlawfully withholds wages in violation of certain specified provisions of the Labor Code is subject to a civil penalty in | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Community Television of So. Cal. v. County of LA
green
2 sentences1996Cal. v. County of Los Angeles (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 276 ], the court applied the public purpose exception by emphasizing the legislation was enacted as an “urgency” measure. 1996Cal. v. County of Los Angeles (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 276 ], the court applied the public purpose exception by emphasizing the legislation was enacted as an “urgency” measure. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Ornelas v. Randolph
green
1 sentence1995(See, e.g., California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliot (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 ["Under the public purpose doctrine, public credit may be extended and public funds disbursed if a direct and substantial public purpose is served and nonstate entities are benefited only as an incident to the public purpose"]; Winkelman v. City of Tiburon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 834, 845-846 ; 77 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen 170, 173 (1994).) Here the county's master plan for a recreational trail system serves a public purpose by promoting "the laudable goal of inducing owners to make their properties available for recreation. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Allied Architects' Ass'n of Los Angeles v. Payne
green
2 sentences1958(Allied Architects’ Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [ 221 P. 209 , 30 A.L.R. 1029]; California Employment Stabilization Com. v. Payne, 31 Cal.2d 210 [ 187 P.2d 702 ]; 23 Ops. 1958(Allied Architects’ Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [ 221 P. 209 , 30 A.L.R. 1029]; California Employment Stabilization Com. v. Payne, 31 Cal.2d 210 [ 187 P.2d 702 ]; 23 Ops. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.