defendant bases claim in Connecticut

1962The defendant bases his claim on State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124 , State v. Jacowitz, 128 Conn. 40 , and State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124 .

1962The defendant bases his claim on State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124 ; State v. Jacowitz, 128 Conn. 40 ; and State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124 .

1962The defendant bases his claim on State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124 , State v. Jacowitz, 128 Conn. 40 , and State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124 .

1962The defendant bases his claim on State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124 ; State v. Jacowitz, 128 Conn. 40 ; and State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124 .

1962The defendant bases his claim on State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124 , State v. Jacowitz, 128 Conn. 40 , and State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124 .

1962The defendant bases his claim on State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124 ; State v. Jacowitz, 128 Conn. 40 ; and State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124 .

2015The defendant relies principally upon State v. Hammond, 221 Conn. 264 , 276–78, 604 A.2d 793 (1992), in which the defendant prevailed on his claim of physi- cal impossibility because the DNA and blood type evi- dence conclusively established that the defendant could not have committed the crime.

2015The defendant relies principally upon State v. Hammond, 221 Conn. 264 , 276–78, 604 A.2d 793 (1992), in which the defendant prevailed on his claim of physi- cal impossibility because the DNA and blood type evi- dence conclusively established that the defendant could not have committed the crime.

2013The defendant bases her claim entirely on the rule set forth by our Supreme Court in Rice v. Farrell, 129 Conn. 362 , 28 A.2d 7 (1942).

2013The defendant bases her claim entirely on the rule set forth by our Supreme Court in Rice v. Farrell, 129 Conn. 362 , 28 A.2d 7 (1942).

2009In State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn. 433, 442 , 465 A.2d 323 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brocuglio, 264 Conn. 778, 786 , 826 A.2d 145 (2003), our Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a limited common-law privilege reasonably to resist an unlawful, warrantless entry by the police into one’s home.

2009In State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn. 433, 442 , 465 A.2d 323 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brocuglio, 264 Conn. 778, 786 , 826 A.2d 145 (2003), our Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a limited common-law privilege reasonably to resist an unlawful, warrantless entry by the police into one’s home.

2009In State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn. 433, 442 , 465 A.2d 323 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brocuglio, 264 Conn. 778, 786 , 826 A.2d 145 (2003), our Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a limited common-law privilege reasonably to resist an unlawful, warrantless entry by the police into one’s home.

2009In State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn. 433, 442 , 465 A.2d 323 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brocuglio, 264 Conn. 778, 786 , 826 A.2d 145 (2003), our Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a limited common-law privilege reasonably to resist an unlawful, warrantless entry by the police into one’s home.

2008In State v. McCall, 187 Conn. 73 , 444 A.2d 896 (1982), we concluded that ajuror’s “[m]ere expression of opinion, as opposed to positive expression of facts [to other jurors during deliberations], does not warrant a mistrial” and does not constitute the consideration of extrinsic evidence.

2008In State v. McCall, 187 Conn. 73 , 444 A.2d 896 (1982), we concluded that ajuror’s “[m]ere expression of opinion, as opposed to positive expression of facts [to other jurors during deliberations], does not warrant a mistrial” and does not constitute the consideration of extrinsic evidence.

2006In the first question, the prosecutor asked her: “So, what the [judicial] marshals testified to did not occur?” A short time later, the prosecutor asked her: “So, you are saying [that] you never did what [the police officers] said you did?” Thereafter, the defendant testified that she had not slept in the same bedroom with Taft on the night of the robbery, and the prosecutor then asked her: “You heard that [Taft had testified that] he was with you in bed . . . when he came back from the robbery . . . ?” In the final question on which the defendant bases her claim, the prosecutor asked her: “So

2006In the first question, the prosecutor asked her: “So, what the [judicial] marshals testified to did not occur?” A short time later, the prosecutor asked her: “So, you are saying [that] you never did what [the police officers] said you did?” Thereafter, the defendant testified that she had not slept in the same bedroom with Taft on the night of the robbery, and the prosecutor then asked her: “You heard that [Taft had testified that] he was with you in bed . . . when he came back from the robbery . . . ?” In the final question on which the defendant bases her claim, the prosecutor asked her: “So

2003The defendant bases this claim on General Statutes § 52-266 4 and this court’s decision in Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn. 282 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983). 5 We disagree.

2003The defendant bases this claim on General Statutes § 52-266 4 and this court’s decision in Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn. 282 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983). 5 We disagree.

