DAG plea in Hawaii

2019State v. Kaufman, 92 Hawai i 322, 328, 991 P.2d 832, 838 (2000) (“Upon review of the legislative and judicial history of DAG plea procedures, it is clear that the DAG plea deferral period is closely analogous to a ‘probationary period.’”); HRS § 853-1 (allowing for the deferred acceptance of guilty pleas and no contest pleas without distinguishing between the two).

2008Pursuant to the foregoing, this court has determined that "the granting of a DAG plea is an act of legislative grace, within the discretion of the trial court; it is not a matter of right for the defendant." State v. Kaufman, 92 Hawai`i 322, 329, 991 P.2d 832, 839 . [3] In Kaufman , the defendant pled guilty to twenty-six counts of theft in the first degree and moved for a DAG plea, which the circuit court granted.

2008In Sylva , the defendant pled guilty to the offense of burglary in the second degree, but was denied his request for a DAG plea pursuant to HRS § 853-4(7). [5] 61 Haw. at 386 , 605 P.2d at 497 .

2008In Sylva , the defendant pled guilty to the offense of burglary in the second degree, but was denied his request for a DAG plea pursuant to HRS § 853-4(7). [5] 61 Haw. at 386 , 605 P.2d at 497 .

2022See Buchanan, 59 Haw. at 563 , 584 P.2d at 127 (approving the trial court’s consideration of the offense conduct in denying a 38 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** DAG motion).

2022See Buchanan, 59 Haw. at 563 , 584 P.2d at 127 (approving the trial court’s consideration of the offense conduct in denying a 38 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** DAG motion).

2003"We have previously recognized that `courts have inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.'" State v. Harrison, 95 Hawai'i 28, 32 , 18 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (quoting Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawai'i 214, 242 , 948 P.2d 1055, 1083 (1997) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))). [3] In that regard, in Martin , the first case to consider the power of a court to grant a DAG plea, this court held that "[i]nherent in the court's *64

2003"We have previously recognized that `courts have inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.'" State v. Harrison, 95 Hawai'i 28, 32 , 18 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (quoting Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawai'i 214, 242 , 948 P.2d 1055, 1083 (1997) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))). [3] In that regard, in Martin , the first case to consider the power of a court to grant a DAG plea, this court held that "[i]nherent in the court's *64

2003In light of this history, the legislature's failure to specifically preclude a deferred acceptance plea for instances involving "substantial bodily injury" leaves undisturbed the court's inherent power to grant or deny Defendant's motion for a DANC plea. [6] Cf. State v. Oshiro, 69 Haw. 438, 447 , 746 P.2d 568, 573 (1987) (determining that negligent homicide in the second degree, "HRS 707-704 is not within the group of offenses subject to HRS 853-4(1)[ ]", which "evidences that the legislature did not mean to divest a trial court of the discretion to grant a DAG plea or a DANC plea for violati

2003In light of this history, the legislature's failure to specifically preclude a deferred acceptance plea for instances involving "substantial bodily injury" leaves undisturbed the court's inherent power to grant or deny Defendant's motion for a DANC plea. [6] Cf. State v. Oshiro, 69 Haw. 438, 447 , 746 P.2d 568, 573 (1987) (determining that negligent homicide in the second degree, "HRS 707-704 is not within the group of offenses subject to HRS 853-4(1)[ ]", which "evidences that the legislature did not mean to divest a trial court of the discretion to grant a DAG plea or a DANC plea for violati

2010Because “the State [had] clearly attempted ‘to accomplish indirectly what it had promised not to do directly[,]’ [and] the subject areas covered in the written statement paralleled] several important factors which a court considers in sentencing^]” it was decided that “the circuit court erred in concluding that the State did not breach the plea agreement.” Id. at 413-14 , 879 P.2d at 518-19 ; see also State v. Anderson, 4 Haw.App. 102, 113 , 661 P.2d 716, 723 (1983) (holding that although the State did not directly advise the court to reject the appellant’s DAG motion, the State “breached its

2010Because “the State [had] clearly attempted ‘to accomplish indirectly what it had promised not to do directly[,]’ [and] the subject areas covered in the written statement paralleled] several important factors which a court considers in sentencing^]” it was decided that “the circuit court erred in concluding that the State did not breach the plea agreement.” Id. at 413-14 , 879 P.2d at 518-19 ; see also State v. Anderson, 4 Haw.App. 102, 113 , 661 P.2d 716, 723 (1983) (holding that although the State did not directly advise the court to reject the appellant’s DAG motion, the State “breached its

