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16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2025(Id. at p. 314; see id. at p. 318; Seibert, at pp. 608-609 (plur. opn.) [“giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver”]; see also People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 448 [“Even when a first statement is taken in the absence of proper advisements and is incriminating, so long as the first statement was voluntary a subseq 2019(Id. at pp. 314, 318; see also Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 448 [“Even when a first statement is taken in the absence of proper advisements and is incriminating, so long as the first statement was voluntary a subsequent voluntary confession ordinarily is not tainted simply because it was procured after a Miranda violation”].) Given that we already found the warned confession in this case to be voluntary, we need only examine whether defendant’s unwarned statements were also voluntary. | 2 | 2 |
Oregon v. Elstadgreen2 sentences2025(See Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 ; Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 .) In Elstad, the court held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” (Elstad, at p. 318.) Instead, as long as both the initial unwarned statement and the subsequent warned statement are voluntary, the warned statement may be deemed the product of a defendant’s “rational and intelligent choice” to confess and so is admissible. 2019(See generally, Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 (Elstad); Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 .) In Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at page 318 , the court held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” Instead, as long as both the initial unwarned statement and the subsequent warned statement are voluntary, the warned statement may be deemed the product of a defendant’s “rational and intelligent choice” to confess and so is admissible. | 1 | 9 |
Missouri v. Seibertgreen2 sentences2025(See Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 ; Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 .) In Elstad, the court held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” (Elstad, at p. 318.) Instead, as long as both the initial unwarned statement and the subsequent warned statement are voluntary, the warned statement may be deemed the product of a defendant’s “rational and intelligent choice” to confess and so is admissible. 2025(See Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 ; Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 .) In Elstad, the court held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” (Elstad, at p. 318.) Instead, as long as both the initial unwarned statement and the subsequent warned statement are voluntary, the warned statement may be deemed the product of a defendant’s “rational and intelligent choice” to confess and so is admissible. | 1 | 5 |
People v. FRADIUEgreen1 sentence2022(Miranda, at pp. 467-471 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 719-722.])” (People v. Fradiue (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 15, 19 (Fradiue).) The evidence whether Correctional Deputy Pannell provided defendant with the requisite Miranda warnings or merely asked if he understood those rights is conflicting. | 1 | 1 |
People v. San Nicolasgreen1 sentence2015(Id. at pp. 305–308; see People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [noting a "'subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement'"].) Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude defendant's initial inculpatory statements, including he went over to the victim's apartment, they argued and they went to "blows," was the result of "deliberately coercive or improper tactics" by the officers, as amply demonstrated by the r | 1 | 1 |
People v. Samayoagreen2 sentences2002Elstad merely held that a suspect who has once incriminated himself in response to "unwarned" but uncoercive questioning is not thereby forever disabled from waiving his rights and confessing "after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; see People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 831 , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ["admissions made pursuant to full Miranda waivers may not be suppressed because of prior Miranda violations unless the later admissions were in fact involuntary," citing Elstad].) In other words, in Elstad, the 2002Elstad merely held that a suspect who has once incriminated himself in response to "unwarned" but uncoercive questioning is not thereby forever disabled from waiving his rights and confessing "after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; see People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 831 , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ["admissions made pursuant to full Miranda waivers may not be suppressed because of prior Miranda violations unless the later admissions were in fact involuntary," citing Elstad].) In other words, in Elstad, the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lalibertegreen2 sentences2009(Willis, at p. 449; but see People v. Laliberte (1993) 246 Ill.App.3d 159, 171-172 [ 186 Ill.Dec. 9 , 615 N.E.2d 813 ] [refusing to apply the rescue doctrine when a suspect invokes the right to counsel]; State v. Miller (1985) 300 Ore. 203 [ 709 P.2d 225, 241 ] [same].) After the California courts had adopted the rescue doctrine, the high court in New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 550 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ] (Quarles) carved out a “public safety” exception to the requisite Miranda warnings. 2009(Willis, at p. 449; but see People v. Laliberte (1993) 246 Ill.App.3d 159, 171-172 [ 186 Ill.Dec. 9 , 615 N.E.2d 813 ] [refusing to apply the rescue doctrine when a suspect invokes the right to counsel]; State v. Miller (1985) 300 Ore. 203 [ 709 P.2d 225, 241 ] [same].) After the California courts had adopted the rescue doctrine, the high court in New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 550 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ] (Quarles) carved out a “public safety” exception to the requisite Miranda warnings. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Quarles
green
2 sentences2015After invoking his right to counsel, Officer Barkley questioned him as to the location of the firearm. 7 The high court in Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. 649 , carved out a “public safety exception” to the requisite Miranda warnings. 2015After invoking his right to counsel, Officer Barkley questioned him as to the location of the firearm. 7 The high court in Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. 649 , carved out a “public safety exception” to the requisite Miranda warnings. | 3 | 2009–2023 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2023We need not resolve this issue because, even accepting appellant’s claim that he was subject to a custodial arrest at the time of questioning, his statement to police was admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda.2 A. Public Safety Exception to Miranda Miranda, requires “procedural safeguards . . . to secure the privilege against self-incrimination,” including warning a defendant “that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Miranda 1977Addressing the issue of voluntary waiver, the Miranda , court observed that, “No effective waiver . . . can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given.” (Miranda, supra, at p. 470 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 721 ].) The record before us reflects that the defendant ultimately was given the requisite Miranda warnings, stated that he understood his constitutional rights, waived those rights, and then made his incriminating statement. | 2 | 1977–2023 |
