Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
16 California opinions name it 3 courts 1957–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE, Defendant-Appelleegreen2 sentences2011(E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian School, supra, 781 F.2d at pp. 1369-1370.) While the fact that a teacher at a college may not be an intermediary between a church and its congregation because that teacher does not “attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine” (E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College, supra, 626 F.2d at p. 485 ), Henry’s position as a church preschool teacher and consideration of her duties requires a different conclusion. 2004(See E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College (5th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 477, 485 [suit brought against religious university by a psychology professor for sex discrimination did not violate First Amendment because *739 faculty and staff did not “function” as ministers or “attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine”].) This is a summary judgment case. | 1 | 2 |
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeahgreen2 sentences2004The state would also need to show its refusal to countenance a religious exception, in a regulatory arena rife with exceptions, is not "official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment." ( Lukumi, supra, 508 U. S. at pp. 533-534, 113 S.Ct. 2217 .) II. 2004The state would also need to show its refusal to countenance a religious exception, in a regulatory arena rife with exceptions, is not “official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment.” ( Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. at pp. 533-534.) II. | 1 | 1 |
Sherbert v. Vernergreen2 sentences1979(See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 219 [ 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 27 ]: “. . . almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs;” Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 399, fn. 1 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 968 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ]: “Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is 1979(See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 219 [ 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 27 ]: “. . . almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs;” Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 399, fn. 1 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 968 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ]: “Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is | 1 | 1 |
Wisconsin v. Yodergreen2 sentences1979(See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 219 [ 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 27 ]: “. . . almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs;” Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 399, fn. 1 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 968 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ]: “Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is 1979(See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 219 [ 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 27 ]: “. . . almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs;” Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 399, fn. 1 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 968 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ]: “Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is | 1 | 1 |
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquistgreen2 sentences1976First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion [citation]; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ [Citation.]” (Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ]; see also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 770-773 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948, 961-963 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ].) Here the California statutory and regulatory scheme of adoption does not further a secular purpose unless it is c 1976First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion [citation]; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ [Citation.]” (Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ]; see also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 770-773 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948, 961-963 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ].) Here the California statutory and regulatory scheme of adoption does not further a secular purpose unless it is c | 1 | 1 |
Lemon v. Kurtzmanred2 sentences1976First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion [citation]; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ [Citation.]” (Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ]; see also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 770-773 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948, 961-963 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ].) Here the California statutory and regulatory scheme of adoption does not further a secular purpose unless it is c 1976First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion [citation]; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ [Citation.]” (Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ]; see also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 770-773 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948, 961-963 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ].) Here the California statutory and regulatory scheme of adoption does not further a secular purpose unless it is c | 1 | 1 |
Bridges v. Californiagreen2 sentences1957It cannot be denied, for example, that the religious test oath or the restrictions upon assembly then prevalent in England would have been regarded as measures which the Constitution prohibited the American Congress from passing.” (Emphasis supplied.) (Bridges v. California (1941), 314 U.S. 252 at 265 [ 62 S.Ct. 190 , 86 L.Ed. 192 , 159 A.L.R. 1346 ].) It is revealing to note that test oaths and the struggle against them arose at a time when the division between church and state was in its early stages, when the separation was far from complete. 1957It cannot be denied, for example, that the religious test oath or the restrictions upon assembly then prevalent in England would have been regarded as measures which the Constitution prohibited the American Congress from passing.” (Emphasis supplied.) (Bridges v. California (1941), 314 U.S. 252 at 265 [ 62 S.Ct. 190 , 86 L.Ed. 192 , 159 A.L.R. 1346 ].) It is revealing to note that test oaths and the struggle against them arose at a time when the division between church and state was in its early stages, when the separation was far from complete. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dawud Halisi Malik v. Neal Brown
green
2 sentences2018"To merit protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a religious claim must satisfy two criteria. 'First, the claimant's proffered belief must be sincerely held; the First Amendment does not extend to "so-called religions which ... are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity." ' [Citation.] Second, 'the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in "purely secular" philosophical concerns.' [Citations.]" ( Malik v. Brown (9th Cir. 1994) 16 F.3d 330 , 333.) Appellant asserts that his religious beliefs do not pose a ri 2018“To merit protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a religious claim must satisfy two criteria. ‘First, the claimant’s proffered belief must be sincerely held; the First Amendment does not extend to “so-called religions which . . . are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity.”’ [Citation.] Second, ‘the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in “purely secular” philosophical concerns.’ [Citations.]” (Malik v. Brown (9th Cir. 1994) 16 F.3d 330, 333 .) Appellant asserts that his religious beliefs do not pose a ri | 3 | 2018–2018 |
