references defense in California

2023Our Supreme Court noted that the various references to the standard of proof in the CALJIC version of the instructions “ ‘related to the murder charge itself and directly informed the jury that, to convict [the defendant] of murder, it had to find each and every element of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 360 , quoting with approval People v. Mayo (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535, 547 .) As in Aranda, “[w]e conclude that in light of these other instructions[,] the omission of the standard instruction on the prosecutor’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reaso

2012(See CALJIC Nos. 8.71, 8.72, 8.75; Mayo, supra, at p. 545 .) Distinguishing the predeliberation instructions in that case from the inadequate instructions given in Vann and its progeny, the Mayo court reasoned that the various references to the standard of proof ―related to the murder charge itself and directly informed the jury that, to convict Mayo of murder, it had to find each and every element of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ ( Mayo, supra, at p. 547 .) In this case, like in Mayo, the trial court repeatedly referred to the prosecution‘s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonabl

2021(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667 .)7 The prosecutor’s numerous references to defense counsel’s tactics as efforts to distract, detract (from), and distort the issues also do not improperly disparage defense counsel.

2021(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667 .)7 The prosecutor’s numerous references to defense counsel’s tactics as efforts to distract, detract (from), and distort the issues also do not improperly disparage defense counsel.

2019A trial court must calculate custody credits as part of the court's imposition of sentence and oral pronouncement of judgment (see § 2900.5, *190 subds. (a) & (d); Buckhalter , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 30 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 , 25 P.3d 1103 ; Karaman , supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 344, fn. 9 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 , 842 P.2d 100 ), and defendant's appellate waiver in this case expressly encompasses an appeal from the "judgment" or any collateral attack on the "sentence." Thus, based on defendant's express waiver of "all rights" regarding "writs and appeal," and the specific references in the waiver

2019A trial court must calculate custody credits as part of the court's imposition of sentence and oral pronouncement of judgment (see § 2900.5, *190 subds. (a) & (d); Buckhalter , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 30 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 , 25 P.3d 1103 ; Karaman , supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 344, fn. 9 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 , 842 P.2d 100 ), and defendant's appellate waiver in this case expressly encompasses an appeal from the "judgment" or any collateral attack on the "sentence." Thus, based on defendant's express waiver of "all rights" regarding "writs and appeal," and the specific references in the waiver

2025Second, Colston argues that based on “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” the omission of defense of another language from the first enumerated finding in each challenged instruction would lead the jury to believe it had to find that Colston “acted to save himself alone.” That canon of interpretation provides that “where exceptions to a general rule are specified . . . , other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed.” (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 195 ; see People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1165 [discussing canon in context of jury instructions].) But

2024When the comments are considered in context, there is no [reasonable] likelihood that the jury would have understood the comments as anything beyond criticism of defense counsel’s tactical approach in argument and the defense view of the evidence in the case, as is allowed. [Citations.] The comments did not constitute an improper argument or an attack on counsel’s personal integrity.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1206 ; cf. People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1203 (Cole) [not reasonably likely that the jury understood the prosecutor’s references to defense counsel as “ ‘deceiv[

2023Our Supreme Court noted that the various references to the standard of proof in the CALJIC version of the instructions “ ‘related to the murder charge itself and directly informed the jury that, to convict [the defendant] of murder, it had to find each and every element of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 360 , quoting with approval People v. Mayo (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535, 547 .) As in Aranda, “[w]e conclude that in light of these other instructions[,] the omission of the standard instruction on the prosecutor’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reaso

2023Our Supreme Court noted that the various references to the standard of proof in the CALJIC version of the instructions “ ‘related to the murder charge itself and directly informed the jury that, to convict [the defendant] of murder, it had to find each and every element of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 360 , quoting with approval People v. Mayo (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535, 547 .) As in Aranda, “[w]e conclude that in light of these other instructions[,] the omission of the standard instruction on the prosecutor’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reaso

2022(See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 .) The Default Judgment The register of action included in the appellate record shows that (1) plaintiffs’ complaint was filed on December 10, 2020; (2) proofs of service were filed in February 2021; (3) plaintiffs’ request for default was filed in April 2021; and (4) a request for court’s judgment and a supporting declaration were filed on June 11, 2021.

2022Defendant Goldberg has been proven guilty by the evidence.’” (Id. at p. 189, italics omitted.) The court noted the jury had been properly instructed on the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor merely restated the law that a “‘defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved….’” (Id. at p. 189.) In People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141 , the prosecutor stated, “‘The defendant was presumed innocent until the contrary was shown.

2022Defendant Goldberg has been proven guilty by the evidence.’” (Id. at p. 189, italics omitted.) The court noted the jury had been properly instructed on the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor merely restated the law that a “‘defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved….’” (Id. at p. 189.) In People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141 , the prosecutor stated, “‘The defendant was presumed innocent until the contrary was shown.

2022(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 .) The foregoing references to waiver, abandonment, and forfeiture are simply less direct ways of saying that the appellant’s briefing did not affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error.

2022In People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 463 , the prosecutor argued the “evidence had ‘stripped away’ defendant’s presumption of innocence.” The Supreme Court rejected a claim of prosecutorial misconduct and concluded “the prosecutor’s references to the presumption of innocence were made in connection with his general point that, in his view, the evidence, to which he had just referred at length, proved defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., the evidence overcame the presumption.” (Ibid.) In People v. Goldberg (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 170 , the prosecutor argued that after revie

2022In People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 463 , the prosecutor argued the “evidence had ‘stripped away’ defendant’s presumption of innocence.” The Supreme Court rejected a claim of prosecutorial misconduct and concluded “the prosecutor’s references to the presumption of innocence were made in connection with his general point that, in his view, the evidence, to which he had just referred at length, proved defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., the evidence overcame the presumption.” (Ibid.) In People v. Goldberg (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 170 , the prosecutor argued that after revie

2015(See Jones, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010 ; Hackett v. John Crane, Inc., supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1241-1242.) Finally, Crane argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s ruling because it was “based upon [the court’s] hunches [and] intuition,” as demonstrated by the court’s references at the hearing to “ ‘human nature’ ” and its own instincts.

2004(See, e.g., People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1167 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827 , 34 P.3d 937 ] [referring to defense “tricks” or “moves” did not constitute improper personal attack on defense counsel’s integrity]; People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th *1204 694, 759 [commenting that “any experienced defense attorney can twist a little, poke a little, try to draw some speculation, try to get you to buy something” did not amount to a personal attack on defense counsel’s integrity].) In summary, the prosecutor’s conduct during closing and rebuttal arguments did not infect the trial “with such unfa

2004(See, e.g., People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1167 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827 , 34 P.3d 937 ] [referring to defense “tricks” or “moves” did not constitute improper personal attack on defense counsel’s integrity]; People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th *1204 694, 759 [commenting that “any experienced defense attorney can twist a little, poke a little, try to draw some speculation, try to get you to buy something” did not amount to a personal attack on defense counsel’s integrity].) In summary, the prosecutor’s conduct during closing and rebuttal arguments did not infect the trial “with such unfa

1997The attorneys’ references to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt fell “short of apprising the jurors that defendants were entitled to acquittal unless each element of the crimes charged was proved to the jurors’ satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt buttressed by additional instructions on the meaning of that phrase.” (People v. Vann, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 227 .) Although, both counsel purported to define reasonable doubt during closing argument, their disagreement concerning the definition was more apt to confuse than to enlighten the jurors.