twelfth instruction in Illinois

1931The tenth instruction, given at the prosecution’s request, related to circumstantial evidence and was the same as the twelfth instruction in People v. Guido, 321 Ill. 397 , and there approved.

1930This instruction is as follows: “The court instructs the jury that before a defendant can avail himself of the defense of an alibi the proof must cover the whole of the time of the commission of the crime so as to render. it impossible or highly improbable that the defendant could have committed the act and unless the proof in a case covers the whole time so as to render the commission of the crime by a defendant impossible or highly improbable, then that defense is not available to such defendant.” This instruction was considered at length in People v. Schladweiler, 315 Ill. 553 , where it wa

1928Von Brethorst.” This instruction is substantially the same as the twelfth instruction approved in Kimber v. Kimber, 317 Ill. 561 .

1927Plaintiff in error argues these instructions clearly called attention to him and assumed his guilt had been established by the evidence, and there was no basis for any instruction with regard to an accessory; that defendants were jointly indicted as principals and that it was error to instruct with regard to an accessory, citing People v. Clark, 301 Ill. 428 , as sustaining this argument.

1926(People v. Robinson, 308 Ill. 398 ; People v. Gormach, 302 Ill. 332 ; People v. Pelinski, 293 Ill. 382 .) We find no reversible error in the record and the judgment of the county court is affirmed.

1926(People v. Robinson, 308 Ill. 398 ; People v. Gormach, 302 Ill. 332 ; People v. Pelinski, 293 Ill. 382 .) We find no reversible error in the record and the judgment of the county court is affirmed.

1926(People v. Robinson, 308 Ill. 398 ; People v. Gormach, 302 Ill. 332 ; People v. Pelinski, 293 Ill. 382 .) We find no reversible error in the record and the judgment of the county court is affirmed.

1919The twelfth instruction reads as follows: “The court instructs the jury that while it is true that under the laws of this State defendants in criminal cases are competent witnesses in their own cases, yet you are instructed that their credibility is left by statute to the consideration of the jury, and in considering the amount of credit or value you will give to the testimony of the defendant in this case you may take into consideration his interest in the result of the case and his desire to avoid punishment for the crime with which he is charged.” The thirteenth instruction contained the fo

1919In our judgment the instructions given in People v. Munday, supra, and People v. Arnold, 248 Ill. 169 , in the principles involved are more nearly like this one than the instructions given in the cases cited by counsel for the State.

1919The twelfth instruction reads as follows: “The court instructs the jury that while it is true that under the laws of this State defendants in criminal cases are competent witnesses in their own cases, yet you are instructed that their credibility is left by statute to the consideration of the jury, and in considering the amount of credit or value you will give to the testimony of the defendant in this case you may take into consideration his interest in the result of the case and his desire to avoid punishment for the crime with which he is charged.” The thirteenth instruction contained the fo

1919In our judgment the instructions given in People v. Munday, supra, and People v. Arnold, 248 Ill. 169 , in the principles involved are more nearly like this one than the instructions given in the cases cited by counsel for the State.

1918A remainder limited to take effect to dubious and uncertain persons or upon a dubious and uncertain event is a contingent remainder. (2 Blackstone’s Com. 168; Thompson v. Adams, 205 Ill. 552 ; Golladay v. Knock, 235 id. 412; Brownback v. Keister, 220 id. 544; Smith v. Chester, supra.) In this instance the reversion in fee did not pass out of the owner and vest in the remainder-man, but remained in him and A^ested in Iris heirs under the twelfth clause of the will, pending the determination of the particular estate.

1918When these heirs, together with their mother, the owner of the particular estate, joined in the conveyances to Annegers, he at once became seized of an estate in fee simple and the estate in remainder was thereby destroyed, (Barr v. Gardner, 259 Ill. 256 ; Bond v. Moore, 236 id. 576; Messer v. Baldwin, 262 id. 48; Blakeley v. Mansfield, 274 id. 133;) and the deed from him to Friedman and Oertley invested them with the grantor’s indefeasible title in fee simple, and they were entitled to have partition made of such estate in accordance with their respective rights and interests therein, free an

1913It has also been approved in Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457 , May v. People, 60 id. 119, Connaghan v. People, 88 id. 460, and later cases decided by this court.

1913An exact copy of this instruction was given as the twelfth instruction for the People in Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1 , and held to be a correct statement of the law.