North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2025(North Coast, supra, at pp. 1152–1153.) Benitez moved for summary adjudication of that specific affirmative defense, which the trial court granted, ruling that neither the federal nor the state Constitutions provide a religious defense to a claim of sexual orientation discrimination under the UCRA. 2025(North Coast, supra, at pp. 1152–1153.) Benitez moved for summary adjudication of that specific affirmative defense, which the trial court granted, ruling that neither the federal nor the state Constitutions provide a religious defense to a claim of sexual orientation discrimination under the UCRA. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Felton v. Felton
green
2 sentences1983Thus there is clear error, for lack of foundation in the record, in the judge's findings of a `deleterious effect' on the children and an `undermining' of the custodial relationship by reason of the father's religious instruction or practice." ( 418 N.E.2d at p. 610 .) (1) Here, too, the evidence is manifestly insufficient. 1983Thus there is clear error, for lack of foundation in the record, in the judge’s findings of a ‘deleterious effect’ on the children and an ‘undermining’ of the custodial relationship by reason of the father’s religious instruction or practice.” ( 418 N.E.2d at p. 610 .) Here, too, the evidence is manifestly insufficient. | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fremont Christian School
green
2 sentences2011Lastly, the court found that as the director of the preschool, about “once a week [Henry] would conduct tours for parents of student applicants as part of which she would assure the parents of the school’s Christian atmosphere.” Henry relies on E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian School, supra, 781 F.2d 1362 , to argue she does not qualify under the ministerial exception because teachers do not “ ‘fulfill the function of a minister’ ” and are not “ ‘intermediaries between a church and its congregation’ in that they ‘neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the w 2011Lastly, the court found that as the director of the preschool, about “once a week [Henry] would conduct tours for parents of student applicants as part of which she would assure the parents of the school’s Christian atmosphere.” Henry relies on E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian School, supra, 781 F.2d 1362 , to argue she does not qualify under the ministerial exception because teachers do not “ ‘fulfill the function of a minister’ ” and are not “ ‘intermediaries between a church and its congregation’ in that they ‘neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the w | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Metropolitan Baptist Church of Richmond, Inc. v. Younger
green
2 sentences2007The whole issue was taken care of in two paragraphs with no citation to any authority: "Our first inquiry is *869 whether the superior court's determination, that the Church's purpose was to teach and preach the Scriptures, as a church in Richmond, Contra Costa County, in essential accord with the beliefs of fundamental Baptist churches, was supported by substantial evidence." (Metropolitan Baptist, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 856 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 899 .) That was one paragraph, setting up the issue. 2007The whole issue was taken care of in two paragraphs with no citation to any authority: "Our first inquiry is *869 whether the superior court's determination, that the Church's purpose was to teach and preach the Scriptures, as a church in Richmond, Contra Costa County, in essential accord with the beliefs of fundamental Baptist churches, was supported by substantial evidence." (Metropolitan Baptist, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 856 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 899 .) That was one paragraph, setting up the issue. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
cluster 19566
green
1 sentence2004E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh NC (4th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 795 [director of music ministry and part-time music teacher at cathedral’s elementary school]; Starkman v. Evans (5th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 173 [church choir director]; Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit (1988) 173 Mich.App. 752 [ 434 N.W.2d 233 ] [church organist]; Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church (Minn. Ct.App. 2004) 679 N.W.2d 350 [church music director at church]; Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church (E.D.Wis. 2001) 141 F. Supp.2d 1174 [ministerial exception applied to music and choir director of church].) T | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Guy Demarco v. Holy Cross High School
green
2 sentences2004(E.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, supra, 4 F.3d 166 [math teacher at Catholic school, even though he led students in prayer and took them to mass]; Guinan v. Roman Cath. 2004(E.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, supra, 4 F.3d 166 [math teacher at Catholic school, even though he led students in prayer and took them to mass]; Guinan v. Roman Cath. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Watson v. Jones
green
2 sentences2004The high court resolved the competing religious claims by deferring to the decision of the General Assembly, thus adopting the rule still in effect today: "[W]henever ... questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them." ( Id., at p. 727.) The rule's modern formulation is similar. ( Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 696 2004The high court resolved the competing religious claims by deferring to the decision of the General Assembly, thus adopting the rule still in effect today: "[W]henever ... questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them." ( Id., at p. 727.) The rule's modern formulation is similar. ( Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 696 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church
green
1 sentence2004E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh NC (4th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 795 [director of music ministry and part-time music teacher at cathedral’s elementary school]; Starkman v. Evans (5th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 173 [church choir director]; Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit (1988) 173 Mich.App. 752 [ 434 N.W.2d 233 ] [church organist]; Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church (Minn. Ct.App. 2004) 679 N.W.2d 350 [church music director at church]; Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church (E.D.Wis. 2001) 141 F. Supp.2d 1174 [ministerial exception applied to music and choir director of church].) T | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich
green
2 sentences2004The high court resolved the competing religious claims by deferring to the decision of the General Assembly, thus adopting the rule still in effect today: "[W]henever ... questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them." ( Id., at p. 727.) The rule's modern formulation is similar. ( Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 696 2004The high court resolved the competing religious claims by deferring to the decision of the General Assembly, thus adopting the rule still in effect today: "[W]henever ... questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them." ( Id., at p. 727.) The rule's modern formulation is similar. ( Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 696 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, North Carolina Sacred Heart Cathedral
green
