time for filing claim in California

2011However, plaintiff alleged she feared retaliation by LaBeach and we note that “for purposes of applying equitable estoppel, the time for filing a claim against [a school] district [is] tolled during the period that the teacher’s threats prevented plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.” (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 446 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ].)

2011However, plaintiff alleged she feared retaliation by LaBeach and we note that “for purposes of applying equitable estoppel, the time for filing a claim against [a school] district [is] tolled during the period that the teacher’s threats prevented plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.” (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 446 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 766 , 769 P.2d 948 ].)

2020To satisfy timely notice, “filing of the first claim must alert the defendant in the second claim of the need to begin investigating the facts which form the basis for the second claim.” (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 102, fn. 2 ; see also Elkins, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 412, 417-418.) Here, a jury could reasonably conclude that Brome’s workers’ compensation claim put the Patrol on notice of his potential discrimination claims.

2020(Id. at pp. 107-108, citing Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 819 .) Under McDonald, the time for filing a claim pursuant to the Act may be tolled where the plaintiff can establish “three elements: ‘timely notice, and lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 102 , quoting Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 319 .) 6 We turn to whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Brome, sufficed to create a triable issue on each element. 1.

2020To satisfy timely notice, “filing of the first claim must alert the defendant in the second claim of the need to begin investigating the facts which form the basis for the second claim.” (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 102, fn. 2 ; see also Elkins, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 412, 417-418.) Here, a jury could reasonably conclude that Brome’s workers’ compensation claim put the Patrol on notice of his potential discrimination claims.

2009(Shewry v. Begil (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 639, 643-644 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 ].) 12 Wooten also contends that the Department’s “noncompliance with Probate Code [section] 9100 caused a detriment to the estate” because it denied her the opportunity to file for a hardship waiver.

2009(Shewry v. Begil (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 639, 643-644 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 ].) 12 Wooten also contends that the Department’s “noncompliance with Probate Code [section] 9100 caused a detriment to the estate” because it denied her the opportunity to file for a hardship waiver.

2003(Balloon v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121 ; Moyer v. Hook (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 491, 493 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 234 ].) Our decision that plaintiffs had until their 19th birthdays to file claims with the Fund is not based on section 352.

2003(Balloon v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121 ; Moyer v. Hook (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 491, 493 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 234 ].) Our decision that plaintiffs had until their 19th birthdays to file claims with the Fund is not based on section 352.

2003(See International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Los Angeles Export Terminal, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 287, 304, fn. 6 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 ], and cases cited therein.) 7 Because the time for filing a claim with the Fund is “the applicable period of limitations for the appropriate civil action underlying the claim” (Health & Saf.

2003(See International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Los Angeles Export Terminal, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 287, 304, fn. 6 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 ], and cases cited therein.) 7 Because the time for filing a claim with the Fund is “the applicable period of limitations for the appropriate civil action underlying the claim” (Health & Saf.

1997As the John R. court explained, "... the teacher's threats may be taken into account in resolving the procedural status of plaintiffs' claims against the district." ( John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 445 , fn. omitted.) "[I]t would plainly be inequitable to permit the district to escape liability only because the teacher's threats succeeded in preventing his victim from disclosing the molestation until the time for filing a claim against the district had elapsed." ( Id. at p. 446.) "[I]f the employee succeeds by threats or duress in coercing the victim not to fil

1997As the John R. court explained, "... the teacher's threats may be taken into account in resolving the procedural status of plaintiffs' claims against the district." ( John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 445 , fn. omitted.) "[I]t would plainly be inequitable to permit the district to escape liability only because the teacher's threats succeeded in preventing his victim from disclosing the molestation until the time for filing a claim against the district had elapsed." ( Id. at p. 446.) "[I]f the employee succeeds by threats or duress in coercing the victim not to fil

1996The effect of this ruling will be to increase the number of unripe and anticipatory lawsuits in the federal courts—lawsuits that should not be filed until some concrete harm has been suffered, and until the parties, and the forces of time, have had maximum opportunity to resolve the controversy.” (Chardon, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 9 [ 70 L.Ed.2d at p. 9 ] (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).) It is true, as Rockwell argues, that courts of this state have relied upon federal authority interpreting title VII in determining the meaning of analogous provisions of the FEHA.

1996The effect of this ruling will be to increase the number of unripe and anticipatory lawsuits in the federal courts—lawsuits that should not be filed until some concrete harm has been suffered, and until the parties, and the forces of time, have had maximum opportunity to resolve the controversy.” (Chardon, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 9 [ 70 L.Ed.2d at p. 9 ] (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).) It is true, as Rockwell argues, that courts of this state have relied upon federal authority interpreting title VII in determining the meaning of analogous provisions of the FEHA.

1953As pointed out in Farrell v. County of Placer (1944), 23 Cal.2d 624, 627-631 [ 145 P.2d 570 , 153 A.L.R. 323 ], “there are many instances in which an equitable estoppel in fact will run against the government where justice and right require it.” In that case, before the time for filing a claim for personal injuries had expired, agents of defendant county learned from plaintiff her version of the accident and by statements upon which she relied lulled her into a sense of security and persuaded her not to file a claim within the time limited by statute.

1953As pointed out in Farrell v. County of Placer (1944), 23 Cal.2d 624, 627-631 [ 145 P.2d 570 , 153 A.L.R. 323 ], “there are many instances in which an equitable estoppel in fact will run against the government where justice and right require it.” In that case, before the time for filing a claim for personal injuries had expired, agents of defendant county learned from plaintiff her version of the accident and by statements upon which she relied lulled her into a sense of security and persuaded her not to file a claim within the time limited by statute.