2008See HRS § 1-15(2) (1993) ("The reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it, may be considered to discover its true meaning."); Kaufman , 92 Hawai`i at 329, 991 P.2d at 839 (holding, based on public policy and the facts and circumstances of that case, that "[w]ithout tolling, a person subject to a deferral period pursuant to a DAG plea would effectively escape the sanction of revocation simply because his untolled deferral period had expired before the trial court ruled on the revocation."); Gray , 84 Hawai`i at 148, 931 P.2d at 590 ("[T]he legislature

2008See HRS § 1-15(2) (1993) ("The reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it, may be considered to discover its true meaning."); Kaufman , 92 Hawai`i at 329, 991 P.2d at 839 (holding, based on public policy and the facts and circumstances of that case, that "[w]ithout tolling, a person subject to a deferral period pursuant to a DAG plea would effectively escape the sanction of revocation simply because his untolled deferral period had expired before the trial court ruled on the revocation."); Gray , 84 Hawai`i at 148, 931 P.2d at 590 ("[T]he legislature

2008See Arbizu, 431 F.3d at 471 .

2008See Arbizu, 431 F.3d at 471 .

2008Rather than strictly construe the plain language of HRS § 706-624(3), the dissent would hold that “a defendant who has actual notice or knowledge of the condition of a DAG plea should not be allowed to avoid punishment for violating those conditions simply because the defendant was not provided with written notice.” State v. Shannon, 116 Hawai'i 38, 41 , 169 P.3d 990, 993 (2007) (Nakamura, J., dissenting).

2008Rather than strictly construe the plain language of HRS § 706-624(3), the dissent would hold that "a defendant who has actual notice or knowledge of the condition of a DAG plea should not be allowed to avoid punishment for violating those conditions simply because the defendant was not provided with written notice." State v. Shannon, 116 Hawai`i 38, 41, 169 P.3d 990, 993 (2007) (Nakamura, J., dissenting).

2008See White, 110 Hawai'i at 83 , 129 P.3d at 1111 .

2008See White , 110 Hawai`i at 83, 129 P.3d at 1111 .

2003"We have previously recognized that `courts have inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.'" State v. Harrison, 95 Hawai'i 28, 32 , 18 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (quoting Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawai'i 214, 242 , 948 P.2d 1055, 1083 (1997) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))). [3] In that regard, in Martin , the first case to consider the power of a court to grant a DAG plea, this court held that "[i]nherent in the court's *64

2003"We have previously recognized that `courts have inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.'" State v. Harrison, 95 Hawai'i 28, 32 , 18 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (quoting Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawai'i 214, 242 , 948 P.2d 1055, 1083 (1997) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))). [3] In that regard, in Martin , the first case to consider the power of a court to grant a DAG plea, this court held that "[i]nherent in the court's *64

2003See State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365 , 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that "the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea"); State v. Buchanan, 59 Haw. 562 , 584 P.2d 126 (1978); State v. Gumienny, 58 Haw. 304 , 568 P.2d 1194 (1977); State v. Martin, 56 Haw. 292, 294 , 535 P.2d 127, 128 (1975); State v. Brown, 1 Haw.App. 602, 603 , 623 P.2d 892, 893 (1981) ("The trial court's power to grant or deny a motion for [DAG] plea is an inherent power.").

2003See State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365 , 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that "the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea"); State v. Buchanan, 59 Haw. 562 , 584 P.2d 126 (1978); State v. Gumienny, 58 Haw. 304 , 568 P.2d 1194 (1977); State v. Martin, 56 Haw. 292, 294 , 535 P.2d 127, 128 (1975); State v. Brown, 1 Haw.App. 602, 603 , 623 P.2d 892, 893 (1981) ("The trial court's power to grant or deny a motion for [DAG] plea is an inherent power.").

2003See State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365 , 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that "the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea"); State v. Buchanan, 59 Haw. 562 , 584 P.2d 126 (1978); State v. Gumienny, 58 Haw. 304 , 568 P.2d 1194 (1977); State v. Martin, 56 Haw. 292, 294 , 535 P.2d 127, 128 (1975); State v. Brown, 1 Haw.App. 602, 603 , 623 P.2d 892, 893 (1981) ("The trial court's power to grant or deny a motion for [DAG] plea is an inherent power.").