1911City of Taylorville v. Stafford, 196 Ill. 288 .

1911As said in Wickes v. Walden, 228 Ill. 56 : “We have repeatedly held that if counsel in their brief and argument do not point out wherein an instruction is erroneous or make a statement by which this court can know upon what basis or for what reason the trial court’s action was erroneous, it is no part of our duty to search for these errors or enter upon an independent investigation of the court’s own motion in order to find material on which to base a judgment of reversal.” Objection is made to the giving of the twelfth instruction.

1911In Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516 , certain language was used which was quoted with apparent approval in Mertens v. Southern Coal Co., 235 Ill. 540 , as follows: “If the jury believed from the evidence, that appellee would not have been injured but for the negligence of appellant in failing to make the examination and in failing to indicate danger by a mark then they were justified in finding that appellee’s injuries were occasioned by the wilful negligence of the appellant within the meaning of the statute.” In Peebles v. O’Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370 , it was said: “Manifestly,

1911In Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516 , certain language was used which was quoted with apparent approval in Mertens v. Southern Coal Co., 235 Ill. 540 , as follows: “If the jury believed from the evidence, that appellee would not have been injured but for the negligence of appellant in failing to make the examination and in failing to indicate danger by a mark then they were justified in finding that appellee’s injuries were occasioned by the wilful negligence of the appellant within the meaning of the statute.” In Peebles v. O’Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370 , it was said: “Manifestly,

1911In Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516 , certain language was used which was quoted with apparent approval in Mertens v. Southern Coal Co., 235 Ill. 540 , as follows: “If the jury believed from the evidence, that appellee would not have been injured but for the negligence of appellant in failing to make the examination and in failing to indicate danger by a mark then they were justified in finding that appellee’s injuries were occasioned by the wilful negligence of the appellant within the meaning of the statute.” In Peebles v. O’Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370 , it was said: “Manifestly,

1911In Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516 , certain language was used which was quoted with apparent approval in Mertens v. Southern Coal Co., 235 Ill. 540 , as follows: “If the jury believed from the evidence, that appellee would not have been injured but for the negligence of appellant in failing to make the examination and in failing to indicate danger by a mark then they were justified in finding that appellee’s injuries were occasioned by the wilful negligence of the appellant within the meaning of the statute.” In Peebles v. O’Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370 , it was said: “Manifestly,

1911In Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516 , certain language was used which was quoted with apparent approval in Mertens v. Southern Coal Co., 235 Ill. 540 , as follows: “If the jury believed from the evidence, that appellee would not have been injured but for the negligence of appellant in failing to make the examination and in failing to indicate danger by a mark then they were justified in finding that appellee’s injuries were occasioned by the wilful negligence of the appellant within the meaning of the statute.” In Peebles v. O’Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370 , it was said: “Manifestly,

1909Co. v. Taylor, 56 S. W. 668 , the fourth clause of the policy there involved provided that it should be void “if the insured dies in consequence of his * * * own criminal action.” The twelfth clause of the policy provided: “If the insured shall die three or more years after the date hereof, and after all due premiums shall have been received by the company, this policy shall be incontestable.” One of the defenses to the action was that the insured died in consequence of his own criminal action, and therefore the policy was void.

1906Appellee’s instruction number one was held correct under a like condition of the pleadings in Pearce v. Pearce, supra, and number two was of like tenor.

1906Taylor v. Felsing, 164 Ill. 331 ; Chicago City Ry. v. Bundy, 210 Ill. 39 ; Hanchett v. Haas, 219 Ill. 546 .

1906Taylor v. Felsing, 164 Ill. 331 ; Chicago City Ry. v. Bundy, 210 Ill. 39 ; Hanchett v. Haas, 219 Ill. 546 .

1906Taylor v. Felsing, 164 Ill. 331 ; Chicago City Ry. v. Bundy, 210 Ill. 39 ; Hanchett v. Haas, 219 Ill. 546 .

1904It is .as follows: “The jury.are instructed that if, under the instructions of the court, they find, from the evidence in this case, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, then they will not have occasion to consider at all the character or extent of plaintiff’s injuries, whether serious or slight.” In support of their contention appellants’ counsel cite the case of Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Osborne, 105 Ill.

1896(City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163 ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, 156 id. 9.) It appears, however, that in the twelfth instruction asked by defendant below, and given by the court, the jury were instructed, in substance, the same as by the fifth instruction after its modification by the court.