time for filing claim (Arkansas) · Go Syfert
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time for filing claim in Arkansas

7 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc.green
ark · 1994 · cited in 1 Arkansas opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015The one-year limitations period begins to run from the last payment of compensation, which this court has held means from the date of the last furnishing of medical services. 319 Ark. at 129 , 890 S.W.2d at 255 (citations omitted).

2015The one-year limitations period begins to run from the last payment of compensation, which this court has held means from the date of the last furnishing of medical services. 319 Ark. at 129 , 890 S.W.2d at 255 (citations omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Sanderson & Porter v. Crow neutral
ark · 1949
2 sentences

1956In Sanderson & Porter v. Crow, 214 Ark. 416 , 216 S. W. 2d 796 , this section, which then appeared as Sec. 18 (a), was held to impose an absolute limitation on the time for filing a claim for additional compensation under the Compensation Act.

1956In Sanderson & Porter v. Crow, 214 Ark. 416 , 216 S. W. 2d 796 , this section, which then appeared as Sec. 18 (a), was held to impose an absolute limitation on the time for filing a claim for additional compensation under the Compensation Act.

31954–1982
Reynolds Metal Company v. Brumley green
ark · 1956
2 sentences

1994There, the supreme court said: The appellant is correct in his statement that we are committed to the rule under Reynolds Metal Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388 , 290 S.W.2d 211 , “that where an employer furnishes an injured employee medical services, this constitutes a payment of compensation or a waiver which suspends the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation.” The keystone to this rule is the two words “employer furnishes.” We have never held that medical services furnished by anyone other than the employer or his compensation insurance carrier, constitute payment of compensat

1994There, the supreme court said: The appellant is correct in his statement that we are committed to the rule under Reynolds Metal Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388 , 290 S.W.2d 211 , “that where an employer furnishes an injured employee medical services, this constitutes a payment of compensation or a waiver which suspends the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation.” The keystone to this rule is the two words “employer furnishes.” We have never held that medical services furnished by anyone other than the employer or his compensation insurance carrier, constitute payment of compensat

21969–1994
Heflin v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. green
ark · 1968
2 sentences

1994Heflin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 244 Ark. 195 , 424 S.W.2d 365 (1968).

1994Heflin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 244 Ark. 195 , 424 S.W.2d 365 (1968).

21994–1994
Ragon v. Great American Indemnity Co. green
ark · 1954
2 sentences

1956In Ragon v. Great American Indemnity Co., 224 Ark. 387 , 272 S. W. 2d 524 , we held that the cost of medicine and medical, surgical or hospital services was a part of “compensation” under Sections 2 (i) 1 and ll 2 .of the Compensation Act.

1956In Ragon v. Great American Indemnity Co., 224 Ark. 387 , 272 S.W2d 524 , we held that the cost of medicine and medical, surgical or hospital services was a part of "compensation" under Sections 2(i) [1] and 11 [2] of the Compensation Act.

11956–1956
Gonzales v. State green
texcrimapp · 1954
2 sentences

1956In Ragon v. Great American Indemnity Co., 224 Ark. 387 , 272 S. W. 2d 524 , we held that the cost of medicine and medical, surgical or hospital services was a part of “compensation” under Sections 2 (i) 1 and ll 2 .of the Compensation Act.

1956In Ragon v. Great American Indemnity Co., 224 Ark. 387 , 272 S.W2d 524 , we held that the cost of medicine and medical, surgical or hospital services was a part of "compensation" under Sections 2(i) [1] and 11 [2] of the Compensation Act.

11956–1956

Where else courts name it

FL 34 (1955–2023) PA 24 (1913–2023) CA 16 (1914–2020) GA 14 (1939–2020) WA 8 (1911–2018) AR 7 (1954–2015) NY 7 (1935–2005) NC 5 (1983–2005) IL 5 (1922–2025) TX 5 (1953–2020) MI 4 (1980–1993) NM 4 (1956–2017) IA 4 (1962–2008) AZ 4 (1966–2015) MA 4 (1926–2021) MO 4 (1958–1980) KS 4 (1934–1992) OR 4 (1976–1986) NJ 4 (1996–2005) MD 3 (1959–1997) NE 3 (1929–2021) OK 3 (1941–2015) OH 3 (1999–2019) MT 3 (1945–1990) AL 3 (1965–2016) MS 2 (1959–2018) CO 2 (1974–1986) RI 2 (1970–1982) UT 2 (1936–2006) WY 2 (1990–2001)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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