2003The court, in its memorandum of decision, ordered the defendant to transfer 50 percent of two retirement accounts to the plaintiff by way of a qualified domestic relations order. 6 With regard to each of the ordered transfers, the court stated: “The court shall retain jurisdiction.” In addition, after listing several items of personal property to be retained by the defendant and ordering him to remove those items from the parties’ home, the court stated: “The court shall retain jurisdiction in the event that the parties are in disagreement as to the distribution of the items specified above.”

2003The court, in its memorandum of decision, ordered the defendant to transfer 50 percent of two retirement accounts to the plaintiff by way of a qualified domestic relations order. 6 With regard to each of the ordered transfers, the court stated: “The court shall retain jurisdiction.” In addition, after listing several items of personal property to be retained by the defendant and ordering him to remove those items from the parties’ home, the court stated: “The court shall retain jurisdiction in the event that the parties are in disagreement as to the distribution of the items specified above.”

2003We find more persuasive, this court’s decision in Burns v. Hanson, 249 Conn. 809 , 734 A.2d 964 (1999).

2003We find more persuasive, this court’s decision in Burns v. Hanson, 249 Conn. 809 , 734 A.2d 964 (1999).

1992The defendant bases his claim of the admissibility of the factual basis underlying the convictions on his reading of State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107 , 405 A.2d 622 (1978).

1992The defendant bases his claim of the admissibility of the factual basis underlying the convictions on his reading of State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107 , 405 A.2d 622 (1978).

1992Even if we assume without deciding that State v. Miranda, supra, applies to an assault case as well as a homicide case; State v. Gooch, 186 Conn. 17, 21 , 438 A.2d 867 (1982); the defendant’s reliance on Miranda is misplaced.

1992Even if we assume without deciding that State v. Miranda, supra, applies to an assault case as well as a homicide case; State v. Gooch, 186 Conn. 17, 21 , 438 A.2d 867 (1982); the defendant’s reliance on Miranda is misplaced.

1989The defendant, having failed to raise any objection at trial, concedes that he did not properly preserve this claim for review, but argues, nonetheless, that he is entitled to relief under the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), or the plain error doctrine.

1989The defendant, having failed to raise any objection at trial, concedes that he did not properly preserve this claim for review, but argues, nonetheless, that he is entitled to relief under the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), or the plain error doctrine.

1988Where, as here, a defendant claims that his statement was “obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the [s]tate need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 , 107 S. Ct. 515 , 93 L.

1988Where, as here, a defendant claims that his statement was “obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the [s]tate need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 , 107 S. Ct. 515 , 93 L.

1987If he did not invoke the right to remain silent, we do not reach the issue of whether the defendant’s right to cut off questioning was “scrupulously honored,” as required by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 , 96 S. Ct. 321 , 46 L.

1987If he did not invoke the right to remain silent, we do not reach the issue of whether the defendant’s right to cut off questioning was “scrupulously honored,” as required by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 , 96 S. Ct. 321 , 46 L.

1987The defendant bases his claim on the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 2 This is a case of first impression in Connecticut, but looking to other jurisdictions, we find that in the seminal case of State v. Crooker, 123 Me. 310 , 122 A. 865 (1923), the Maine Supreme Court held that a defendant may cross-examine any witness who offers testimony adverse to him.

1987The defendant bases his claim on the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 2 This is a case of first impression in Connecticut, but looking to other jurisdictions, we find that in the seminal case of State v. Crooker, 123 Me. 310 , 122 A. 865 (1923), the Maine Supreme Court held that a defendant may cross-examine any witness who offers testimony adverse to him.

1984This court, in State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 6 , 411 A.2d 3 (1979), adopted the holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S. Ct. 2319 , 53 L.

1984This court, in State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 6 , 411 A.2d 3 (1979), adopted the holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S. Ct. 2319 , 53 L.

1984The defendant bases this claim on a statement by this court that “[a]lthough extreme emotional disturbance is an affirmative defense, it requires no special plea, notice or other formal assertion by a defendant.” See State v. Marino, 190 Conn. 639 , 651 n.11, 462 A.2d 1021 (1983).

1984The defendant bases this claim on a statement by this court that “[a]lthough extreme emotional disturbance is an affirmative defense, it requires no special plea, notice or other formal assertion by a defendant.” See State v. Marino, 190 Conn. 639 , 651 n.11, 462 A.2d 1021 (1983).

1984This court, in State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 6 , 411 A.2d 3 (1979), adopted the holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S. Ct. 2319 , 53 L.

1984This court, in State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 6 , 411 A.2d 3 (1979), adopted the holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S. Ct. 2319 , 53 L.