2003See State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365 , 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that "the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea"); State v. Buchanan, 59 Haw. 562 , 584 P.2d 126 (1978); State v. Gumienny, 58 Haw. 304 , 568 P.2d 1194 (1977); State v. Martin, 56 Haw. 292, 294 , 535 P.2d 127, 128 (1975); State v. Brown, 1 Haw.App. 602, 603 , 623 P.2d 892, 893 (1981) ("The trial court's power to grant or deny a motion for [DAG] plea is an inherent power.").

2003"We have previously recognized that `courts have inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.'" State v. Harrison, 95 Hawai'i 28, 32 , 18 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (quoting Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawai'i 214, 242 , 948 P.2d 1055, 1083 (1997) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))). [3] In that regard, in Martin , the first case to consider the power of a court to grant a DAG plea, this court held that "[i]nherent in the court's *64

2003"We have previously recognized that `courts have inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.'" State v. Harrison, 95 Hawai'i 28, 32 , 18 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (quoting Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawai'i 214, 242 , 948 P.2d 1055, 1083 (1997) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))). [3] In that regard, in Martin , the first case to consider the power of a court to grant a DAG plea, this court held that "[i]nherent in the court's *64

2003"We have previously recognized that `courts have inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.'" State v. Harrison, 95 Hawai'i 28, 32 , 18 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (quoting Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawai'i 214, 242 , 948 P.2d 1055, 1083 (1997) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))). [3] In that regard, in Martin , the first case to consider the power of a court to grant a DAG plea, this court held that "[i]nherent in the court's *64

2003"We have previously recognized that `courts have inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.'" State v. Harrison, 95 Hawai'i 28, 32 , 18 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (quoting Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawai'i 214, 242 , 948 P.2d 1055, 1083 (1997) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))). [3] In that regard, in Martin , the first case to consider the power of a court to grant a DAG plea, this court held that "[i]nherent in the court's *64

2001See id. at 580, 592 P.2d at 835 . 2 The proposition, then, that a DANC plea, or DAG plea for that matter, is not a conviction or a sentence applies to defense as well as prosecution appeals from deferral plea orders.

2000“Generally, to constitute an abuse, it must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the *327 party litigant.” Id. at 160 , 616 P.2d at 228 ; see also State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 197 , 948 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1997) (citing State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai'i 358, 373 , 917 P.2d 370, 385 (1996)).

2000“Generally, to constitute an abuse, it must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the *327 party litigant.” Id. at 160 , 616 P.2d at 228 ; see also State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 197 , 948 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1997) (citing State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai'i 358, 373 , 917 P.2d 370, 385 (1996)).

2000“Generally, to constitute an abuse, it must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the *327 party litigant.” Id. at 160 , 616 P.2d at 228 ; see also State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 197 , 948 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1997) (citing State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai'i 358, 373 , 917 P.2d 370, 385 (1996)).

2000“Generally, to constitute an abuse, it must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the *327 party litigant.” Id. at 160 , 616 P.2d at 228 ; see also State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 197 , 948 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1997) (citing State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai'i 358, 373 , 917 P.2d 370, 385 (1996)).

2000See, e.g., People v. Peretsky, 44 Colo.App. 270 , 616 P.2d 170, 172 (1980) (recognizing that revocation of probation is closely analogous to revocation of a deferred sentence); see also Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-60 (1997) (using the term “probation” rather than deferral in a statute analogous to the DAG plea statute, which provides that the court may “[d]efer further proceeding and place the defendant on pro bation[,]” prior to adjudication of guilt); Ariz.Rev.Stat.

2000See, e.g., People v. Peretsky, 44 Colo.App. 270 , 616 P.2d 170, 172 (1980) (recognizing that revocation of probation is closely analogous to revocation of a deferred sentence); see also Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-60 (1997) (using the term “probation” rather than deferral in a statute analogous to the DAG plea statute, which provides that the court may “[d]efer further proceeding and place the defendant on pro bation[,]” prior to adjudication of guilt); Ariz.Rev.Stat.

2000State v. Karwacki, 1 Haw.App. 157, 159-60 , 616 P.2d 226, 228 (1980).

2000State v. Karwacki, 1 Haw.App. 157, 159-60 , 616 P.2d 226, 228 (1980).

1980While a prior conviction which is relevant to the witness’s truth and veracity may be used for impeachment purposes, Asato v. Furtado, 52 Haw. 284, 293 , 474 P.2d 288, 295 (1970), a DAG plea is not a conviction and may not be so used.

1980While a prior conviction which is relevant to the witness’s truth and veracity may be used for impeachment purposes, Asato v. Furtado, 52 Haw. 284, 293 , 474 P.2d 288, 295 (1970), a DAG plea is not a conviction and may not be so used.