1 sentence2004E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh NC (4th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 795 [director of music ministry and part-time music teacher at cathedral’s elementary school]; Starkman v. Evans (5th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 173 [church choir director]; Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit (1988) 173 Mich.App. 752 [ 434 N.W.2d 233 ] [church organist]; Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church (Minn. Ct.App. 2004) 679 N.W.2d 350 [church music director at church]; Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church (E.D.Wis. 2001) 141 F. Supp.2d 1174 [ministerial exception applied to music and choir director of church].) T | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ferman Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Incorporated
green
1 sentence2004(See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc. (4th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 299 [kosher supervisor at Jewish home for elderly].) Next are individuals whose duties for a church not only involve traditional public relations, but who are also, functionally, paid to actively proselytize on a church’s behalf. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit
green
2 sentences2004E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh NC (4th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 795 [director of music ministry and part-time music teacher at cathedral’s elementary school]; Starkman v. Evans (5th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 173 [church choir director]; Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit (1988) 173 Mich.App. 752 [ 434 N.W.2d 233 ] [church organist]; Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church (Minn. Ct.App. 2004) 679 N.W.2d 350 [church music director at church]; Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church (E.D.Wis. 2001) 141 F. Supp.2d 1174 [ministerial exception applied to music and choir director of church].) T 2004E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh NC (4th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 795 [director of music ministry and part-time music teacher at cathedral’s elementary school]; Starkman v. Evans (5th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 173 [church choir director]; Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit (1988) 173 Mich.App. 752 [ 434 N.W.2d 233 ] [church organist]; Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church (Minn. Ct.App. 2004) 679 N.W.2d 350 [church music director at church]; Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church (E.D.Wis. 2001) 141 F. Supp.2d 1174 [ministerial exception applied to music and choir director of church].) T | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh NC (4th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 795 [director of music ministry and part-time music teacher at cathedral’s elementary school]; Starkman v. Evans (5th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 173 [church choir director]; Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit (1988) 173 Mich.App. 752 [ 434 N.W.2d 233 ] [church organist]; Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church (Minn. Ct.App. 2004) 679 N.W.2d 350 [church music director at church]; Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church (E.D.Wis. 2001) 141 F. Supp.2d 1174 [ministerial exception applied to music and choir director of church].) T | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cantwell v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1979(See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 219 [ 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 27 ]: “. . . almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs;” Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 399, fn. 1 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 968 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ]: “Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is 1979(See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 219 [ 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 27 ]: “. . . almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs;” Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 399, fn. 1 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 968 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ]: “Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Woody
green
2 sentences1979(See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 219 [ 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 27 ]: “. . . almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs;” Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 399, fn. 1 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 968 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ]: “Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is 1979(See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 219 [ 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 27 ]: “. . . almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs;” Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 399, fn. 1 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 968 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 ]: “Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School District
green
2 sentences1977Lebanon Township School District, 342 F.Supp. 1293 , a federal district court found no establishment clause violation in allowing invocational and benedictional prayers to be said in on-campus graduation ceremonies where there was no “semblance of governmental establishment or even condonation.” (Id., at p. 1295.) The fact that the physical place of the religious activity is not the controlling factor was inversely confirmed in Moore v. Board of Education, 4 Ohio Misc. 257 [33 Ohio Ops.2d 406, 212 N.E.2d 833 ], where an Ohio court would not countenance a release-time program off the school cam 1977Lebanon Township School District, 342 F. Supp. 1293 , a federal district court found no establishment clause violation in allowing invocational and benedictional prayers to be said in on-campus graduation ceremonies where there was no "semblance of governmental establishment or even condonation." ( Id., at p. 1295.) The fact that the physical place of the religious activity is not the controlling factor was inversely confirmed in Moore v. Board of Education, 4 Ohio Misc. 257 [33 Ohio Ops.2d 406, 212 N.E.2d 833 ], where an Ohio court would not countenance a release-time program off the school c | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Goldman
green
1 sentence1976(Petitions of Goldman, supra, 121 N.E.2d at p. 846 .) *506 A religious requirement imposed upon adoptive parents by the state is thus unconstitutional unless it is limited to religious matching. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
In Re Jenison Contempt Proceedings
green
2 sentences1964New Mexico in 1959, and Montana in 1957, amended their narcotics laws to provide that the prohibition against narcotics “shall not apply to the possession, sale or gift of peyote for religious sacramental purposes by any bona fide *724 religious organization incorporated under the laws of the state.” 4 Arizona has reached a similar result by judicial decree. 5 That the state’s showing of “compelling interest” cannot lie in untested assertions that recognition of the religious immunity will interfere with the enforcement of the state statute, finds illustrated in the Minnesota litigation culmin 1964New Mexico in 1959, and Montana in 1957, amended their narcotics laws to provide that the prohibition against narcotics “shall not apply to the possession, sale or gift of peyote for religious sacramental purposes by any bona fide *724 religious organization incorporated under the laws of the state.” 4 Arizona has reached a similar result by judicial decree. 5 That the state’s showing of “compelling interest” cannot lie in untested assertions that recognition of the religious immunity will interfere with the enforcement of the state statute, finds illustrated in the Minnesota litigation culmin | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.