People v. Camino
green
2 sentences2014(Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 .) Seibert is a plurality opinion, with the narrowest opinion being written by Justice Kennedy. “[B]oth the plurality and Justice Kennedy agree that where law enforcement officers deliberately employ a two-step interrogation to obtain a confession and where separations of time and circumstance and additional curative warning are absent or fail to apprise a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes of his rights, the trial court should suppress the confession.” 6 (United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 ; People v. Camino (2010) 188 2013Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298 , “held that a suspect who responds ‘to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning’ may later waive his rights and confess after being ‘given the requisite Miranda warnings.’” (Camino, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368 .) In Elstad, police arrived at the residence of a burglary suspect with an arrest warrant. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
United States v. Tashiri Wayne Williams
green
2 sentences2014(Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 .) Seibert is a plurality opinion, with the narrowest opinion being written by Justice Kennedy. “[B]oth the plurality and Justice Kennedy agree that where law enforcement officers deliberately employ a two-step interrogation to obtain a confession and where separations of time and circumstance and additional curative warning are absent or fail to apprise a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes of his rights, the trial court should suppress the confession.” 6 (United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 ; People v. Camino (2010) 188 2014(Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 .) Seibert is a plurality opinion, with the narrowest opinion being written by Justice Kennedy. “[B]oth the plurality and Justice Kennedy agree that where law enforcement officers deliberately employ a two-step interrogation to obtain a confession and where separations of time and circumstance and additional curative warning are absent or fail to apprise a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes of his rights, the trial court should suppress the confession.” 6 (United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 ; People v. Camino (2010) 188 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Massie
green
1 sentence2014“Under both state and federal law, courts apply a ‘totality of circumstances’ test to determine the voluntariness of a confession. [Citations.] Among the factors to be considered are ‘“the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the 13 interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity” as well as “the defendant’s maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental health.”’ [Citation.] On appeal, the trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2009(Willis, at p. 449; but see People v. Laliberte (1993) 246 Ill.App.3d 159, 171-172 [ 186 Ill.Dec. 9 , 615 N.E.2d 813 ] [refusing to apply the rescue doctrine when a suspect invokes the right to counsel]; State v. Miller (1985) 300 Ore. 203 [ 709 P.2d 225, 241 ] [same].) After the California courts had adopted the rescue doctrine, the high court in New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 550 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ] (Quarles) carved out a “public safety” exception to the requisite Miranda warnings. 2009(Willis, at p. 449; but see People v. Laliberte (1993) 246 Ill.App.3d 159, 171-172 [ 186 Ill.Dec. 9 , 615 N.E.2d 813 ] [refusing to apply the rescue doctrine when a suspect invokes the right to counsel]; State v. Miller (1985) 300 Ore. 203 [ 709 P.2d 225, 241 ] [same].) After the California courts had adopted the rescue doctrine, the high court in New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 550 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ] (Quarles) carved out a “public safety” exception to the requisite Miranda warnings. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Crump
green
1 sentence2002Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , italics added.) Significantly, the majority in Elstad expressly distinguished cases involving continued interrogation after a request for counsel, suggesting the rule would be different in such a case. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U. S. at pp. 312-313, fn. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) As the Elstad majority observed "inapposite are the cases the dis | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Hartley
green
2 sentences2002Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , italics added.) Significantly, the majority in Elstad expressly distinguished cases involving continued interrogation after a request for counsel, suggesting the rule would be different in such a case. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U. S. at pp. 312-313, fn. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) As the Elstad majority observed "inapposite are the cases the dis 2002Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , italics added.) Significantly, the majority in Elstad expressly distinguished cases involving continued interrogation after a request for counsel, suggesting the rule would be different in such a case. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U. S. at pp. 312-313, fn. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) As the Elstad majority observed "inapposite are the cases the dis | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Fuller
green
2 sentences2002Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , italics added.) Significantly, the majority in Elstad expressly distinguished cases involving continued interrogation after a request for counsel, suggesting the rule would be different in such a case. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U. S. at pp. 312-313, fn. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) As the Elstad majority observed "inapposite are the cases the dis 2002Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , italics added.) Significantly, the majority in Elstad expressly distinguished cases involving continued interrogation after a request for counsel, suggesting the rule would be different in such a case. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U. S. at pp. 312-313, fn. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) As the Elstad majority observed "inapposite are the cases the dis | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Bradford
green
2 sentences2002Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , italics added.) Significantly, the majority in Elstad expressly distinguished cases involving continued interrogation after a request for counsel, suggesting the rule would be different in such a case. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U. S. at pp. 312-313, fn. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) As the Elstad majority observed "inapposite are the cases the dis 2002Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." ( Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , italics added.) Significantly, the majority in Elstad expressly distinguished cases involving continued interrogation after a request for counsel, suggesting the rule would be different in such a case. ( Elstad, supra, 470 U. S. at pp. 312-313, fn. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) As the Elstad majority observed "inapposite are the cases the dis | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.